Putin has his priorities in order -- but who would charge him
with a traffic infraction?
In an environment where traffic tickets often are "arranged"
with the police officer who charged the infraction, and the former
mayor of Moscow's wife "cleared" municipal building contracts, the
Russian public has become inured to all forms of corruption. It's
an area of clearly different perceptions by the country's
president, Dmitry Medvedev, and its prime minister, Vladimir
Putin.
It is not that one leader is for corruption and the other
is against it. Rather it's a matter of how influential corruption
is viewed as an obstacle to daily governance. Putin, for example,
knows full well that the interior ministry, with its own police
power, is now and has been for a very long time the center of a
culture of governmental privilege and self-administered justice. It
is just that he also views the character of the ministry as
essential for the maintenance of a basic level of security. This
concept is left over from the Soviet days.
Medvedev, though a lawyer, does not come from the same
security background as his older and more politically calloused
former (and perhaps still) boss. Medvedev is said to carry with him
a consciousness more appropriate to the ordinary Russian who has no
relationship other than adversarial with the police. The problem in
political terms was defined clearly by Lilia Shevtsova of the
Carnegie Center in Moscow earlier this year: "The relationship
between ordinary Russians and the police is one of the most serious
sources of conflict between [leadership] and people at
large."
Putin has attempted to place himself as far away from this
problem as possible. With the exposure last spring of massive graft
and general corruption in the most feared of Russia's internal
police force, OMON, (Special Purpose Police Unit), Putin became
unavailable to officials seeking him in his office in Russia's
White House. This was one year after the now famous "Confidential"
cable under the signature of U.S. Ambassador John Beyrle noted that
Putin had "lost his edge" in economic matters, and that the Russian
PM was "working from home," leaving most of the government business
to his deputies. This March '09 cable, made public by Wikileaks,
contained no context as to what had caused this unusual behavior
other than to state that "well connected" sources reported Putin to
be "distracted and disinterested."
Since the OMON exposure -- and without any Wikileaks aid
-- President Medvedev has fired nearly two dozen of the top
interior ministry administrators and fifteen prison officials. A
general purge of police ranks followed. While this action has
gained considerable press and public approval for Medvedev, the
problem continues of criminality within Russia's law enforcement
community.
Another aspect of corruption is apparent in the lack of
police action to counter assaults against the press by "unknown
assailants." An international committee tracking such matters
(Committee to Protect Journalists) reports eight Russian
journalists have been killed and forty assaulted so far this year.
Molodaya Gvardia, a youth branch of the political party
United Russia that is chaired by Putin, has been charged with
inciting the brutal beating of Oleg Kashin, an investigative
reporter for the major newspaper, Kommersant. And this
simply was about his writing of a conflict between environmental
groups and the building of a highway through a suburban Moscow
forest.
President Medvedev's aides have made it clear that their
boss is outraged at this increasing violence against journalists
and environmental activists. Medvedev even posted a personal
message of condemnation of such acts on Twitter. Meanwhile, Putin's
camp -- and the man, himself -- have avoided assuming any
leadership in this regard, even though such civil disorder normally
falls well within the purview of the office of the prime
minister.
This creates a picture of Putin doing everything he can to
avoid political conflict with any aspect of the security forces
that are deemed his base. At the same time, he is promoted by his
public relations advisors as the senior leader involved in good
works and "presidential" matters rather than the hardworking,
operational chief in his actual role as PM. Putin's choice just
this week of personally commenting on the Kremlin-announced $646
billion modernization of the Russian strategic military fits well
into his chosen self-characterization paralleling his newly
developing role as "man of the people." The political image-making
is unmistakable when Russia's next presidential election is only
about seventeen months away.
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin is now only 58 years old. He
is far too young to continue in Russia's political life as even a
titular #2. The alternative of moving into the world of private
business as the chairman of a major industry just doesn't seem to
be his métier, though the opportunity certainly would be
there. Contrary to the March '09 cable from the American embassy,
Putin is not withdrawing from an active role in official affairs,
but he is staying out of the fray and preserving his
siloviki support structure of key figures in security,
intelligence, the military and, importantly, the oligarchs. It is
hoped that the current State Department is doing a better job of
looking beyond the information it has received from its previously
characterized "well connected" sources.
About the Author
George H. Wittman writes a weekly column on international affairs for The American Spectator online. He was the founding chairman of the National Institute for Public Policy.
Putin is an ex-KGB thug & he wants the old Soviet Union back
& all the perks associated w/the elitists---He being 1 of
course!
I always thought Medvedev was the pretty boy, but apparently
not. I wish him luck in cleaning up the police.
Rich Rostrom| 12.17.10 @ 1:10PM
Interesting. Were any of the police officials fired by Medvedev
amonng Putin's siloviki supporters?
Alan Brooks| 12.17.10 @ 1:17PM
If this is correct WE are in trouble too:
"Trying to play down the significance of an ongoing Wikileaks dump
of more than 250,000 State Department documents, Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates recently offered the following bit of
Washington wisdom: “The fact is, governments deal with the United
States because it's in their interest, not because they like us,
not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep
secrets... [S]ome governments deal with us because they fear us,
some because they respect us, most because they need us. We are
still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable
nation.”
Now, wisdom like that certainly sounds sober; it’s definitely
what passes for hardheaded geopolitical realism in our nation’s
capital; and it's true, Gates is not the first top American
official to call the U.S. “the indispensable nation”; nor do I
doubt that he and many other inside-the-Beltway players are
convinced of our global indispensability. The problem is that the
news has almost weekly been undermining his version of realism,
making it look ever more phantasmagorical. The ability of
Wikileaks, a tiny organization of activists, to thumb its
cyber-nose at the global superpower, repeatedly shining a blaze of
illumination on the penumbra of secrecy under which its political
and military elite like to conduct their affairs, hasn’t helped one
bit either. If our indispensability is, as yet, hardly questioned
in Washington, elsewhere on the planet it’s another matter.
The once shiny badge of the “global sheriff” has lost its gleam
and, in Dodge City, ever fewer are paying the sort of attention
that Washington believes is its due. To my mind, the single most
intelligent comment on the latest Wikileaks uproar comes from Simon
Jenkins of the British Guardian who, on making his way through the
various revelations (not to speak of the mounds of global gossip),
summed matters up this way: “The money-wasting is staggering.
[U.S.] Aid payments are never followed, never audited, never
evaluated. The impression is of the world's superpower roaming
helpless in a world in which nobody behaves as bidden. Iran,
Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, the United Nations, are all
perpetually off script. Washington reacts like a wounded bear, its
instincts imperial but its power projection unproductive.”
Sometimes, to understand just where you are in the present, it
helps to peer into the past -- in this case, into what happened to
previous “indispensable” imperial powers; sometimes, it’s no less
useful to peer into the future. In his latest TomDispatch post,
Alfred W. McCoy, author most recently of Policing America’s Empire:
The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the
Surveillance State, does both. Having convened a global working
group of 140 historians to consider the fate of the U.S. as an
imperial power, he offers us a glimpse of four possible American
(near-)futures. They add up to a monumental, even indispensable
look at just how fast our indispensability is likely to unravel in
the years to come. Tom
The Decline and Fall of the American Empire
Four Scenarios for the End of the American Century by 2025
By Alfred W. McCoy
A soft landing for America 40 years from now? Don’t bet on it.
The demise of the United States as the global superpower could come
far more quickly than anyone imagines. If Washington is dreaming of
2040 or 2050 as the end of the American Century, a more realistic
assessment of domestic and global trends suggests that in 2025,
just 15 years from now, it could all be over except for the
shouting.
