It is clear that some entity is attempting to attack Iran’s
nuclear weapon development program through assassination of members
of its scientific and administrative executive. This is tactical
targeting in the extreme. It’s also the most ancient form of
political military warfare.
Covert activity in modern times against war-making
industrial potential centered about the facilities themselves.
Singling out individual scientists and key administrators indicates
either a weakness in penetrating the internal physical structure of
Iran’s key nuclear operations or, oddly enough, quite the opposite.
In this latter case the covert action against individuals could be
a result of excellent intelligence on exactly those people whose
intellectual input is so important as to act as the controlling
factor in the development process.
From an Iranian counter-intelligence standpoint the
tendency would be to judge that the information that led to the
choice of a given set of human targets must be derived from
assessments that were obtained from deep penetration of the Iranian
nuclear program. The accumulation of such extensive and carefully
guarded intelligence would be daunting and equaled only by the
analysis and assessment of the information gathered.
Obviously, external observers such as the foreign press
cannot make an informed judgment on the scope of validity of the
intelligence product available to the entity directing the covert
operations. Even trained technical experts differ on the relative
importance of the several personalities who already have been
successfully targeted. In the absence of specific information,
however, various elements of the situation can be discerned through
logical analysis.
Individual key-party assassination is a very dangerous
weapon to employ in covert operations because it invites direct
retribution of a similar type. This then establishes the basis for
an escalation; a fact known to all covert action organizations,
though non-state groups usually care little about issues of
escalation. Actions by state-run agencies sometimes are used by
their governments to invite counteraction. Such acts then are
exploited as a justified provocation for an escalated response. If
such is perceived as the case by Iran — and the antagonist is
believed to be Israel aided by the United States — Iran logically
would be constrained in order to avoid a full scale Israeli attack
on Tehran’s nuclear facilities. Such purposeful provocation is a
tactic not unknown in the history of past non-nuclear
conflicts.
The problem that Iranian counter-espionage strategists
have is that the information on who holds important positions in
their nuclear program actually has become well known in the
international nuclear community. To add to this is that the
identity of most of the scientists and high level technicians in
the nuclear field is a matter of general knowledge within the
Iranian academic and industrial community. It is just not that
difficult to figure out who works where if one already is in the
appropriate social/technical orbit. Iran’s scientific and
technological society is a rather tight fraternity — and in some
instances, sorority.
If the removal of one or several key minds from the
Iranian program is the objective of these assassinations, it would
suggest that the objective is, at the very least, to delay the
progress of the nuclear program. But to suspect the so far
relatively small number of killings would have a major impact on
Iran’s nuclear weapon development requires the assessment that
Tehran has access to very few intellects capable of such activity.
With the number of nuclear and akin discipline scientists available
internationally who are willing to work for high pay, the latter
circumstance seems beyond improbable.
One factor that certainly would not have been overlooked
by Iranian security is the existence of a purely politically
motivated internal faction that seeks to embarrass the current
leadership. Hitting the regime through its highest profile secret
program might be considered in anti-government terms to be the most
effective form of public embarrassment that could be created. This
would be so even if the assassinations do not have a serious impact
on the nuclear weapon program as such. Indeed the internal
dissidents might be connected to a foreign service — or
not.
Assassinations, such as those already accomplished in
Iran, introduce an element of fear among scientific peers not only
in the nuclear field but in similar sensitive industries. The
killings, however, do not stop work except where the victim is
technically irreplaceable. The value of assassination is that of a
force multiplier: One can attain a possible result detrimental to
the ultimate target (i.e. nuclear weapon development) at little
cost materially or, in most instances, even politically.
Assassination can be the ultimate sanction weapon short of any
other military action.
While most Iranian public statements regarding the
assassination of key individuals in the nuclear field focus on the
Israelis, Americans, and sometimes the British, Tehran is aware
that most Arab neighbors in the Middle East have considerable
objections to Iran’s nuclear weapon ambition. Wanting to avoid
proliferation of these weapons in their region has been a
well-known goal of the Saudis, the Gulf States, and Turkey. All
these countries have a vested interest in any covert operations
inhibiting Iran’s growth as a military power. They can not be ruled
out as at least collaborating in operations aimed at disrupting
Iranian weapon development.
Iran decided to take on the entire Western world when it
proceeded with its massive secret nuclear program. Why it would be
surprised that every weapon — including assassination — would be
used against it defies logic.
