Conventional wisdom in Washington and in European capitals is
that the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad is doomed. The protests
that have spread across the country since March of 2011 and claimed
the lives of more than 6,000 people appear to be progressing by
their own inertia. Secure in the assumption that “it’s only a
matter of time,” Western countries have tagged on sanctions and
other punitive measures that target Syria’s economy but have left
out any discussion over the possibility of military
intervention.
The assumption, however, that the regime’s days are
numbered is seriously flawed. After all, U.S. and EU sanctions may
have driven up food and energy prices, but it has failed to
fundamentally alter the regime’s behavior. The Arab League even
took the unprecedented step of kicking Syria out of the
organization and dispatching a 165-member delegation of observers
to monitor the situation inside the country. It was hoped that
their presence would reduce the level of violence. But that mission
has proven to be a failure, with the average daily death toll
climbing to 50 since the monitors arrived in late
December.
In fact, the case can be made that the international
response to the Syrian uprising has emboldened the regime. On
January 11, President Assad appeared in public for the first time
since the uprisings began where he addressed a rally in Umayyad
Square in Damascus and promised to defeat the “conspiracies”
against his country. A day earlier he delivered a speech at
Damascus University where he vowed to use an “iron fist” to put
down the uprising, labeling the protesters as traitors and
terrorists. Indeed, by continuing to blame the uprising on a
foreign conspiracy and calling thousands of his countrymen
“bandits, Zionists and al Qaeda,” the Syrian leader is
demonstrating that he is as delusional as the late Libyan leader,
Moammar Gaddafi. In past speeches, Assad paid lip service to the
idea of government reform and offered some hollow concessions to
the protesters but none were mentioned this time around. As the
protests have continued, Assad has gauged what the outside world is
willing to do — and more importantly, not do. The result is that
he has become less willing to compromise.
The decision to foreswear military intervention bolsters
the Assad regime at the expense of the opposition and American
interests. Yet without foreign intervention, the unfortunate but
most likely result will be a protracted and bitter, sectarian civil
war. The smart money would be on the Assad regime maintaining power
due to Iranian assistance and the continued delivery of fresh arms
from Russia and Iran.
The greatest argument against military intervention
remains the mantra, “Syria is not Libya.” And that is certainly
true. In Libya’s case, Gaddafi was loathed both at home and abroad
whereas Syria still enjoys the backing of Iran, Hezbollah, Russia,
and to an extent, China. In Libya there were mass defections of
soldiers and officers and an area of territory dominated and
controlled by the opposition that could be used as a base to
project power. In Syria, there are no swaths of territories firmly
held by the forces of those defected, such as the Free Syrian Army.
And there is no indication that Assad is failing to maintain his
grip on the four pillars of Syrian power, namely, the unity of the
Alawites, supremacy of the Ba’ath Party, supremacy of the al-Assad
clan, and Alawite dominance over the military and intelligence
apparatus. While all of this may be true, it is not a case for the
White House to rest on its laurels.
The U.S. must prepare for the militarization of the
conflict. If the Syrian civil war grows, regional actors will
likely become involved, eager to sway the outcome. One need look no
further than Syria’s neighbors in Lebanon and Iraq to gauge the
probability of a regional conflict taking shape. In that scenario
the U.S. will need to have a plan in place to set up “no-go”,
“no-fly” and humanitarian zones. To prepare for this likelihood,
Washington should form a contact group to work with international
partners to share this cost and responsibility, while increasing
the pressure on the Syrian regime.
Washington should also assist the various opposition
groups in developing a strategy for coordinated civil resistance
that includes providing them with intelligence, training, and
advice. While a unified plan among the various opposition factions
within Syria remains elusive, they have nevertheless made some
uniform requests. Providing them with night-vision goggles, better
communications equipment, and RPGs could help them fight beyond the
current standstill and would perhaps be enough to free up towns
that are under siege.
The anti-regime opposition began as a peaceful protest
against a dictatorship. Bashar al-Assad’s brutal response —
including the arrest and torture of regime opponents, the
indiscriminate shelling of cities, and the cutoff of escape routes
for civilian refugees to Turkey and Lebanon — has pushed the
opposition to respond with force. By ignoring Assad’s
escalation of violence against his people, the United States is
helping to pave the way for more and greater depredations. The U.S.
may choose not to intervene militarily, although the case for
humanitarian intervention is manifest. But under no circumstances
should Washington decline to provide the opposition the means to
protect the people and, perhaps, oust a brutal dictator and puppet
of Iran.
