The U.S. and China recently held their third annual Strategic
Dialogue. Limited economic and security agreements were
reached. Perhaps more important, Chinese military officers
joined the discussions and toured American military facilities
afterwards. Relations between the two nations
appear to be thawing.
However, bilateral controversies remain. Washington and
Beijing disagree on much, including trade, North Korea, and
maritime rights in China’s “Near Seas.” But nothing causes greater
discord than the status of Taiwan, which is pressing the U.S. to
sell submarines and advanced fighters.
After being detached from the mainland by Japan more than
a century ago, the island of Formosa was under effective Chinese
authority only during the short interregnum between the end of
World War II and the Chinese Revolution. In 1949 the defeated
Kuomintang Party moved the Republic of China government to
Taiwan.
During the Cold War the two Chinas were bitterly at odds.
As the People’s Republic of China has grown economically and
moderated politically, Beijing surged past Taipei on the
international stage. Even the U.S. recognizes only the PRC and
formally acknowledges but one China.
However, Washington retains a quasi-embassy in Taipei,
enjoys a profitable trading relationship with Taiwan, and has
promised to sell the latter weapons for its defense. China’s
patience with both the ROC’s separate existence and America’s arms
sales has been declining. Last year Beijing ended military contacts
with the U.S. in retaliation for the latter’s announcement of a
$6.4 billion arms package for Taiwan.
Despite the recent uptick in U.S.-China relations,
acceding to Taipei’s latest weapons request could spark Chinese
retaliation. Nevertheless, Washington should help its democratic
friend defend itself.
The U.S.-China relationship likely will be the world’s
most important bilateral connection this century. The two nations
are tightly linked economically. They share many other interests:
stability in East Asia, freedom of the seas, open global economy,
cooperative international institutions.
Perhaps the most important objective between the existing
superpower and the potential superpower is to avoid war. When faced
with two rising powers in the late 19th century, Great Britain
accommodated the U.S. and confronted Germany. The result was two
world wars involving the latter. Similar conflicts between the U.S.
and China would be catastrophic.
In fact, there is little over which Beijing and Washington
might fight. The PRC has demonstrated little interest in overseas
military expansion or attacking the U.S. Economic competition
between the two is growing in Asia, Africa, and even South America,
but Washington’s best response would be to liberalize the American
economy, not deploy the U.S. Navy.
A clash is possible in East Asia, however. Today the U.S.
dominates the region, even along China’s border. But the PRC is
building deterrent forces, particularly missiles and submarines
capable of sinking U.S. carriers.
The Pentagon’s latest assessment of Chinese military
spending speaks of “anti-access” and “area denial” capabilities.
Notably, the PRC poses no threat to the American homeland. But
Beijing doesn’t want the U.S. to be able to threaten its
homeland. One can imagine the U.S. reaction if the Chinese navy was
patrolling America’s coasts, prepared to intervene in, say,
Washington’s struggle with Hawaiian secessionists.
Unfortunately for the U.S., it is far cheaper to build
defensive than offensive weapons. America could bankrupt itself
attempting to protect its carriers and buy additional platforms in
order to maintain its ability to attack the Chinese
mainland.
Nevertheless, Washington should not abandon Taiwan, as
tempting as that option might be to some. Even if the U.S. does not
formally recognize the ROC, the Taiwanese people have made a
separate identity for themselves.
Whatever the technical, juridical issues surrounding the
China-Taiwan relationship, Taiwan is entitled to decide on its own
destiny. Certainly Beijing is not justified in attempting to coerce
the Taiwanese people.
The best solution would be a negotiated settlement when
China institutes political as well as economic reforms. The two
states and peoples have been drawing steadily closer. However, the
PRC will make itself politically attractive only when it accepts a
free society as well as a freer economy.
In the meantime, the U.S. should permit arms sales that
enable Taipei to maintain a military deterrent just as China is
building a deterrent to America. Taiwan is wealthy, but falling
further behind the PRC in overall economic strength. Thus, Taipei
should not “try to match the PRC ship for ship, plane for plane, or
missile for missile,” as the Washington-based Taiwan Policy Working
Group observed. Rather, Taipei should build a small but deadly
force capable of exacting a high price from any
attackers.
Last year’s weapons package included Harpoon and Patriot
missiles, mine-detection ships, Blackhawk helicopters, and
communications equipment. Washington put off any decision on
advanced F-16s and diesel submarines. But Taiwan is now pressing
for the fighters and subs.
The Obama administration should say yes.
China might retaliate diplomatically. But empowering
Taiwan is worth risking tenser relations with the PRC. After all,
arms sales do not put America and China on a path to war. Rather,
they create a disincentive for Beijing to consider war as an
option, irrespective of Washington’s perceived willingness to
intervene.
Moreover, while U.S.-Chinese ties may be warming, Beijing
remains recalcitrant on important issues like North Korea. Indeed,
the North’s “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il has made another visit to the
PRC, his third in a year, presumably to beg for more
aid.
Indeed, China has been expanding ties with Pyongyang even
as the latter has provoked South Korea almost to war. Beijing also
subsidizes other pariah regimes, such as Burma and Zimbabwe. The
PRC is determined to pursue what it perceives to be its national
interest. So should the U.S.
Ultimately, a reasonable accommodation between China and
Taiwan is more likely if Taipei possesses the ability to defend
itself. Of course, Taipei should not be purely reliant on America.
Then its security will depend on the vagaries of politics in
Washington as well as the state of U.S.-Chinese relations. Noted
Liu Yu-jiun of Taiwan’s Fo Guang University: “If you put too much
emphasis on imports and something goes sour between importer and
exporter, you end up with an empty hand.”
Taiwan recently deployed its third generation of Brave
Wind anti-ship missiles. Taipei also is considering production of
the Hsiung Feng-2E ballistic missile. Even a small strategic
deterrent would force the PRC to hesitate before threatening
Taiwan.
Ultimately, Washington’s objective in helping enable
Taipei to defend itself is to ensure that the latter never actually
has to do so. Peace is in the interest of Taiwan, China, and the
U.S. Washington should promote a good relationship with the PRC.
But the U.S. should view continuing arms sales to Taipei as perhaps
the best means to maintain stability and peace across the Taiwan
Strait.
