There is a phenomenon in Russia these days, grown out of the
Putin era, of encouraging and utilizing the nationalistic instincts
of the country’s youth. Unfortunately for Vladimir Putin and his
plans for a “disciplined” future, these radicalized young people
have there own ambitions. And these ambitions do not include
acceptance of what they now consider the “old order” — V.V. Putin,
Dmitry Medvedev, and the siloviki of the past decade.
In an odd association of bedfellows, the liberal partisans
and parties have found themselves demonstrating for the same
anti-Putin causes that have driven the young radical rightists. The
anti-establishment, anti-Kremlin rally the last week of December
2011 had been estimated to be an amazing 100,000 demonstrators.
That number and more marched through downtown Moscow on February 4.
Nothing this size has occurred in the last twenty years. The stage
for this extraordinary political action was set several weeks
before the December affair when several thousand protesters rallied
in Moscow against what they claimed were fraudulent actions by
Putin’s party, United Russia, in its majority victory in the
parliamentary elections.
Neutral observers from the Council of Europe supported
these claims of electoral fraud, which they characterized as
“flagrant procedural violations.” This was a diplomatic way of
referring to obviously stuffed ballot boxes, 99% victories, and the
accumulation of votes in excess of the population living in various
districts. These violations were so egregious that it brings into
question the political competence of the Putin machine — or
perhaps the degree of control Vladimir Putin’s lieutenants have
over his local followers.
Of course, none of this was supposed to happen. The
right-wing youth were considered solidly in the Putin camp. The
middle class urban liberals had never shown any real sense of
organization — and certainly not enough to join in a massive
public demonstration. Given the coolness that Putin has personified
over the years, he certainly was deemed to have his country’s
politics and his own future under control. What
happened?
To begin with, the quiescent Russia that the
Medvedev/Putin tandem has purportedly personified apparently does
not exist. Medvedev’s representation of the economic middle class
and the intellectual liberals was calculated as a balance to
Putin’s supposed attraction to the more conservative nationalistic
“ordinary citizen.” This latter group turns out to have a larger
component that is far more radical than previously
perceived.
Conservative nationalists include a segment of the youth
demographic that reveres the racist beliefs of Nazism and extols
the thuggery of street action. This segment of the population is
dominated by the under-thirties who strongly feel their
estrangement from the establishment. The FSB and local police
thought they had these neo-Nazis and skinheads well penetrated and
under control. They were wrong. The so-called conservative
nationalists may include many “ordinary citizens,” but it also
embodies the violence-prone hooliganism akin to the early days of
Bolshevism and, of course, Nazi street fighters.
The numbers of the politically liberal include many who
originally supported the reforms urged by Putin because the
laissez-faire Yeltsin years dominated by newly minted
multi-millionaire oligarchs had produced so much economic
inequality. The ranks of the people who consider themselves
“liberals” are weakened by an excess of leaders who, in spite of
their considerable number, are unable to energize and effectively
organize their followers. In brief, these anti-Putin elements
suffer from the traditional “too many chiefs — not enough Indians”
syndrome.
Structurally, therefore, the opposition to Putin’s
imperial leadership lacks the cohesiveness and strength to
challenge Putin’s dominant political party, United Russia.
Overturning the government through public demonstrations has no
possibility in a Russia that in general still is accepting of the
authoritarian rule of Vladimir Putin.
There is a tendency in Europe and the United States to
view the leadership style of a former career KGB officer as
inconsistent with the growth of democracy in Russia. This view is
counter-reality, according to Kremlin insiders. The belief of these
Putin loyalists, such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, is that
strong leadership is the sine qua non of today’s democracy
in Russia. In this context holding the nation together with a firm
hand — politically, economically, socially and militarily — is
necessary in order to encourage democracy to thrive in a country
struggling to define itself in global terms. Self-serving, true,
but that’s what they believe.
Putin’s drive to return Russia to the forefront of world
political military powers will brook no interference from internal
divisions. His aim is to bring Russia back to superpower status and
he will do whatever necessary to achieve that objective. According
to Putinistas, if the left and right wing mobs in the streets don’t
understand this, they will have to be “taught.”
