In the typical Hollywood action film a special operations unit
daringly raids an enemy camp and rescues innocent victims of
kidnapping. Some of the good guys might be killed, some wounded,
but lots of bad guys hit the dust. In the end, the innocents are
all rescued and the entire operation is a great success. That’s
Hollywood. In real life it is much more complicated and often
tragic.
In the daylight hours of March 8, 2012 a sixteen-man team
of British commandos of the Special Boat Service (SBS) augmented by
four regional intelligence special operators attacked a compound in
the Mabera suburb of Sokoto, northwest Nigeria. This was a joint
British/Nigerian operation that had discovered the whereabouts of
two civilian construction engineers who had been taken prisoner
about ten moths earlier by a then unknown criminal gang. Later it
was suspected that the kidnappers were members of the
jihadi group, Boko Haram.
The location of the two prisoners, one British, the other
Italian, was obtained during interrogation of a captured leader of
a supposed Boko Haram splinter group after an earlier gunfight in
Zaria, Kaduna. This SBS team is one of two who in spite of their
name also operate on land. This team immediately coordinated its
planned follow-up rescue operation with its liaison in the Office
of the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street. PM David Cameron gave
his personal approval for the operation to proceed.
So far, so good. Proper procedure had been followed in
swift fashion; the basic outline of the attack on the Sokoto
compound had been approved; optimum security had been maintained.
The commandos quickly moved into place; their Nigerian spec ops
compatriots secured a wide perimeter outside the target compound.
But here is where the script begins to break down.
Supposedly the Italian authorities knew nothing about the
activity in progress. This story was maintained in order to cover
the political positions of the president and prime minister of
Italy. Italian law enforcement and judiciary have taken a public
stance against negotiation for ransom of any hostages, and in these
volatile times all must seem in line with that stated policy. When
the story broke of the raid, however, the Italian leadership gave
the appearance of being completely out of the loop. It said it was
not informed beforehand about the action in Sokoto. Basically Rome
wanted it both ways. It didn’t want to know anything and then was
upset that it didn’t know anything. The Brits insist the action was
taken without time for coordination.
With that matter aside for the moment, the scene turns to
the twenty SBS team members who began an assault on the enemy
compound. Armed relatively lightly, both sides battled on in the
dry, 110 degree heat of this region that borders the Sahara. The
fire-fight lasted nearly an hour as the British unit carefully
infiltrated the compound.
According to a Nigerian woman living in a section of the
target home with her husband, six of the criminal gang burst in
with the prisoners; the two hostages were dragged into the bathroom
and shot multiple times. The woman’s husband was shot and killed by
the attacking force as the captors fled. No other casualties have
been reported, though three prisoners were taken during the raid
and another two arrested later in Zaria.
The British and Nigerian authorities agree that there was
no alternative to attack as soon as they learned where the hostages
were being held and that they were about to be moved. The
expectation was that the two Europeans were slated for immediate
execution, according to the original captured informant.
Nonetheless, the Italian president and prime minister vociferously
condemned the lack of consultation and cooperation by their EU and
NATO partners. The apparent truth is that the British did not trust
the security at the upper levels of Italian leadership.
An additional problem now is that press sources in Africa
report discussions on possible ransom were held with
representatives of the kidnappers by British and Italian officials.
To complicate matters further, a purported spokesman for Boko Haram
has insisted that group had nothing to do with the kidnapping.
Meanwhile other press sources with close contacts with Al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) say that the group in Sokoto was
affiliated with the latter. In fact, AQIM is supposed to have
facilitated a demand for ransom from the family of the British man
who was being held.
Rome continues to be outraged over the entire affair in
public even though Italian ops personnel apparently had been
briefed all along. It was the politicians who were cut out. To add
to the political complexity is the fact that Britain is currently
attempting to mediate a conflict between Italy and India over the
arrest of two Italian marines for allegedly killing two Indian
fishermen who were mistaken for pirates while attempting to board
an Italian ship.
All this is far too complicated for a Hollywood film, but
it reflects the real world circumstances of what was unfortunately
a typical special operation. The U.S. Army expression for such an
activity that long has been adopted by most English-speaking
military is FUBAR. It doesn’t take a cryptologist to figure out
what that means.
There will be no medals for this operation, but it took
the same degree of courage and élan as a more successful
effort would have required. That’s what separates fact from
fiction. The motto of the SBS is “By Strength and Guile.” It does
not ensure every mission will succeed, but it does mean everything
will be done to make success possible. Now comes the unforgiving
after-action report minus the Hollywood post-production editing.
The Italian political elite should be happy it was cut out of the
script.
