There is no question that some things will happen in the
forthcoming year that generally will surprise foreign policy and
defense analysts. Of course most of these worthies will never admit
they hadn’t had at least a brief thought about these contingencies.
In reality many nascent situations already show their potential and
should surprise no one.
Perhaps Iran is the most obvious venue for the unexpected
to occur, even though any confirmation it has perfected a nuclear
weapon would be anticlimactic. Ahmadinejad already has proven
himself capable of surprising even his short list of friends. The
real opportunity for the “I wasn’t ready for that one” award must
arise from the ongoing covert operational environment that Iran’s
internal politics presents. The gathering of information as well as
covert action against computer networks that occurred in Iran in
2011 can be expected to continue and grow during 2012. The result
could be Iranian counter-action in the form of a stepped-up cyber
and sabotage campaign of their own against American installations
in the Gulf, while at the same time signing a mutual non-aggression
pact with Iraq. The threats to close the Straits of Hormuz will
continue, but that surprises no one and the U.S. Navy already has
its contingency plans.
North Korea always surprises observers because it
maintains such an effectively closed society. Next year can be
expected to be no different. In fact the biggest surprise would be
to have no surprise at all. Interestingly there has been none of
the usual quick analysis/propaganda coming out of Beijing that one
would have expected in regard to the death of Kim Jong-il and the
impact of the ascendancy of Kim Jong-un. The suspicion is that the
Chinese believe the Obama administration wants a foreign policy
victory so badly for this election year that it will be amenable to
a deal with North Korea on terms it otherwise wouldn’t consider. In
addition it is reasoned that Kim Jong-un and his regents recognize
they need an early victory to solidify the power transition in
Pyongyang. This combination of factors could produce a diplomatic
breakthrough even though it would be at the expense of North Korean
military cohesiveness on the General Staff level.
Pakistan provides a good chance for a surprise next year –
though it seemingly does that every year. This South Asian nation
has been in the midst of political turmoil ever since General
Musharraf was booted out and Benazir Bhutto assassinated. Once
again no strong civilian leader has emerged, so it would seem to be
time for another coup. This time the army has a very good reason to
take over once again. Pakistan’s economy cannot make ends meet
without external aid. At the same time Pakistan’s internal civilian
politics does not allow for the continued close relationship with
the Americans that brings in the extra money. It’s a perfect
setting for another military coup surprise. And who knows, it might
just spur Washington to an even earlier departure from Afghanistan.
At least that’s what some Pakistani generals might
argue.
In the field of military coups, Egypt would have to be
high on the list of possibilities. This would be one of those
surprises that was definitely in the “I told you so” category. The
unexpected aspect would be the strong Islamic alignment of the
coup. Ever since the coup against the monarchy in 1952 the military
has been the éminence grise of any secular government. The
military was the instrument of the original revolution and the
ultimate defender of Arab socialism under Gamal Abdel Nasser from
1956. The opening now exists for the army to split apart with
allegiance to their faith overriding allegiance to non-religiously
aligned military tradition. The creation of an “Islamic Army of the
Republic of Egypt” partnered with a Moslem Brotherhood and
Salafist-dominated parliament would create a new dynamic, not only
in Egypt, but the Sunni Arab world in general.
If these “surprises” are not destabilizing enough for one
to contemplate, it might be well to consider exactly how far the
street reaction will go in Russia against Putin’s reelection as
president. The nearly twenty percent (19.2%) of votes obtained by
the Communist Party in the parliamentary election was the second
largest single block after Putin’s own party, United Russia. The
Communists may not be a major political factor at this time, but it
is not something to disregard. Certainly Putin has to take the
numbers into consideration in close votes in the Duma, but, more
importantly, a rejuvenation of the Communist Party has the
potential of stirring popular reaction. A repeat of Moscow’s police
forces’ instinctive reaction to violently put down demonstrations
could spread dangerously next year throughout Russia’s urban
centers. That would be destabilizing within Russia and
internationally.
There certainly are other areas of potential problems, but
at least these few show what national security analysts have to
consider. In a presidential election year, however, how much
attention will the upper levels of the current administration in
Washington pay to these potentials?
