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At Large
It’s Not a Movie
A real-life hostage rescue that lacked a Hollywood ending.
In the typical Hollywood action film a special operations unit daringly raids an enemy camp and rescues innocent victims of kidnapping. Some of the good guys might be killed, some wounded, but lots of bad guys hit the dust. In the end, the innocents are all rescued and the entire operation is a great success. That’s Hollywood. In real life it is much more complicated and often tragic.
In the daylight hours of March 8, 2012 a sixteen-man team of British commandos of the Special Boat Service (SBS) augmented by four regional intelligence special operators attacked a compound in the Mabera suburb of Sokoto, northwest Nigeria. This was a joint British/Nigerian operation that had discovered the whereabouts of two civilian construction engineers who had been taken prisoner about ten moths earlier by a then unknown criminal gang. Later it was suspected that the kidnappers were members of the jihadi group, Boko Haram.
The location of the two prisoners, one British, the other Italian, was obtained during interrogation of a captured leader of a supposed Boko Haram splinter group after an earlier gunfight in Zaria, Kaduna. This SBS team is one of two who in spite of their name also operate on land. This team immediately coordinated its planned follow-up rescue operation with its liaison in the Office of the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street. PM David Cameron gave his personal approval for the operation to proceed.
So far, so good. Proper procedure had been followed in swift fashion; the basic outline of the attack on the Sokoto compound had been approved; optimum security had been maintained. The commandos quickly moved into place; their Nigerian spec ops compatriots secured a wide perimeter outside the target compound. But here is where the script begins to break down.
Supposedly the Italian authorities knew nothing about the activity in progress. This story was maintained in order to cover the political positions of the president and prime minister of Italy. Italian law enforcement and judiciary have taken a public stance against negotiation for ransom of any hostages, and in these volatile times all must seem in line with that stated policy. When the story broke of the raid, however, the Italian leadership gave the appearance of being completely out of the loop. It said it was not informed beforehand about the action in Sokoto. Basically Rome wanted it both ways. It didn’t want to know anything and then was upset that it didn’t know anything. The Brits insist the action was taken without time for coordination.
With that matter aside for the moment, the scene turns to the twenty SBS team members who began an assault on the enemy compound. Armed relatively lightly, both sides battled on in the dry, 110 degree heat of this region that borders the Sahara. The fire-fight lasted nearly an hour as the British unit carefully infiltrated the compound.
According to a Nigerian woman living in a section of the target home with her husband, six of the criminal gang burst in with the prisoners; the two hostages were dragged into the bathroom and shot multiple times. The woman’s husband was shot and killed by the attacking force as the captors fled. No other casualties have been reported, though three prisoners were taken during the raid and another two arrested later in Zaria.
The British and Nigerian authorities agree that there was no alternative to attack as soon as they learned where the hostages were being held and that they were about to be moved. The expectation was that the two Europeans were slated for immediate execution, according to the original captured informant. Nonetheless, the Italian president and prime minister vociferously condemned the lack of consultation and cooperation by their EU and NATO partners. The apparent truth is that the British did not trust the security at the upper levels of Italian leadership.
An additional problem now is that press sources in Africa report discussions on possible ransom were held with representatives of the kidnappers by British and Italian officials. To complicate matters further, a purported spokesman for Boko Haram has insisted that group had nothing to do with the kidnapping. Meanwhile other press sources with close contacts with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) say that the group in Sokoto was affiliated with the latter. In fact, AQIM is supposed to have facilitated a demand for ransom from the family of the British man who was being held.
Rome continues to be outraged over the entire affair in public even though Italian ops personnel apparently had been briefed all along. It was the politicians who were cut out. To add to the political complexity is the fact that Britain is currently attempting to mediate a conflict between Italy and India over the arrest of two Italian marines for allegedly killing two Indian fishermen who were mistaken for pirates while attempting to board an Italian ship.
All this is far too complicated for a Hollywood film, but it reflects the real world circumstances of what was unfortunately a typical special operation. The U.S. Army expression for such an activity that long has been adopted by most English-speaking military is FUBAR. It doesn’t take a cryptologist to figure out what that means.
There will be no medals for this operation, but it took the same degree of courage and élan as a more successful effort would have required. That’s what separates fact from fiction. The motto of the SBS is “By Strength and Guile.” It does not ensure every mission will succeed, but it does mean everything will be done to make success possible. Now comes the unforgiving after-action report minus the Hollywood post-production editing. The Italian political elite should be happy it was cut out of the script.
