The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (ATF)
program involving the sale of guns to intermediaries who would
smuggle the weapons into Mexico has been “blown” (using the
intelligence parlance for compromised). The congressional
investigation of the project “Fast and Furious” produced
considerable contradiction along with little hard information,
while the White House aided the probe not at all.
When the story first broke, it was the size of the operation
that attracted the most attention: 2,500 weapons — semi and fully
automatic, as well as 34 powerful .50 caliber sniper rifles. The
ATF spokesman said the movement of this vast armory through “straw”
buyers was intended to identify Mexican drug cartel leaders and gun
smuggling routes across the border into the United States. If this
project actually expected to be successful, it would have had to
have a very sophisticated method of tracking the weapons. It
appears that the congressional committee did not inquire regarding
that point and the ATF witnesses were not about to volunteer this
highly classified information.
In reality, the entire activity was clearly implied as early as
April 2009 during the meeting in Mexico City between both American
and Mexican presidents. That much heralded session specifically
noted American willingness to contain the north-south flow of guns
through what was quoted as “gun tracing.” To underline this
commitment, President Obama pointed out that he had marked $10
million for “gun control” in the February ‘09 stimulus package.
Whatever was to be the tracing method obviously had no control
mechanisms. Weapons from the F&F project were found to be
involved in crimes in four cities in Arizona and one in Texas,
eventually totaling eleven crime scenes in the U.S. And these were
in addition to the two weapons recovered after the killing of
Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry. While such events may be
considered “acceptable casualties” or “collateral damage” by ATF
and Justice Department operational planners, field agents don’t
enjoy such cavalier justifications.
Aside from the inconsistency of attempting to run a covert “gun
walking” project where military-type gun sales are carefully
monitored by local, state, and several federal agencies, the
availability and distribution of 2,500 weapons clearly would draw
attention. The question also arises as to why ATF needed a special
project to track arms sales to cartels in the first place. Cartels
have had numerous sources of weapons for years — including the
Mexican army and police. U.S. programs to assist in arming the
Mexican anti-drug forces have already inadvertently provided the
drug cartels with considerable armament and equipment through
illicit Mexican military resale.
Nobody wants to discuss it, but it appears there may have been
other reasons to mount “Fast and Furious.” The ATF project may have
been purposely aimed at arming certain Mexican drug elements in
order to enable one chosen cartel operation to gain superiority
over another. Why would the ATF have wanted to do that? There could
be several explanations, but the one given to the congressional
committee — to track arms sales — just does not pass the smell
test.
According to the report by the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, Carlos Canino, Acting ATF Attache in the U.S.
Embassy in Mexico, referred to the F&F black gun running
operation as “the perfect storm of idiocy.” Canino went on to say,
“We armed the cartel.” Apparently he meant the several cartels that
have been mentioned as sites where F&F weapons have been
recovered (Sinaloa, La Familia, and the El Teo branch of the
old Tijuana organization).
As illogical as intentional arming of Mexican drug cartels may
appear, the possibility exists that some ranking officers in
Justice and ATF perceived that those delivering such arms would
become valued assets for the cartel leaders. This would have the
potential of placing ATF agents in a trusted relationship with
command personalities in drug trafficking. The cartels certainly
had alternate sources for weapon acquisition, though with more
difficulty and at a higher price. It would have been argued within
the ATF — and even on the National Security Council Staff level —
that the weapons they provided would not in themselves be something
to which the chosen cartels did not already have access.
Such thinking is not far separated from the idea that certain
cartels are preferable to others, e.g. because of an apparent
willingness to avoid civilian deaths. It is important to remember
that the Calderon administration has as its top priority the
reduction in civilian deaths. Public safety has a political impact
in Mexico. Shipping vast amounts of drugs north to the U.S. does
not. Well-contained battling between cartels that results in the
domination of key Mexican states by one cartel theoretically could
provide a unified vehicle with which Mexico City could negotiate.
This has occurred before. Was this also in the minds of the ATF
planners?
Scott Stewart has made clear in his recent authoritative
analysis for Stratfor that the cartels fear
the potential of American intervention capability along the
U.S.-Mexico border. Poorly thought-out efforts such as project
“Fast & Furious” do nothing to maintain the cartels’ fears of
American counteractions.