Despite the aura of omnipotence most empires project, a look at
their history should remind us that they are fragile organisms. So
delicate is their ecology of power that, when things start to go
truly bad, empires regularly unravel with unholy speed: just a year
for Portugal, two years for the Soviet Union, eight years for
France, 11 years for the Ottomans, 17 years for Great Britain, and,
in all likelihood, 22 years for the United States, counting from
the crucial year 2003.
Future historians are likely to identify the Bush
administration’s rash invasion of Iraq in that year as the start of
America's downfall. However, instead of the bloodshed that marked
the end of so many past empires, with cities burning and civilians
slaughtered, this twenty-first century imperial collapse could come
relatively quietly through the invisible tendrils of economic
collapse or cyberwarfare.
But have no doubt: when Washington's global dominion finally
ends, there will be painful daily reminders of what such a loss of
power means for Americans in every walk of life. As a half-dozen
European nations have discovered, imperial decline tends to have a
remarkably demoralizing impact on a society, regularly bringing at
least a generation of economic privation. As the economy cools,
political temperatures rise, often sparking serious domestic
unrest.
Available economic, educational, and military data indicate
that, when it comes to U.S. global power, negative trends will
aggregate rapidly by 2020 and are likely to reach a critical mass
no later than 2030. The American Century, proclaimed so
triumphantly at the start of World War II, will be tattered and
fading by 2025, its eighth decade, and could be history by
2030.
Significantly, in 2008, the U.S. National Intelligence Council
admitted for the first time that America's global power was indeed
on a declining trajectory. In one of its periodic futuristic
reports, Global Trends 2025, the Council cited “the transfer of
global wealth and economic power now under way, roughly from West
to East" and "without precedent in modern history,” as the primary
factor in the decline of the “United States' relative strength --
even in the military realm.” Like many in Washington, however, the
Council’s analysts anticipated a very long, very soft landing for
American global preeminence, and harbored the hope that somehow the
U.S. would long “retain unique military capabilities… to project
military power globally” for decades to come.
No such luck. Under current projections, the United States will
find itself in second place behind China (already the world's
second largest economy) in economic output around 2026, and behind
India by 2050. Similarly, Chinese innovation is on a trajectory
toward world leadership in applied science and military technology
sometime between 2020 and 2030, just as America's current supply of
brilliant scientists and engineers retires, without adequate
replacement by an ill-educated younger generation.
By 2020, according to current plans, the Pentagon will throw a
military Hail Mary pass for a dying empire. It will launch a lethal
triple canopy of advanced aerospace robotics that represents
Washington's last best hope of retaining global power despite its
waning economic influence. By that year, however, China's global
network of communications satellites, backed by the world's most
powerful supercomputers, will also be fully operational, providing
Beijing with an independent platform for the weaponization of space
and a powerful communications system for missile- or cyber-strikes
into every quadrant of the globe.
Wrapped in imperial hubris, like Whitehall or Quai d'Orsay
before it, the White House still seems to imagine that American
decline will be gradual, gentle, and partial. In his State of the
Union address last January, President Obama offered the reassurance
that “I do not accept second place for the United States of
America.” A few days later, Vice President Biden ridiculed the very
idea that “we are destined to fulfill [historian Paul] Kennedy's
prophecy that we are going to be a great nation that has failed
because we lost control of our economy and overextended.”
Similarly, writing in the November issue of the establishment
journal Foreign Affairs, neo-liberal foreign policy guru Joseph Nye
waved away talk of China's economic and military rise, dismissing
“misleading metaphors of organic decline” and denying that any
deterioration in U.S. global power was underway.
Ordinary Americans, watching their jobs head overseas, have a
more realistic view than their cosseted leaders. An opinion poll in
August 2010 found that 65% of Americans believed the country was
now “in a state of decline.” Already, Australia and Turkey,
traditional U.S. military allies, are using their
American-manufactured weapons for joint air and naval maneuvers
with China. Already, America's closest economic partners are
backing away from Washington's opposition to China's rigged
currency rates. As the president flew back from his Asian tour last
month, a gloomy New York Times headline summed the moment up this
way: “Obama's Economic View Is Rejected on World Stage, China,
Britain and Germany Challenge U.S., Trade Talks With Seoul Fail,
Too.”
Viewed historically, the question is not whether the United
States will lose its unchallenged global power, but just how
precipitous and wrenching the decline will be. In place of
Washington's wishful thinking, let’s use the National Intelligence
Council's own futuristic methodology to suggest four realistic
scenarios for how, whether with a bang or a whimper, U.S. global
power could reach its end in the 2020s (along with four
accompanying assessments of just where we are today). The future
scenarios include: economic decline, oil shock, military
misadventure, and World War III. While these are hardly the only
possibilities when it comes to American decline or even collapse,
they offer a window into an onrushing future.
Economic Decline: Present Situation
Today, three main threats exist to America’s dominant position
in the global economy: loss of economic clout thanks to a shrinking
share of world trade, the decline of American technological
innovation, and the end of the dollar's privileged status as the
global reserve currency.
By 2008, the United States had already fallen to number three in
global merchandise exports, with just 11% of them compared to 12%
for China and 16% for the European Union. There is no reason to
believe that this trend will reverse itself.
Similarly, American leadership in technological innovation is on
the wane. In 2008, the U.S. was still number two behind Japan in
worldwide patent applications with 232,000, but China was closing
fast at 195,000, thanks to a blistering 400% increase since 2000. A
harbinger of further decline: in 2009 the U.S. hit rock bottom in
ranking among the 40 nations surveyed by the Information Technology
& Innovation Foundation when it came to “change” in “global
innovation-based competitiveness” during the previous decade.
Adding substance to these statistics, in October China's Defense
Ministry unveiled the world's fastest supercomputer, the Tianhe-1A,
so powerful, said one U.S. expert, that it “blows away the existing
No. 1 machine” in America.
Add to this clear evidence that the U.S. education system, that
source of future scientists and innovators, has been falling behind
its competitors. After leading the world for decades in 25- to
34-year-olds with university degrees, the country sank to 12th
place in 2010. The World Economic Forum ranked the United States at
a mediocre 52nd among 139 nations in the quality of its university
math and science instruction in 2010. Nearly half of all graduate
students in the sciences in the U.S. are now foreigners, most of
whom will be heading home, not staying here as once would have
happened. By 2025, in other words, the United States is likely to
face a critical shortage of talented scientists.
Such negative trends are encouraging increasingly sharp
criticism of the dollar's role as the world’s reserve currency.
“Other countries are no longer willing to buy into the idea that
the U.S. knows best on economic policy,” observed Kenneth S.
Rogoff, a former chief economist at the International Monetary
Fund. In mid-2009, with the world's central banks holding an
astronomical $4 trillion in U.S. Treasury notes, Russian president
Dimitri Medvedev insisted that it was time to end “the artificially
maintained unipolar system” based on “one formerly strong reserve
currency.”
Simultaneously, China's central bank governor suggested that the
future might lie with a global reserve currency “disconnected from
individual nations” (that is, the U.S. dollar). Take these as
signposts of a world to come, and of a possible attempt, as
economist Michael Hudson has argued, “to hasten the bankruptcy of
the U.S. financial-military world order.”
Economic Decline: Scenario 2020
After years of swelling deficits fed by incessant warfare in
distant lands, in 2020, as long expected, the U.S. dollar finally
loses its special status as the world's reserve currency. Suddenly,
the cost of imports soars. Unable to pay for swelling deficits by
selling now-devalued Treasury notes abroad, Washington is finally
forced to slash its bloated military budget. Under pressure at home
and abroad, Washington slowly pulls U.S. forces back from hundreds
of overseas bases to a continental perimeter. By now, however, it
is far too late.
