Soon after the death of Kim Jong-il was announced, U.S.
television audiences were treated to many clips of North Koreans
keening and wailing over the passing of The Dear Leader. Since he
had died (on a train) two days before the announcement, there was
plenty of time to stage-manage the grief.
Kim was a master of keeping leaks about the poverty and
repression of his people to a minimum. Ever since his
father, Kim Il-sung, founder of the Kim dynasty, had turned the
country into the Hermit Kingdom, news for the outside world was
carefully rationed. He was concentrating power in the military and
security forces and keeping most of the population under very tight
control, while bestowing privileges on an elite few who danced and
sang in praise of him.
Beginning in summer 2010, Kim Jong-il, then still
recovering from what is believed to have been a 2008 stroke,
anointed his third son Kim Jong-un as potential successor. This
young man, now 28, supplanted his eldest brother, Kim Jong-nam, who
had fallen from favor and decamped to Macau to lead the good life.
The second son, Kim Jong-chol, apparently has a position in the
Workers’ Party of Korea’s Organization and Guidance
Departments.
Despite no military schooling or background, Kim Jong-un
in August last year was made a four-star general by his father and
promptly dubbed, “The Dear General.” Some of his schooling was in
Switzerland, prompting some observers to guess that his exposure to
Western standards might lead him to lean toward reform. This is
wishful thinking, for the country is tightly managed by the army
and state security apparatus and The Dear General can be expected
to closely follow its wishes.
He will have as his mentor and guide his uncle by
marriage, Chong Song-taek who is married to Kim Jong-il’s only
sister. In 2009, Chong was elected to the powerful National Defense
Commission. On that commission, he is the director of the
bland-sounding Administration Department. His duties are anything
but bland. In fact, the job title means he oversees the Ministry of
Public Security and the State Security Department, both pivotal
power levers.
Just prior to Kim Jong-il’s death, at age 69, is was
expected that the frequently fruitless Six Party Talks would soon
be resumed, aimed at reducing a North Korean nuclear threat. This
is not likely to happen any time soon. Nor is it likely, as some
observers speculate, that young Kim Jong-un will carry out some
daring and aggressive move against South Korea or Japan as a means
of proving his mettle to his military regents. He has
had nearly 17 months to build relationships with them and, with the
guidance — and protection — of Mr. Chong, he is likely to spend
his early months in office working behind the scenes to further
consolidate support.
More than anything else, the military elite members want
to protect the status quo. They may set diplomats to talking with
representatives of the other five members of the Six Party group,
but this is all it will be, talk. As for military action, it can
come later, once the elite is comfortably settled in with The Dear
General. Provocative action is a staple of North Korea’s strategy,
for it has almost always brought concessions from the other
parties, either in the form of food for starving peasants or
commodities to run the economy. It will come in due
course.