About the Author
George H. Wittman writes a weekly column on international affairs for The American Spectator online. He was the founding chairman of the National Institute for Public Policy.
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Con Chef (NB) | 3.16.12 @ 8:38AM
When the SAS & Paras carried out Operation Barras in Sierra Lione, all of the captured Royal Irish Rangers patrol & their Lionese liason officer were rescued, some Paras were injured by mortar fire & one SAS trooper died. However, the mission was a success. There were plenty of dead bad guys in the village where the raid took place & the leader of the rebel gang was captured & jailed.
This mission just proves the old military axiom that no plan ever survives first contact with the enemy. And this is even MORE true when dealing with hostage takers. Those of you who know about such things will remember the Beslan School massacre. Those people had AKs, suicide vests & the whole place wired with homemade claymores. And when the assualt took place, they blew their IEDs & started one pisser of a firefight. In the end, 380 people died out of 1,100 hostages.
Now, I'm sure that Spetznaz are pretty good at what they do. They kill people. Chechens mostly, these days. Hostage rescue has never been their forte. The Moscow Theater fiasco also comes to mind. The SAS, Delta, SEALs & SBS have ALL been honed on hostage rescue skills almost as much as their war-fighting skills. However, it still proves the "iffy" proposition every time hostage rescue ops take place. ONE minute late getting to a certain room can result in dead hostages. Hell, getting to that room SECONDS late can equal dead hostages.
Harry the Horrible| 3.16.12 @ 9:21AM
Sometimes it works. Sometimes it doesn't. But we have to try. Paying ransoms, or otherwise letting the enemy use hostages against us successfully just encourages them to take more hostages.
But in a saner time, we'd make them pay - the WHOLE CITY should pay in blood.
richard ryan| 3.16.12 @ 9:32AM
Whole city??!!? That's absolutely barbaric. We've never done anything like that have we? 600,000 died in Dresden. Not sure on Tokyo fire bombings but it was a huge number. War is hell, but necessary in preserving human life and human freedom.
Con Chef (NB) | 3.16.12 @ 10:10AM
"You must know the enemy's timing & use a timing which he does not expect."...Miyamoto Musashi
Those firebombings, as horriffic as they were, served to demoralize the populations of Germany, & to a somewhat lesser extent, Japan. Its called "total war." And you do it to break the enemy's will to fight. We don't conduct wars like that anymore.
Wonder why we keep fighting wars to stalemates? That's why.
Bill| 3.16.12 @ 12:22PM
How do you know?
Con Chef (NB) | 3.16.12 @ 1:09PM
Because I've read up on my military history & have been doing so since I was 12. Try reading some Keagan.
Bill| 3.16.12 @ 1:32PM
You probably mean Keegan.
Harry the Horrible| 3.16.12 @ 2:03PM
Its called gunboat diplomacy (though Sokoto is a bit far inland...). Worked for a century and more. Bring it back. It is what they understand.
Occam's Tool| 3.18.12 @ 7:18PM
600,000 did not die in Dresden. Closer to 40,000. The worst firebombing of WWII was Tokyo, with about 100,000 dead. You are essentially claiming that Dresden was equal to 6 Hisroshimas. Please.
And Bill, it was that fight with the excesses that have ensured pacifism in germany and japan since. Con may have misspelled John Keegan's name, but he got Keegan's message, which may be more than can be said for you. (Or Jack, or Clint.)
Occam's Tool| 3.18.12 @ 7:27PM
Sorry, "Hiroshimas." The rerst of the comment stands. The number of approximate dead is from Max Hasting's Armageddon. I just checked it again from my bookshelves. Back to review of substance abuse treatment from Focus, now.
Bill| 3.16.12 @ 9:47AM
If they entered the compound after an hour-long fire fight, I don't it's quite accurate to characterize their conduct as "careful infiltration."
Sorry to be picky.
Con Chef (NB) | 3.16.12 @ 10:14AM
You know as much about operations like this as you do racial tolerence. Operation Barras took about an hour to execute:
"The rescuers, SAS troopers, extracted the remaining six British soldiers and the Sierra Leonean Officer, Lieutenant Musa Bangura, within twenty minutes. They were flown out to the RFA Sir Percivale moored in Freetown harbour at about 7:00 that morning. In Magbeni, the Paratroopers engaged the awakened rebels. A second wave soon brought the Paras to full strength as they continued the assault. This attack diverted attention from the rescue mission on the opposite bank in Geberi Bana. Most of the action was over by 8:00, although the last British troops pulled out at 14:00 in the afternoon, after conducting mopping-up operations that saw the capture of Foday Kallay and the recovery of the Land Rovers. One SAS member, Bombardier Brad Tinnion, was killed in the operation, and eight paratroopers and four SAS were wounded."