Faced with a fading superpower incapable of paying the bills,
China, India, Iran, Russia, and other powers, great and regional,
provocatively challenge U.S. dominion over the oceans, space, and
cyberspace. Meanwhile, amid soaring prices, ever-rising
unemployment, and a continuing decline in real wages, domestic
divisions widen into violent clashes and divisive debates, often
over remarkably irrelevant issues. Riding a political tide of
disillusionment and despair, a far-right patriot captures the
presidency with thundering rhetoric, demanding respect for American
authority and threatening military retaliation or economic
reprisal. The world pays next to no attention as the American
Century ends in silence.
Oil Shock: Present Situation
One casualty of America's waning economic power has been its
lock on global oil supplies. Speeding by America's gas-guzzling
economy in the passing lane, China became the world's number one
energy consumer this summer, a position the U.S. had held for over
a century. Energy specialist Michael Klare has argued that this
change means China will “set the pace in shaping our global
future.”
By 2025, Iran and Russia will control almost half of the world's
natural gas supply, which will potentially give them enormous
leverage over energy-starved Europe. Add petroleum reserves to the
mix and, as the National Intelligence Council has warned, in just
15 years two countries, Russia and Iran, could “emerge as energy
kingpins.”
Despite remarkable ingenuity, the major oil powers are now
draining the big basins of petroleum reserves that are amenable to
easy, cheap extraction. The real lesson of the Deepwater Horizon
oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico was not BP's sloppy safety
standards, but the simple fact everyone saw on “spillcam”: one of
the corporate energy giants had little choice but to search for
what Klare calls “tough oil” miles beneath the surface of the ocean
to keep its profits up.
Compounding the problem, the Chinese and Indians have suddenly
become far heavier energy consumers. Even if fossil fuel supplies
were to remain constant (which they won’t), demand, and so costs,
are almost certain to rise -- and sharply at that. Other developed
nations are meeting this threat aggressively by plunging into
experimental programs to develop alternative energy sources. The
United States has taken a different path, doing far too little to
develop alternative sources while, in the last three decades,
doubling its dependence on foreign oil imports. Between 1973 and
2007, oil imports have risen from 36% of energy consumed in the
U.S. to 66%.
Oil Shock: Scenario 2025
The United States remains so dependent upon foreign oil that a
few adverse developments in the global energy market in 2025 spark
an oil shock. By comparison, it makes the 1973 oil shock (when
prices quadrupled in just months) look like the proverbial
molehill. Angered at the dollar's plummeting value, OPEC oil
ministers, meeting in Riyadh, demand future energy payments in a
“basket” of Yen, Yuan, and Euros. That only hikes the cost of U.S.
oil imports further. At the same moment, while signing a new series
of long-term delivery contracts with China, the Saudis stabilize
their own foreign exchange reserves by switching to the Yuan.
Meanwhile, China pours countless billions into building a massive
trans-Asia pipeline and funding Iran's exploitation of the world
largest natural gas field at South Pars in the Persian Gulf.
Concerned that the U.S. Navy might no longer be able to protect
the oil tankers traveling from the Persian Gulf to fuel East Asia,
a coalition of Tehran, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi form an unexpected new
Gulf alliance and affirm that China's new fleet of swift aircraft
carriers will henceforth patrol the Persian Gulf from a base on the
Gulf of Oman. Under heavy economic pressure, London agrees to
cancel the U.S. lease on its Indian Ocean island base of Diego
Garcia, while Canberra, pressured by the Chinese, informs
Washington that the Seventh Fleet is no longer welcome to use
Fremantle as a homeport, effectively evicting the U.S. Navy from
the Indian Ocean.
With just a few strokes of the pen and some terse announcements,
the “Carter Doctrine,” by which U.S. military power was to
eternally protect the Persian Gulf, is laid to rest in 2025. All
the elements that long assured the United States limitless supplies
of low-cost oil from that region -- logistics, exchange rates, and
naval power -- evaporate. At this point, the U.S. can still cover
only an insignificant 12% of its energy needs from its nascent
alternative energy industry, and remains dependent on imported oil
for half of its energy consumption.
The oil shock that follows hits the country like a hurricane,
sending prices to startling heights, making travel a staggeringly
expensive proposition, putting real wages (which had long been
declining) into freefall, and rendering non-competitive whatever
American exports remained. With thermostats dropping, gas prices
climbing through the roof, and dollars flowing overseas in return
for costly oil, the American economy is paralyzed. With
long-fraying alliances at an end and fiscal pressures mounting,
U.S. military forces finally begin a staged withdrawal from their
overseas bases.
Within a few years, the U.S. is functionally bankrupt and the
clock is ticking toward midnight on the American Century.
Military Misadventure: Present Situation
Counterintuitively, as their power wanes, empires often plunge
into ill-advised military misadventures. This phenomenon is known
among historians of empire as “micro-militarism” and seems to
involve psychologically compensatory efforts to salve the sting of
retreat or defeat by occupying new territories, however briefly and
catastrophically. These operations, irrational even from an
imperial point of view, often yield hemorrhaging expenditures or
humiliating defeats that only accelerate the loss of power.
Embattled empires through the ages suffer an arrogance that
drives them to plunge ever deeper into military misadventures until
defeat becomes debacle. In 413 BCE, a weakened Athens sent 200
ships to be slaughtered in Sicily. In 1921, a dying imperial Spain
dispatched 20,000 soldiers to be massacred by Berber guerrillas in
Morocco. In 1956, a fading British Empire destroyed its prestige by
attacking Suez. And in 2001 and 2003, the U.S. occupied Afghanistan
and invaded Iraq. With the hubris that marks empires over the
millennia, Washington has increased its troops in Afghanistan to
100,000, expanded the war into Pakistan, and extended its
commitment to 2014 and beyond, courting disasters large and small
in this guerilla-infested, nuclear-armed graveyard of empires.
Military Misadventure: Scenario 2014
So irrational, so unpredictable is “micro-militarism” that
seemingly fanciful scenarios are soon outdone by actual events.
With the U.S. military stretched thin from Somalia to the
Philippines and tensions rising in Israel, Iran, and Korea,
possible combinations for a disastrous military crisis abroad are
multifold.
It’s mid-summer 2014 and a drawn-down U.S. garrison in embattled
Kandahar in southern Afghanistan is suddenly, unexpectedly overrun
by Taliban guerrillas, while U.S. aircraft are grounded by a
blinding sandstorm. Heavy loses are taken and in retaliation, an
embarrassed American war commander looses B-1 bombers and F-16
fighters to demolish whole neighborhoods of the city that are
believed to be under Taliban control, while AC-130U “Spooky”
gunships rake the rubble with devastating cannon fire.
Soon, mullahs are preaching jihad from mosques throughout the
region, and Afghan Army units, long trained by American forces to
turn the tide of the war, begin to desert en masse. Taliban
fighters then launch a series of remarkably sophisticated strikes
aimed at U.S. garrisons across the country, sending American
casualties soaring. In scenes reminiscent of Saigon in 1975, U.S.
helicopters rescue American soldiers and civilians from rooftops in
Kabul and Kandahar.
Meanwhile, angry at the endless, decades-long stalemate over
Palestine, OPEC’s leaders impose a new oil embargo on the U.S. to
protest its backing of Israel as well as the killing of untold
numbers of Muslim civilians in its ongoing wars across the Greater
Middle East. With gas prices soaring and refineries running dry,
Washington makes its move, sending in Special Operations forces to
seize oil ports in the Persian Gulf. This, in turn, sparks a rash
of suicide attacks and the sabotage of pipelines and oil wells. As
black clouds billow skyward and diplomats rise at the U.N. to
bitterly denounce American actions, commentators worldwide reach
back into history to brand this “America's Suez,” a telling
reference to the 1956 debacle that marked the end of the British
Empire.
