It is always difficult to be an Iranian politician. One has to
work so hard to make sure you are recognized as being against the
right thing. Being properly negative — and that also means being
against the correct issue at the correct time — requires
considerable attention to the signs coming from the office of the
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This is not always easy.
The leader’s office is a form of combined national and
international security staff. From this office reflects the
consideration and movement of all key domestic and foreign
policies. If you do not have access to this center, you are not “in
the loop.”
The sacking of the British embassy is one of the more
recent examples of touchy issues. Several hundred extremely mature
“students” attacked the embassy and its guards. Reportedly the mob
was organized by various hard-line politicians. It was a full day
before it was clear in Tehran that this was an approved raid as far
as the supreme leader was concerned.
In a surprising reversal of his previously moderate
stance, Tehran’s mayor, Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, rushed to condemn
Britain and extol the “revolutionary” strength of the “students.”
Joining him shortly afterward was the always politically alert
speaker of the parliament, Ali Larijani, who made a point of
explaining the action of Iranian “youth” as reflecting the view of
all Iranians. This line had to have been transmitted through the
supreme leader’s office that already supported the embassy attack
as “the people’s reaction” to Britain’s hostile economic action
(sanctions).
President Ahmadinejad used a reverse twist on the issue by
attempting to cut the ground from under Larijani, a political
competitor and possible presidential candidate in the 2013
elections. Having already knocked heads with the supreme leader
over the issue of firing the intelligence minister, Ahmadinejad
took a chance and went against the already established line by
opposing the diplomatic sanctions already called for against Great
Britain.
A more cynical interpretation of the Iranian president’s
tactic would suggest he recognizes that Ayatollah Khamenei does not
support him or his political future and in consequence Ahmadinejad
decided to seek political support from the more moderate elements
in Iranian politics. This tack is not as radical as it appears.
Ahmdinejad always has sought the support of major political power
centers before acting. His turning to those who represent a less
pugnacious wing of Iran’s political life may be his only hope of
continuing to remain a major figure. No matter the reasoning,
Ahmadinejad’s actions point to divisions within the power players
in Iran. For the moment, however, the supreme leader and the
operative elements surrounding him have ultimate control of the key
aspects of Iranian life.
From a practical point of view the internal security
service of VEVAK, the al Quds force within the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Council of Guardians are the
operative instruments of Ayatollah Khamenei that hold the physical
and ideological reins of power. They will remain the definitive
factor for the near future, and it is the office of the supreme
leader that maintains the coordination and balance among
them.
If an individual or group seeks to wrest power from the
existing structure militarily, judicially, or politically, they
seemingly have an insurmountable obstacle to overcome. Even the
appearance of defiance is quickly put down, although at the same
time disagreement on the paths toward a policy is allowed. This
provides the illusion of a form of democratic process. If a
politician — as in this case Ahmadinejad — takes a line contrary
to that which is generally approved but beforehand can point to a
form of consent from one of the power centers, this politician has
covered himself. It’s all quite logical and very Persian, but
Ahmadinejad still has support from someone on the Council of
Guardians.
The signs are clear that the office of the supreme leader
— as well as Ayatollah Khamenei, himself — at this time does not
support Ahmadinejad for a further major political role. Larijani
will take maximum advantage of the current president’s period in
the dog house to enhance his own chances for 2013. Further conflict
with the United States and the European Union doesn’t seem to
benefit or disadvantage either figure. The real question is whether
Ayatollah Khamenei can remain as the supreme leader. That question
remains in the hands of the religious hierarchy — not the
electoral process.
At this time no Iranian politician speculates on the
country’s future nuclear weapon. That major issue is considered the
purview of only the top of the chain of command within the supreme
leader’s office. Ahmadinejad has done his job of holding fast to
the myth that Iranian nuclear development is solely for civilian
power use. The truth is that no matter the eventual outcome of the
current internal political maneuvering, the creation of an Iranian
nuclear weapon is just a matter of time. This was a decision made
decades ago.