From: "PARAS' SHOWDOWN IN THE JUNGLE"
Get a clue, Bill.
Bill| 3.16.12 @ 12:18PM
So where am I incorrect to say that an hour-long firefight seems to fall short of "careful infiltration?"
Yes, I have never been in an elite unit, and I respect their work most highly. I don't think it's dishonoring them to have said what I said.
Bill| 3.16.12 @ 12:31PM
The term "infiltration" is generally defined as entering enemy territory surreptitiously (although in the military sense it can mean passing into enemy territory). I interpreted the term "careful" as underscoring the surreptitious portion of the definition.
Bill| 3.16.12 @ 12:31PM
Just to assist you in arriving at true understanding.
Con Chef (NB) | 3.16.12 @ 1:15PM
"No [plan ever survives first contact with the enemy."
For examples of this, read "Lone Survivor" by Marcus Luttrell & the accounts of the Battle of Takur Gar. All the stealth in the world counts for nothing if you're discovered by someone while getting into position, as happened to Luttrell's 4 man team (they were discovered by goat hearders).
At the very heart of the issue is that axiom. And its as true now as is was since Moses wore short pants.
Bill| 3.16.12 @ 1:34PM
I've read Lone Survivor. Yes, plans change at first contact with the enemy. That doesn't turn a firefight into an infiltration. It turns a plan to infiltrate into a battle.
Con Chef (NB) | 3.16.12 @ 1:39PM
"It turns a plan to infiltrate into a battle."
Given how the SBS train, which is hardly different from the SAS, Delta or Dev Gru, I'm guessing that this SBS unit was compromised in the same way as Luttrell's team. It was in an urban area. All it takes is someone looking out the window...
Bill| 3.16.12 @ 1:46PM
Please, compromise of the mission or not, this did not turn out to be something that Wittberg could properly characterize as a "careful infiltration."
I have no doubt that it could have been carried out as an infiltration; I also have no doubt that every effort was made to make that happen. But it's also true that something happened in which those troops were discovered and fired on. Their experience then became something other than a "careful infiltration."
Actually, it kind of DOES seem that that self-evident point, which is the only one I'm trying to make, is causing me to talk to myself. So I'm done now.
Occam's Tool| 3.18.12 @ 7:18PM
You would be incorrect, Bill.
Bill| 3.16.12 @ 12:20PM
And I don't know where you get your notions of my degree of racial tolerance, but you're wrong about that, too.
Nick| 3.16.12 @ 1:24PM
If you are not the same "Bill" who wrote, ""That nigger lover President Clinton had the pen and vetoed so many good bills passed by the Gingrich-led Congress," then you need to distinguish yourself from Bill the Bigot, who just posts Bill.
Otherwise, people will confuse you with that racist.
Bill| 3.16.12 @ 1:34PM
You are correct. I am not that Bill.
Con Chef (NB) | 3.16.12 @ 1:31PM
I agree with Nick. If you're not THAT Bill, then please distinguish yourself so there's no more "friendly fire."
Bill| 3.16.12 @ 1:36PM
I am not that Bill. There seem to be at least three Bills posting here. I don't know what to do about that. Perhaps I can change my user name, but that would require effort. I'll think about it.
In the meantime, perhaps a writing approach that avoided hostility would be called for.
Con Chef (NB) | 3.16.12 @ 1:41PM
My most sincere apologies, sir. The "other" Bill has the disdain of many regulars here.
Sorry for jumping the gun. That was the reason for my snarky response. Again, my apologies.
Bill| 3.16.12 @ 12:41PM
By the way, the operation you posted about, Operation Barras is not the operation discussed in the article.
It was the article's account of a special operation twelve years later that mentioned "careful infiltration."
I don't know why you have attempted to hijack this discussion into a discussion of Operation Barras, but you've made an error as to my comment on that score, too. I was talking about George Wittman's article, not your post, which has no particular interest for me.
Con Chef (NB) | 3.16.12 @ 1:11PM
I see I need to explain the obvious to the idiots amonst us.