World War III: Present Situation
In the summer of 2010, military tensions between the U.S. and
China began to rise in the western Pacific, once considered an
American “lake.” Even a year earlier no one would have predicted
such a development. As Washington played upon its alliance with
London to appropriate much of Britain's global power after World
War II, so China is now using the profits from its export trade
with the U.S. to fund what is likely to become a military challenge
to American dominion over the waterways of Asia and the
Pacific.
With its growing resources, Beijing is claiming a vast maritime
arc from Korea to Indonesia long dominated by the U.S. Navy. In
August, after Washington expressed a “national interest” in the
South China Sea and conducted naval exercises there to reinforce
that claim, Beijing's official Global Times responded angrily,
saying, “The U.S.-China wrestling match over the South China Sea
issue has raised the stakes in deciding who the real future ruler
of the planet will be.”
Amid growing tensions, the Pentagon reported that Beijing now
holds “the capability to attack… [U.S.] aircraft carriers in the
western Pacific Ocean” and target “nuclear forces throughout… the
continental United States.” By developing “offensive nuclear,
space, and cyber warfare capabilities,” China seems determined to
vie for dominance of what the Pentagon calls “the information
spectrum in all dimensions of the modern battlespace.” With ongoing
development of the powerful Long March V booster rocket, as well as
the launch of two satellites in January 2010 and another in July,
for a total of five, Beijing signaled that the country was making
rapid strides toward an “independent” network of 35 satellites for
global positioning, communications, and reconnaissance capabilities
by 2020.
To check China and extend its military position globally,
Washington is intent on building a new digital network of air and
space robotics, advanced cyberwarfare capabilities, and electronic
surveillance. Military planners expect this integrated system to
envelop the Earth in a cyber-grid capable of blinding entire armies
on the battlefield or taking out a single terrorist in field or
favela. By 2020, if all goes according to plan, the Pentagon will
launch a three-tiered shield of space drones -- reaching from
stratosphere to exosphere, armed with agile missiles, linked by a
resilient modular satellite system, and operated through total
telescopic surveillance.
Last April, the Pentagon made history. It extended drone
operations into the exosphere by quietly launching the X-37B
unmanned space shuttle into a low orbit 255 miles above the planet.
The X-37B is the first in a new generation of unmanned vehicles
that will mark the full weaponization of space, creating an arena
for future warfare unlike anything that has gone before.
World War III: Scenario 2025
The technology of space and cyberwarfare is so new and untested
that even the most outlandish scenarios may soon be superseded by a
reality still hard to conceive. If we simply employ the sort of
scenarios that the Air Force itself used in its 2009 Future
Capabilities Game, however, we can gain “a better understanding of
how air, space and cyberspace overlap in warfare,” and so begin to
imagine how the next world war might actually be fought.
It’s 11:59 p.m. on Thanksgiving Thursday in 2025. While
cyber-shoppers pound the portals of Best Buy for deep discounts on
the latest home electronics from China, U.S. Air Force technicians
at the Space Surveillance Telescope (SST) on Maui choke on their
coffee as their panoramic screens suddenly blip to black. Thousands
of miles away at the U.S. CyberCommand's operations center in
Texas, cyberwarriors soon detect malicious binaries that, though
fired anonymously, show the distinctive digital fingerprints of
China's People's Liberation Army.
The first overt strike is one nobody predicted. Chinese
“malware” seizes control of the robotics aboard an unmanned
solar-powered U.S. “Vulture” drone as it flies at 70,000 feet over
the Tsushima Strait between Korea and Japan. It suddenly fires all
the rocket pods beneath its enormous 400-foot wingspan, sending
dozens of lethal missiles plunging harmlessly into the Yellow Sea,
effectively disarming this formidable weapon.
Determined to fight fire with fire, the White House authorizes a
retaliatory strike. Confident that its F-6 “Fractionated,
Free-Flying” satellite system is impenetrable, Air Force commanders
in California transmit robotic codes to the flotilla of X-37B space
drones orbiting 250 miles above the Earth, ordering them to launch
their “Triple Terminator” missiles at China's 35 satellites. Zero
response. In near panic, the Air Force launches its Falcon
Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle into an arc 100 miles above the Pacific
Ocean and then, just 20 minutes later, sends the computer codes to
fire missiles at seven Chinese satellites in nearby orbits. The
launch codes are suddenly inoperative.
As the Chinese virus spreads uncontrollably through the F-6
satellite architecture, while those second-rate U.S. supercomputers
fail to crack the malware's devilishly complex code, GPS signals
crucial to the navigation of U.S. ships and aircraft worldwide are
compromised. Carrier fleets begin steaming in circles in the
mid-Pacific. Fighter squadrons are grounded. Reaper drones fly
aimlessly toward the horizon, crashing when their fuel is
exhausted. Suddenly, the United States loses what the U.S. Air
Force has long called “the ultimate high ground”: space. Within
hours, the military power that had dominated the globe for nearly a
century has been defeated in World War III without a single human
casualty.
A New World Order?
Even if future events prove duller than these four scenarios
suggest, every significant trend points toward a far more striking
decline in American global power by 2025 than anything Washington
now seems to be envisioning.
As allies worldwide begin to realign their policies to take
cognizance of rising Asian powers, the cost of maintaining 800 or
more overseas military bases will simply become unsustainable,
finally forcing a staged withdrawal on a still-unwilling
Washington. With both the U.S. and China in a race to weaponize
space and cyberspace, tensions between the two powers are bound to
rise, making military conflict by 2025 at least feasible, if hardly
guaranteed.
Complicating matters even more, the economic, military, and
technological trends outlined above will not operate in tidy
isolation. As happened to European empires after World War II, such
negative forces will undoubtedly prove synergistic. They will
combine in thoroughly unexpected ways, create crises for which
Americans are remarkably unprepared, and threaten to spin the
economy into a sudden downward spiral, consigning this country to a
generation or more of economic misery.
As U.S. power recedes, the past offers a spectrum of
possibilities for a future world order. At one end of this
spectrum, the rise of a new global superpower, however unlikely,
cannot be ruled out. Yet both China and Russia evince
self-referential cultures, recondite non-roman scripts, regional
defense strategies, and underdeveloped legal systems, denying them
key instruments for global dominion. At the moment then, no single
superpower seems to be on the horizon likely to succeed the
U.S.
In a dark, dystopian version of our global future, a coalition
of transnational corporations, multilateral forces like NATO, and
an international financial elite could conceivably forge a single,
possibly unstable, supra-national nexus that would make it no
longer meaningful to speak of national empires at all. While
denationalized corporations and multinational elites would
assumedly rule such a world from secure urban enclaves, the
multitudes would be relegated to urban and rural wastelands.
In Planet of Slums, Mike Davis offers at least a partial vision
of such a world from the bottom up. He argues that the billion
people already packed into fetid favela-style slums worldwide
(rising to two billion by 2030) will make “the 'feral, failed
cities' of the Third World… the distinctive battlespace of the
twenty-first century.” As darkness settles over some future
super-favela, “the empire can deploy Orwellian technologies of
repression” as “hornet-like helicopter gun-ships stalk enigmatic
enemies in the narrow streets of the slum districts… Every morning
the slums reply with suicide bombers and eloquent explosions.”
