Contrary to the expectations of many analysts, both the Muslim
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and the Salafist
al-Nour coalition trounced the secular Egyptian Bloc and the Wafd
Party in the
first stage of voting for the parliamentary elections. Indeed,
whereas Wafd received 7.1% of the vote and the Egyptian Bloc 13.4%,
al-Nour alone took 24.4% of votes and the Brotherhood’s party
36.6%.
Even more discouraging, this round of voting took place in
areas where Egyptian liberals and secularists can most count on
support. One can only wonder how much wider the margin will be as
the second round of voting
commenced on Wednesday.
That said, it should not necessarily be thought that the
Brotherhood will form some sort of an alliance with Salafist
parties.
Deep tensions between the two Islamist factions have already
become apparent with reports of attacks by members of Gamaa
Islamiyya on Brotherhood campaign workers in the southern province
of Assiut, where there was a local run-off election as part of the
first round of voting.
The animosity exists not because the Brotherhood is
somehow actually more moderate, but rather because the Salafists
are against the idea of forming coalitions and being pragmatic in
trying to implement Sharia. For the Brotherhood, unlike the al-Nour
coalition, believes that it is better to apply Islamic law in
gradual stages. The rivalry will almost certainly become more
evident in the next stages of voting that will take place in the
more rural areas of Upper Egypt, where the popularity of Salafists
could well outstrip support for the Brotherhood.
Yet the more urgent question arises of why the secularists
and liberals have fared so poorly in these elections. After all,
were they not dominant in the mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square
back in January and February that culminated in the resignation of
Hosni Mubarak? Did not numerous pundits speak of the “Twitter and
Facebook” generation of secularists and liberals — primarily youth
activists — that would supposedly prevent the Islamists from
gaining ascendancy in the post-Mubarak political scene?
Before turning to recent developments for explanation, it
is worth pointing out that the military regime that overthrew the
constitutional monarchy in 1952 and has been ruling Egypt since has
always had a love-hate relationship with the Islamists.
While Islamists were formally snubbed in the upper ranks
of government and those who openly came out in opposition to the
regime were subject to brutal crackdowns (particularly during Gamal
Abdel Nasser’s rule), they were granted numerous concessions at the
ground level and tolerated in the promotion of Islamist ideals.
This de facto arrangement included, for example, the teaching and
glorification of jihad in school textbooks, and the promotion of
Islamist discourse on Egyptian TV channels. That Islamism
consequently has a significant degree of appeal should not come as
a surprise.
Coming back to the present day, it is of course true that
the Islamists were in general conspicuously absent from the initial
protests against Mubarak’s regime, but many pundits made the
mistake of assuming that mass demonstrations expressing a
particular opinion or ideology are representative of the population
at large. Indeed, as the intelligence group STRATFOR estimated, the
protests in Tahrir Square probably
never exceeded 300,000 people. Given that Egypt has a
population of over 80 million, it would be absurd to extrapolate
the liberal and secular sentiments of the protesters in those
anti-Mubarak demonstrations to the people at large.
In the protests last month where the military attacked and
killed numerous demonstrators, the Islamists’ absence was again
notable. Yet this observation easily links to an inherent problem
with the performance of liberals and secularists in Egypt. The
Islamists’ decision not to attend the more recent demonstrations
was a very clever move on their part.
The Islamists and the military realize that the continuing
anarchy produced by these protests and clashes is only aggravating
the disastrous situation for Egypt’s economy, which was improving
significantly under Mubarak’s reforms in the ex-president’s last
few years in power.
As the Wall Street Journal notes, foreign exchange
reserves at Egypt’s central bank have halved to around $22 billion,
while the projected deficit for the current fiscal year is thought
to be around 9% of GDP, which “would not be sustainable even if
Egypt’s economy were growing at robust rates.” The Brotherhood has
some idea that a key problem here is the subsidy system, even as
the group does not offer specific policy initiatives on the issue,
but the liberals and secularists seem to be completely oblivious to
the economic problems at hand.
Meanwhile, tourism revenues have decreased
by a third this year, and it is likely that many tourists will
be deterred from traveling to Egypt over the coming years in light
of prominent calls from Islamists for a ban on alcohol and
segregation on beaches. Given that sexual harassment is already a
problem widely noted by tourists, the feeling of intimidation is
only likely to increase.
Perhaps most importantly, instead of trying to offer
comprehensive alternative policy programs to voters, prominent,
Western-educated Egyptians like Mona Eltahawy have become
enthralled with spectacles like that of an Egyptian female
blogger’s stripping completely naked (this was a problem first
drawn to my attention by the owner of the “Happy Arab News Service”
blog).
Writing in the Guardian’s “Comment
is Free” site, Eltahawy hailed Aliaa Mahdy for posing nude on
her blog site, claiming that she is “the Molotov cocktail thrown at
the Mubaraks in our heads — the dictators of our mind.”
The idea that baring one’s breasts and genitalia will
somehow reduce support for the Brotherhood, Salafists, and other
Egyptian misogynists is misguided, to put it mildly. In fact, given
the high prevalence of female genital mutilation in Egypt (because
the prominent Shafi’i school of Islamic jurisprudence in Egypt
affirms that the practice is mandatory in accordance with Muslim
tradition), it is hardly as though the Islamists in particular are
going to be scared away by a blogger’s posing nude. No, they have
probably seen much worse than that.
Far from aiding the cause of secular liberalism in Egypt,
Eltahawy and her ilk have done it more harm than any Salafist could
have hoped to achieve. If, in the midst of an Islamist upsurge in
Egypt, they can find nothing better to do than to express delight
over someone exposing her entire body on a public forum, then sadly
one can only recognize their disconnect from Egyptian
society.
If the secularists and liberals do not wish to become a
completely marginalized force, they must overcome the problem of
disorganization, abandon incoherent leftist populism, and wake up
to the dire reality of the economic situation.
The army probably desires to continue managing
things behind the scenes and is certainly aiming to remain
independent. However, the army may come to feel that it has no
other option but to rely on the Muslim Brotherhood, or perhaps even
the Salafists. Ironically, the liberals and secularists may soon
discover — if they are able to get their act together —
that the military they have so vigorously opposed could also
be the last institution that can prevent an Islamist
takeover.