You made the comment to the effect that an hour long firefight was a little too long. I used Operation Barras as an example of how long some hostage rescue operations take. Get it now?
Bill| 3.16.12 @ 1:37PM
I didn't say an hour-long firefight was too long. I said its existence took the moment out of the category of a "careful infiltration."
Bill| 3.16.12 @ 1:39PM
Although, come to think of it, for a special op, it actually DOES seem a bit lengthy for comfort.
I say that as one who has never had anything to do with special ops.
Con Chef (NB) | 3.16.12 @ 1:47PM
In the case of Barras, the Paras HAD to neutralize the village across the river from where the SAS were conducting the exfil. This was because the rebels (the West Side Boys) had mortars in that village that could've rained hate & discontent down on the small SAS team. It was a classic example of what our spec ops guys do in situations like this. The Paras served as a blocking force for the SAS, just as the Rangers & Marines do for Delta, Dev Gru or MARSOC.
I'm guessing that the reason there was no blocking force in this instance is because Nigeria is not in the throes of civil war as bad as Sierra Lione was. That, in addition to the fact that Barras took place in a jungle & this took place in an urban area. I don't think the Brits have the current testicular fortitude in their leadership to have dispatched the Paras to help the SBS.
I'd bet you a buck that Blair would've let them go in.
Tim the Enchanter| 3.16.12 @ 1:14PM
Bill- maybe you should consider getting a sock puppet. Maybe that way you won't appear to be having a conversation all by yourself.
Bill| 3.16.12 @ 1:38PM
Maybe you could fill that bill. Send me an application and we'll talk.
Ron| 3.16.12 @ 12:48PM
I realize it was in Nigeria, but to trust local forces (even their alleged "special operations" units) borders on lunacy...
Counter-terrorist operations are successful in the first 10 minutes...if it takes longer than that, you are quite probably going to end up with dead or wounded hostages.
Fabio P.Barbieri| 3.16.12 @ 2:14PM
If you believe the fables spun by David Cameron after he had an Italian citizen killed in an utterly misconceived operation (assaulting a defended compound by DAYTIME?) in order to look macho, you are too naive to work as a journalist - or to life. Have you forgotten that the only actual work the man ever had before he became a full-time politician was to be a spin doctor? The only thing he knows is how to spin, that is, how to lie. A self-respecting human being would have resigned. Cameron prefers to smear an ally he has already damaged. No wonder Obama seems to like him.
albert constantine jr.| 3.16.12 @ 2:45PM
Success has a thousand fathers; failure is an orphan.
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cicero| 3.16.12 @ 6:41PM
There is no way that these little Quaeda splinter groups can be defeated by random rescue operations. If the civilized world is serious about snuffing them out, it will have to put men and money into the game. When the United States finally got serious about the Apache depredations in the old southwest, they sent in the troopers, and pursued the Apache tribe relentlessly. It ran them into the ground, never giving them a chance to regroup or rest. In the end, it saved a lot of lives (even of the Apache), and was effective. The same must be done now. If Boco Oram is a problem, they must be run to ground, and destroyed. Once that is done, we must go after the next group, and do the same thing. There is no easy way around this. Playing whack a mole just won't do it. We often see the question asked as to who the enemy is. Well, the enemy are radical islamists who insist on spreading their beliefs with fire and sword (bombs and Kalishnikovs). They are united in purpose. If the civilized world is not equally united, civilization, as we know it, will fail.
Martin Owens| 3.16.12 @ 9:18PM
The tactical analysis is flawless. Run 'em into the ground, give them no rest until they give up- oh, and by the way, once they give up, re-educate them , and especially their children, out of the old bloodthirsty ways. If a few dances and ceremonies fall by the wayside, it's an acceptable exchange.
Worked like a charm out West.
But that was back when Western Civilization believed in itself, and was willing to make the effort and pay the price to preserve and expand itself.
Today? Where will you find any of that? We'll be lucky if Boko Haram doesn't head up the UN Human Rights Commission in ten years....
albert constantine jr.| 3.16.12 @ 10:53PM
Boko Haram?
I thought you were referring to Procul Harem, and I was thinking that the meetings would open with "Conquistador' and close with "A Whiter Shade of Pale".
Occam's Tool| 3.18.12 @ 7:21PM
Alobert: you noticed that , too? The name of the music group had to do with a male cat's prowess with the ladies.
College Bowl Champion for TCU.