At a midpoint on the spectrum of possible futures, a new global
oligopoly might emerge between 2020 and 2040, with rising powers
China, Russia, India, and Brazil collaborating with receding powers
like Britain, Germany, Japan, and the United States to enforce an
ad hoc global dominion, akin to the loose alliance of European
empires that ruled half of humanity circa 1900.
Another possibility: the rise of regional hegemons in a return
to something reminiscent of the international system that operated
before modern empires took shape. In this neo-Westphalian world
order, with its endless vistas of micro-violence and unchecked
exploitation, each hegemon would dominate its immediate region --
Brasilia in South America, Washington in North America, Pretoria in
southern Africa, and so on. Space, cyberspace, and the maritime
deeps, removed from the control of the former planetary
“policeman,” the United States, might even become a new global
commons, controlled through an expanded U.N. Security Council or
some ad hoc body.
All of these scenarios extrapolate existing trends into the
future on the assumption that Americans, blinded by the arrogance
of decades of historically unparalleled power, cannot or will not
take steps to manage the unchecked erosion of their global
position.
If America's decline is in fact on a 22-year trajectory from
2003 to 2025, then we have already frittered away most of the first
decade of that decline with wars that distracted us from long-term
problems and, like water tossed onto desert sands, wasted trillions
of desperately needed dollars.
If only 15 years remain, the odds of frittering them all away
still remain high. Congress and the president are now in gridlock;
the American system is flooded with corporate money meant to jam up
the works; and there is little suggestion that any issues of
significance, including our wars, our bloated national security
state, our starved education system, and our antiquated energy
supplies, will be addressed with sufficient seriousness to assure
the sort of soft landing that might maximize our country's role and
prosperity in a changing world.
Europe's empires are gone and America's imperium is going. It
seems increasingly doubtful that the United States will have
anything like Britain's success in shaping a succeeding world order
that protects its interests, preserves its prosperity, and bears
the imprint of its best values."
Bob K.| 12.18.10 @ 9:48PM
Geez Alan,
Why didn't you just put up a link to this summation of what a
global group of 140 historians came up with after considering the
fate of the US as an Imperial Power.
One wonders if they wondered about the fate of Historians after
this gloomy forecast!
axbucxdu| 12.18.10 @ 1:02PM
"..., our starved education system" is anything but.
PolishKnight| 12.18.10 @ 8:45PM
axbucxdu, good catch!
Indeed, that single sentence fragment undermines the credibility
of the whole treatise!
The American education system isn't "starved". It's OBESE with
an emphasis on the wrong priorities: women's studies over
engineering. Diversity over merit. And last but not least:
educational unions and special interests over that of the students
and public.
JLK| 12.19.10 @ 9:00PM
This Brooks character seems to have a lot of time for a guy who
has to work so hard to make a living. His bombastic verbosity has
few peers in the virtual world of angry replies to whoever does not
agree with their cherished personal shibboleths.
Just because you can do a decent job of putting a few sentences
together doesn't mean you are right.
I have been hearing this same old tired "Decline and Fall of the
American Empire" stuff for 40 years. The most recent spasm was
during the Carter years when Japan was supposed to rule the world
within 20 years. Now it is again all Bush's fault. It was BUSH, I
tell you BUSH who is the cause of all things evil in the world!
I get the feeling that when (obvious) Liberals see their beloved
Utopian ideals slipping through their fingers they start calling
for the end of Western Civilization and in the case of the Church
of AGW, the world.
Get a grip. You have no idea when and if your predictions will
happen. Maybe if you worked a little harder at your profession, and
a little less hard at internet bombast, you would make enough money
to become a greedy Conservative.
JLK
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PJ| 12.17.10 @ 8:22AM
Putin is an ex-KGB thug & he wants the old Soviet Union back & all the perks associated w/the elitists---He being 1 of course!
I always thought Medvedev was the pretty boy, but apparently not. I wish him luck in cleaning up the police.
Rich Rostrom| 12.17.10 @ 1:10PM
Interesting. Were any of the police officials fired by Medvedev amonng Putin's siloviki supporters?
Alan Brooks| 12.17.10 @ 1:17PM
If this is correct WE are in trouble too:
"Trying to play down the significance of an ongoing Wikileaks dump of more than 250,000 State Department documents, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently offered the following bit of Washington wisdom: “The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it's in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets... [S]ome governments deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us. We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation.”
Now, wisdom like that certainly sounds sober; it’s definitely what passes for hardheaded geopolitical realism in our nation’s capital; and it's true, Gates is not the first top American official to call the U.S. “the indispensable nation”; nor do I doubt that he and many other inside-the-Beltway players are convinced of our global indispensability. The problem is that the news has almost weekly been undermining his version of realism, making it look ever more phantasmagorical. The ability of Wikileaks, a tiny organization of activists, to thumb its cyber-nose at the global superpower, repeatedly shining a blaze of illumination on the penumbra of secrecy under which its political and military elite like to conduct their affairs, hasn’t helped one bit either. If our indispensability is, as yet, hardly questioned in Washington, elsewhere on the planet it’s another matter.
The once shiny badge of the “global sheriff” has lost its gleam and, in Dodge City, ever fewer are paying the sort of attention that Washington believes is its due. To my mind, the single most intelligent comment on the latest Wikileaks uproar comes from Simon Jenkins of the British Guardian who, on making his way through the various revelations (not to speak of the mounds of global gossip), summed matters up this way: “The money-wasting is staggering. [U.S.] Aid payments are never followed, never audited, never evaluated. The impression is of the world's superpower roaming helpless in a world in which nobody behaves as bidden. Iran, Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, the United Nations, are all perpetually off script. Washington reacts like a wounded bear, its instincts imperial but its power projection unproductive.”
Sometimes, to understand just where you are in the present, it helps to peer into the past -- in this case, into what happened to previous “indispensable” imperial powers; sometimes, it’s no less useful to peer into the future. In his latest TomDispatch post, Alfred W. McCoy, author most recently of Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State, does both. Having convened a global working group of 140 historians to consider the fate of the U.S. as an imperial power, he offers us a glimpse of four possible American (near-)futures. They add up to a monumental, even indispensable look at just how fast our indispensability is likely to unravel in the years to come. Tom
The Decline and Fall of the American Empire
Four Scenarios for the End of the American Century by 2025
By Alfred W. McCoy
A soft landing for America 40 years from now? Don’t bet on it. The demise of the United States as the global superpower could come far more quickly than anyone imagines. If Washington is dreaming of 2040 or 2050 as the end of the American Century, a more realistic assessment of domestic and global trends suggests that in 2025, just 15 years from now, it could all be over except for the shouting.
Despite the aura of omnipotence most empires project, a look at their history should remind us that they are fragile organisms. So delicate is their ecology of power that, when things start to go truly bad, empires regularly unravel with unholy speed: just a year for Portugal, two years for the Soviet Union, eight years for France, 11 years for the Ottomans, 17 years for Great Britain, and, in all likelihood, 22 years for the United States, counting from the crucial year 2003.
Future historians are likely to identify the Bush administration’s rash invasion of Iraq in that year as the start of America's downfall. However, instead of the bloodshed that marked the end of so many past empires, with cities burning and civilians slaughtered, this twenty-first century imperial collapse could come relatively quietly through the invisible tendrils of economic collapse or cyberwarfare.
But have no doubt: when Washington's global dominion finally ends, there will be painful daily reminders of what such a loss of power means for Americans in every walk of life. As a half-dozen European nations have discovered, imperial decline tends to have a remarkably demoralizing impact on a society, regularly bringing at least a generation of economic privation. As the economy cools, political temperatures rise, often sparking serious domestic unrest.
