Last week’s agreement between Fatah and Hamas to form a unity
government in the Palestinian Authority (PA) came as a shock to
many Middle East observers — including those who have long
advocated their political reconciliation. The two factions have
been at each other’s throats for years and the last agreement
proved to be of limited durability, culminating in Hamas’s coup in
Gaza in 2007. Although there have been several attempts to form a
unity government and break the Palestinian political stalemate,
those efforts have failed. Why it succeeded now reveals much about
how the PA views the peace process and should have far-reaching
implications for U.S. policy.
Many have long argued that a unity government would make
it easier to negotiate a Palestinian-Israeli peace. It was assumed
that this would paper over the fact that both Palestinian politics
and governance are divided between Hamas-ruled Gaza and the Fatah
or PA-ruled West Bank. The problem with this logic is the
assumption that peace remains elusive because the PA is not sharing
power with Hamas. On the contrary, there can be no Israeli peace
with a PA that includes Hamas because it is a terrorist group
committed to Israel’s destruction. Those who argue that Palestinian
unity is the key to negotiating peace base their case on political
expediency with the naïve notion that Hamas will either reform or
moderate itself as a part of the Palestinian government. However,
the “Palestinian National Accord” agreed to in Cairo last week does
not require Hamas to recognize Israel or renounce terrorism — in
fact it did not require any compromises from the terrorist group at
all. Given the longstanding animosity between Fatah and Hamas, it
begs the question: why is it in Fatah’s interest to form a unity
government now?
There are several reasons a unity government would appeal
to both Fatah and Hamas and much of it has to do with the magic
month of September 2011. On the internal Palestinian political
dimension, the decision clears the way for long overdue
parliamentary and presidential elections. Mahmoud Abbas’s
presidential mandate expired in 2009 and earlier this year the PA
announced plans for elections in September. Without an agreement
between the two factions, previous calls for elections have fallen
flat, a casualty of the apparent irreconcilable differences between
Fatah and Hamas.
But the larger, external issue revolves around the PA’s
international campaign for gaining recognition as a state by
attempting to pass a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
resolution and requesting admission into the General Assembly as a
member state. The UNGA convenes in September and both Fatah and
Hamas have likely calculated that it will be easier to plead their
case to the UNGA if they can demonstrate that recognition of their
statehood would encompass both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Of
course, should this effort at the UN succeed, any agreement between
the two factions would probably unravel since their differences are
ideological and insurmountable over the long haul. This temporary
marriage of convenience is about elections and gaining statehood —
without negotiating with Israel.
It is in this light one should view PA President Mahmoud
Abbas’s comments last Thursday where he proclaimed that Hamas’s
inclusion in the government would not undermine peace efforts.
“Politics are for the PLO, which means [it’s] for me, and the
government will work according to my policy,” he said. Yet it is
Abbas of the PLO, PA, and Fatah — not Hamas — who has made an art
form out of walking away from negotiations with Israel. What this
new agreement means is that Abbas has made the determination that
the path to statehood requires no compromise from Fatah either, let
alone Hamas. In fact, it does not even require negotiations with
Israel.
The formation of a Palestinian unity government should
necessitate a review of American assistance to the PA. Since 1994,
total U.S. assistance to the PA has topped $3.5 billion, with an
average of about $400 million per year going to the PA while headed
by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, much of it aimed at improving
governance and security in preparation for eventual statehood. If
Hamas is in the government, why should the U.S. foot the bill for
helping to create a new terrorist state? American taxpayer dollars
that have previously helped pay for the training of Palestinian
security services should be withdrawn as well. After all, the
training and funds were designed to prevent terrorism and contain
Hamas. And how would Abbas be able to order the crackdown on Hamas
operatives in the West Bank if they are his partners?
Fatah’s decision to embrace Hamas, abandon negotiations,
and pursue an international recognition of statehood represents a
major setback for Palestinian-Israeli peace. The Obama
administration — like the Bush administration before him — should
publicly disavow any Palestinian government that includes Hamas and
should make clear to Abbas that the only path to a Palestinian
state is through a negotiated settlement with Israel.