Available economic, educational, and military data indicate that, when it comes to U.S. global power, negative trends will aggregate rapidly by 2020 and are likely to reach a critical mass no later than 2030. The American Century, proclaimed so triumphantly at the start of World War II, will be tattered and fading by 2025, its eighth decade, and could be history by 2030.
Significantly, in 2008, the U.S. National Intelligence Council admitted for the first time that America's global power was indeed on a declining trajectory. In one of its periodic futuristic reports, Global Trends 2025, the Council cited “the transfer of global wealth and economic power now under way, roughly from West to East" and "without precedent in modern history,” as the primary factor in the decline of the “United States' relative strength -- even in the military realm.” Like many in Washington, however, the Council’s analysts anticipated a very long, very soft landing for American global preeminence, and harbored the hope that somehow the U.S. would long “retain unique military capabilities… to project military power globally” for decades to come.
No such luck. Under current projections, the United States will find itself in second place behind China (already the world's second largest economy) in economic output around 2026, and behind India by 2050. Similarly, Chinese innovation is on a trajectory toward world leadership in applied science and military technology sometime between 2020 and 2030, just as America's current supply of brilliant scientists and engineers retires, without adequate replacement by an ill-educated younger generation.
By 2020, according to current plans, the Pentagon will throw a military Hail Mary pass for a dying empire. It will launch a lethal triple canopy of advanced aerospace robotics that represents Washington's last best hope of retaining global power despite its waning economic influence. By that year, however, China's global network of communications satellites, backed by the world's most powerful supercomputers, will also be fully operational, providing Beijing with an independent platform for the weaponization of space and a powerful communications system for missile- or cyber-strikes into every quadrant of the globe.
Wrapped in imperial hubris, like Whitehall or Quai d'Orsay before it, the White House still seems to imagine that American decline will be gradual, gentle, and partial. In his State of the Union address last January, President Obama offered the reassurance that “I do not accept second place for the United States of America.” A few days later, Vice President Biden ridiculed the very idea that “we are destined to fulfill [historian Paul] Kennedy's prophecy that we are going to be a great nation that has failed because we lost control of our economy and overextended.” Similarly, writing in the November issue of the establishment journal Foreign Affairs, neo-liberal foreign policy guru Joseph Nye waved away talk of China's economic and military rise, dismissing “misleading metaphors of organic decline” and denying that any deterioration in U.S. global power was underway.
Ordinary Americans, watching their jobs head overseas, have a more realistic view than their cosseted leaders. An opinion poll in August 2010 found that 65% of Americans believed the country was now “in a state of decline.” Already, Australia and Turkey, traditional U.S. military allies, are using their American-manufactured weapons for joint air and naval maneuvers with China. Already, America's closest economic partners are backing away from Washington's opposition to China's rigged currency rates. As the president flew back from his Asian tour last month, a gloomy New York Times headline summed the moment up this way: “Obama's Economic View Is Rejected on World Stage, China, Britain and Germany Challenge U.S., Trade Talks With Seoul Fail, Too.”
Viewed historically, the question is not whether the United States will lose its unchallenged global power, but just how precipitous and wrenching the decline will be. In place of Washington's wishful thinking, let’s use the National Intelligence Council's own futuristic methodology to suggest four realistic scenarios for how, whether with a bang or a whimper, U.S. global power could reach its end in the 2020s (along with four accompanying assessments of just where we are today). The future scenarios include: economic decline, oil shock, military misadventure, and World War III. While these are hardly the only possibilities when it comes to American decline or even collapse, they offer a window into an onrushing future.
Economic Decline: Present Situation
Today, three main threats exist to America’s dominant position in the global economy: loss of economic clout thanks to a shrinking share of world trade, the decline of American technological innovation, and the end of the dollar's privileged status as the global reserve currency.
By 2008, the United States had already fallen to number three in global merchandise exports, with just 11% of them compared to 12% for China and 16% for the European Union. There is no reason to believe that this trend will reverse itself.
Similarly, American leadership in technological innovation is on the wane. In 2008, the U.S. was still number two behind Japan in worldwide patent applications with 232,000, but China was closing fast at 195,000, thanks to a blistering 400% increase since 2000. A harbinger of further decline: in 2009 the U.S. hit rock bottom in ranking among the 40 nations surveyed by the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation when it came to “change” in “global innovation-based competitiveness” during the previous decade. Adding substance to these statistics, in October China's Defense Ministry unveiled the world's fastest supercomputer, the Tianhe-1A, so powerful, said one U.S. expert, that it “blows away the existing No. 1 machine” in America.
Add to this clear evidence that the U.S. education system, that source of future scientists and innovators, has been falling behind its competitors. After leading the world for decades in 25- to 34-year-olds with university degrees, the country sank to 12th place in 2010. The World Economic Forum ranked the United States at a mediocre 52nd among 139 nations in the quality of its university math and science instruction in 2010. Nearly half of all graduate students in the sciences in the U.S. are now foreigners, most of whom will be heading home, not staying here as once would have happened. By 2025, in other words, the United States is likely to face a critical shortage of talented scientists.
Such negative trends are encouraging increasingly sharp criticism of the dollar's role as the world’s reserve currency. “Other countries are no longer willing to buy into the idea that the U.S. knows best on economic policy,” observed Kenneth S. Rogoff, a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. In mid-2009, with the world's central banks holding an astronomical $4 trillion in U.S. Treasury notes, Russian president Dimitri Medvedev insisted that it was time to end “the artificially maintained unipolar system” based on “one formerly strong reserve currency.”
Simultaneously, China's central bank governor suggested that the future might lie with a global reserve currency “disconnected from individual nations” (that is, the U.S. dollar). Take these as signposts of a world to come, and of a possible attempt, as economist Michael Hudson has argued, “to hasten the bankruptcy of the U.S. financial-military world order.”
Economic Decline: Scenario 2020
After years of swelling deficits fed by incessant warfare in distant lands, in 2020, as long expected, the U.S. dollar finally loses its special status as the world's reserve currency. Suddenly, the cost of imports soars. Unable to pay for swelling deficits by selling now-devalued Treasury notes abroad, Washington is finally forced to slash its bloated military budget. Under pressure at home and abroad, Washington slowly pulls U.S. forces back from hundreds of overseas bases to a continental perimeter. By now, however, it is far too late.
Faced with a fading superpower incapable of paying the bills, China, India, Iran, Russia, and other powers, great and regional, provocatively challenge U.S. dominion over the oceans, space, and cyberspace. Meanwhile, amid soaring prices, ever-rising unemployment, and a continuing decline in real wages, domestic divisions widen into violent clashes and divisive debates, often over remarkably irrelevant issues. Riding a political tide of disillusionment and despair, a far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric, demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal. The world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence.
Oil Shock: Present Situation
One casualty of America's waning economic power has been its lock on global oil supplies. Speeding by America's gas-guzzling economy in the passing lane, China became the world's number one energy consumer this summer, a position the U.S. had held for over a century. Energy specialist Michael Klare has argued that this change means China will “set the pace in shaping our global future.”
By 2025, Iran and Russia will control almost half of the world's natural gas supply, which will potentially give them enormous leverage over energy-starved Europe. Add petroleum reserves to the mix and, as the National Intelligence Council has warned, in just 15 years two countries, Russia and Iran, could “emerge as energy kingpins.”
Despite remarkable ingenuity, the major oil powers are now draining the big basins of petroleum reserves that are amenable to easy, cheap extraction. The real lesson of the Deepwater Horizon oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico was not BP's sloppy safety standards, but the simple fact everyone saw on “spillcam”: one of the corporate energy giants had little choice but to search for what Klare calls “tough oil” miles beneath the surface of the ocean to keep its profits up.
Compounding the problem, the Chinese and Indians have suddenly become far heavier energy consumers. Even if fossil fuel supplies were to remain constant (which they won’t), demand, and so costs, are almost certain to rise -- and sharply at that. Other developed nations are meeting this threat aggressively by plunging into experimental programs to develop alternative energy sources. The United States has taken a different path, doing far too little to develop alternative sources while, in the last three decades, doubling its dependence on foreign oil imports. Between 1973 and 2007, oil imports have risen from 36% of energy consumed in the U.S. to 66%.
Oil Shock: Scenario 2025
The United States remains so dependent upon foreign oil that a few adverse developments in the global energy market in 2025 spark an oil shock. By comparison, it makes the 1973 oil shock (when prices quadrupled in just months) look like the proverbial molehill. Angered at the dollar's plummeting value, OPEC oil ministers, meeting in Riyadh, demand future energy payments in a “basket” of Yen, Yuan, and Euros. That only hikes the cost of U.S. oil imports further. At the same moment, while signing a new series of long-term delivery contracts with China, the Saudis stabilize their own foreign exchange reserves by switching to the Yuan. Meanwhile, China pours countless billions into building a massive trans-Asia pipeline and funding Iran's exploitation of the world largest natural gas field at South Pars in the Persian Gulf.
Concerned that the U.S. Navy might no longer be able to protect the oil tankers traveling from the Persian Gulf to fuel East Asia, a coalition of Tehran, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi form an unexpected new Gulf alliance and affirm that China's new fleet of swift aircraft carriers will henceforth patrol the Persian Gulf from a base on the Gulf of Oman. Under heavy economic pressure, London agrees to cancel the U.S. lease on its Indian Ocean island base of Diego Garcia, while Canberra, pressured by the Chinese, informs Washington that the Seventh Fleet is no longer welcome to use Fremantle as a homeport, effectively evicting the U.S. Navy from the Indian Ocean.
With just a few strokes of the pen and some terse announcements, the “Carter Doctrine,” by which U.S. military power was to eternally protect the Persian Gulf, is laid to rest in 2025. All the elements that long assured the United States limitless supplies of low-cost oil from that region -- logistics, exchange rates, and naval power -- evaporate. At this point, the U.S. can still cover only an insignificant 12% of its energy needs from its nascent alternative energy industry, and remains dependent on imported oil for half of its energy consumption.
The oil shock that follows hits the country like a hurricane, sending prices to startling heights, making travel a staggeringly expensive proposition, putting real wages (which had long been declining) into freefall, and rendering non-competitive whatever American exports remained. With thermostats dropping, gas prices climbing through the roof, and dollars flowing overseas in return for costly oil, the American economy is paralyzed. With long-fraying alliances at an end and fiscal pressures mounting, U.S. military forces finally begin a staged withdrawal from their overseas bases.
Within a few years, the U.S. is functionally bankrupt and the clock is ticking toward midnight on the American Century.
Military Misadventure: Present Situation
Counterintuitively, as their power wanes, empires often plunge into ill-advised military misadventures. This phenomenon is known among historians of empire as “micro-militarism” and seems to involve psychologically compensatory efforts to salve the sting of retreat or defeat by occupying new territories, however briefly and catastrophically. These operations, irrational even from an imperial point of view, often yield hemorrhaging expenditures or humiliating defeats that only accelerate the loss of power.
Embattled empires through the ages suffer an arrogance that drives them to plunge ever deeper into military misadventures until defeat becomes debacle. In 413 BCE, a weakened Athens sent 200 ships to be slaughtered in Sicily. In 1921, a dying imperial Spain dispatched 20,000 soldiers to be massacred by Berber guerrillas in Morocco. In 1956, a fading British Empire destroyed its prestige by attacking Suez. And in 2001 and 2003, the U.S. occupied Afghanistan and invaded Iraq. With the hubris that marks empires over the millennia, Washington has increased its troops in Afghanistan to 100,000, expanded the war into Pakistan, and extended its commitment to 2014 and beyond, courting disasters large and small in this guerilla-infested, nuclear-armed graveyard of empires.
Military Misadventure: Scenario 2014
So irrational, so unpredictable is “micro-militarism” that seemingly fanciful scenarios are soon outdone by actual events. With the U.S. military stretched thin from Somalia to the Philippines and tensions rising in Israel, Iran, and Korea, possible combinations for a disastrous military crisis abroad are multifold.
It’s mid-summer 2014 and a drawn-down U.S. garrison in embattled Kandahar in southern Afghanistan is suddenly, unexpectedly overrun by Taliban guerrillas, while U.S. aircraft are grounded by a blinding sandstorm. Heavy loses are taken and in retaliation, an embarrassed American war commander looses B-1 bombers and F-16 fighters to demolish whole neighborhoods of the city that are believed to be under Taliban control, while AC-130U “Spooky” gunships rake the rubble with devastating cannon fire.
Soon, mullahs are preaching jihad from mosques throughout the region, and Afghan Army units, long trained by American forces to turn the tide of the war, begin to desert en masse. Taliban fighters then launch a series of remarkably sophisticated strikes aimed at U.S. garrisons across the country, sending American casualties soaring. In scenes reminiscent of Saigon in 1975, U.S. helicopters rescue American soldiers and civilians from rooftops in Kabul and Kandahar.
Meanwhile, angry at the endless, decades-long stalemate over Palestine, OPEC’s leaders impose a new oil embargo on the U.S. to protest its backing of Israel as well as the killing of untold numbers of Muslim civilians in its ongoing wars across the Greater Middle East. With gas prices soaring and refineries running dry, Washington makes its move, sending in Special Operations forces to seize oil ports in the Persian Gulf. This, in turn, sparks a rash of suicide attacks and the sabotage of pipelines and oil wells. As black clouds billow skyward and diplomats rise at the U.N. to bitterly denounce American actions, commentators worldwide reach back into history to brand this “America's Suez,” a telling reference to the 1956 debacle that marked the end of the British Empire.
World War III: Present Situation
In the summer of 2010, military tensions between the U.S. and China began to rise in the western Pacific, once considered an American “lake.” Even a year earlier no one would have predicted such a development. As Washington played upon its alliance with London to appropriate much of Britain's global power after World War II, so China is now using the profits from its export trade with the U.S. to fund what is likely to become a military challenge to American dominion over the waterways of Asia and the Pacific.
With its growing resources, Beijing is claiming a vast maritime arc from Korea to Indonesia long dominated by the U.S. Navy. In August, after Washington expressed a “national interest” in the South China Sea and conducted naval exercises there to reinforce that claim, Beijing's official Global Times responded angrily, saying, “The U.S.-China wrestling match over the South China Sea issue has raised the stakes in deciding who the real future ruler of the planet will be.”
Amid growing tensions, the Pentagon reported that Beijing now holds “the capability to attack… [U.S.] aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean” and target “nuclear forces throughout… the continental United States.” By developing “offensive nuclear, space, and cyber warfare capabilities,” China seems determined to vie for dominance of what the Pentagon calls “the information spectrum in all dimensions of the modern battlespace.” With ongoing development of the powerful Long March V booster rocket, as well as the launch of two satellites in January 2010 and another in July, for a total of five, Beijing signaled that the country was making rapid strides toward an “independent” network of 35 satellites for global positioning, communications, and reconnaissance capabilities by 2020.
To check China and extend its military position globally, Washington is intent on building a new digital network of air and space robotics, advanced cyberwarfare capabilities, and electronic surveillance. Military planners expect this integrated system to envelop the Earth in a cyber-grid capable of blinding entire armies on the battlefield or taking out a single terrorist in field or favela. By 2020, if all goes according to plan, the Pentagon will launch a three-tiered shield of space drones -- reaching from stratosphere to exosphere, armed with agile missiles, linked by a resilient modular satellite system, and operated through total telescopic surveillance.
Last April, the Pentagon made history. It extended drone operations into the exosphere by quietly launching the X-37B unmanned space shuttle into a low orbit 255 miles above the planet. The X-37B is the first in a new generation of unmanned vehicles that will mark the full weaponization of space, creating an arena for future warfare unlike anything that has gone before.
World War III: Scenario 2025
The technology of space and cyberwarfare is so new and untested that even the most outlandish scenarios may soon be superseded by a reality still hard to conceive. If we simply employ the sort of scenarios that the Air Force itself used in its 2009 Future Capabilities Game, however, we can gain “a better understanding of how air, space and cyberspace overlap in warfare,” and so begin to imagine how the next world war might actually be fought.
It’s 11:59 p.m. on Thanksgiving Thursday in 2025. While cyber-shoppers pound the portals of Best Buy for deep discounts on the latest home electronics from China, U.S. Air Force technicians at the Space Surveillance Telescope (SST) on Maui choke on their coffee as their panoramic screens suddenly blip to black. Thousands of miles away at the U.S. CyberCommand's operations center in Texas, cyberwarriors soon detect malicious binaries that, though fired anonymously, show the distinctive digital fingerprints of China's People's Liberation Army.
The first overt strike is one nobody predicted. Chinese “malware” seizes control of the robotics aboard an unmanned solar-powered U.S. “Vulture” drone as it flies at 70,000 feet over the Tsushima Strait between Korea and Japan. It suddenly fires all the rocket pods beneath its enormous 400-foot wingspan, sending dozens of lethal missiles plunging harmlessly into the Yellow Sea, effectively disarming this formidable weapon.
Determined to fight fire with fire, the White House authorizes a retaliatory strike. Confident that its F-6 “Fractionated, Free-Flying” satellite system is impenetrable, Air Force commanders in California transmit robotic codes to the flotilla of X-37B space drones orbiting 250 miles above the Earth, ordering them to launch their “Triple Terminator” missiles at China's 35 satellites. Zero response. In near panic, the Air Force launches its Falcon Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle into an arc 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean and then, just 20 minutes later, sends the computer codes to fire missiles at seven Chinese satellites in nearby orbits. The launch codes are suddenly inoperative.
As the Chinese virus spreads uncontrollably through the F-6 satellite architecture, while those second-rate U.S. supercomputers fail to crack the malware's devilishly complex code, GPS signals crucial to the navigation of U.S. ships and aircraft worldwide are compromised. Carrier fleets begin steaming in circles in the mid-Pacific. Fighter squadrons are grounded. Reaper drones fly aimlessly toward the horizon, crashing when their fuel is exhausted. Suddenly, the United States loses what the U.S. Air Force has long called “the ultimate high ground”: space. Within hours, the military power that had dominated the globe for nearly a century has been defeated in World War III without a single human casualty.
A New World Order?
Even if future events prove duller than these four scenarios suggest, every significant trend points toward a far more striking decline in American global power by 2025 than anything Washington now seems to be envisioning.
As allies worldwide begin to realign their policies to take cognizance of rising Asian powers, the cost of maintaining 800 or more overseas military bases will simply become unsustainable, finally forcing a staged withdrawal on a still-unwilling Washington. With both the U.S. and China in a race to weaponize space and cyberspace, tensions between the two powers are bound to rise, making military conflict by 2025 at least feasible, if hardly guaranteed.
Complicating matters even more, the economic, military, and technological trends outlined above will not operate in tidy isolation. As happened to European empires after World War II, such negative forces will undoubtedly prove synergistic. They will combine in thoroughly unexpected ways, create crises for which Americans are remarkably unprepared, and threaten to spin the economy into a sudden downward spiral, consigning this country to a generation or more of economic misery.
As U.S. power recedes, the past offers a spectrum of possibilities for a future world order. At one end of this spectrum, the rise of a new global superpower, however unlikely, cannot be ruled out. Yet both China and Russia evince self-referential cultures, recondite non-roman scripts, regional defense strategies, and underdeveloped legal systems, denying them key instruments for global dominion. At the moment then, no single superpower seems to be on the horizon likely to succeed the U.S.
In a dark, dystopian version of our global future, a coalition of transnational corporations, multilateral forces like NATO, and an international financial elite could conceivably forge a single, possibly unstable, supra-national nexus that would make it no longer meaningful to speak of national empires at all. While denationalized corporations and multinational elites would assumedly rule such a world from secure urban enclaves, the multitudes would be relegated to urban and rural wastelands.
In Planet of Slums, Mike Davis offers at least a partial vision of such a world from the bottom up. He argues that the billion people already packed into fetid favela-style slums worldwide (rising to two billion by 2030) will make “the 'feral, failed cities' of the Third World… the distinctive battlespace of the twenty-first century.” As darkness settles over some future super-favela, “the empire can deploy Orwellian technologies of repression” as “hornet-like helicopter gun-ships stalk enigmatic enemies in the narrow streets of the slum districts… Every morning the slums reply with suicide bombers and eloquent explosions.”
At a midpoint on the spectrum of possible futures, a new global oligopoly might emerge between 2020 and 2040, with rising powers China, Russia, India, and Brazil collaborating with receding powers like Britain, Germany, Japan, and the United States to enforce an ad hoc global dominion, akin to the loose alliance of European empires that ruled half of humanity circa 1900.
Another possibility: the rise of regional hegemons in a return to something reminiscent of the international system that operated before modern empires took shape. In this neo-Westphalian world order, with its endless vistas of micro-violence and unchecked exploitation, each hegemon would dominate its immediate region -- Brasilia in South America, Washington in North America, Pretoria in southern Africa, and so on. Space, cyberspace, and the maritime deeps, removed from the control of the former planetary “policeman,” the United States, might even become a new global commons, controlled through an expanded U.N. Security Council or some ad hoc body.
All of these scenarios extrapolate existing trends into the future on the assumption that Americans, blinded by the arrogance of decades of historically unparalleled power, cannot or will not take steps to manage the unchecked erosion of their global position.
If America's decline is in fact on a 22-year trajectory from 2003 to 2025, then we have already frittered away most of the first decade of that decline with wars that distracted us from long-term problems and, like water tossed onto desert sands, wasted trillions of desperately needed dollars.
If only 15 years remain, the odds of frittering them all away still remain high. Congress and the president are now in gridlock; the American system is flooded with corporate money meant to jam up the works; and there is little suggestion that any issues of significance, including our wars, our bloated national security state, our starved education system, and our antiquated energy supplies, will be addressed with sufficient seriousness to assure the sort of soft landing that might maximize our country's role and prosperity in a changing world.
Europe's empires are gone and America's imperium is going. It seems increasingly doubtful that the United States will have anything like Britain's success in shaping a succeeding world order that protects its interests, preserves its prosperity, and bears the imprint of its best values."
Bob K.| 12.18.10 @ 9:48PM
Geez Alan,
Why didn't you just put up a link to this summation of what a global group of 140 historians came up with after considering the fate of the US as an Imperial Power.
One wonders if they wondered about the fate of Historians after this gloomy forecast!
axbucxdu| 12.18.10 @ 1:02PM
"..., our starved education system" is anything but.
PolishKnight| 12.18.10 @ 8:45PM
axbucxdu, good catch!
Indeed, that single sentence fragment undermines the credibility of the whole treatise!
The American education system isn't "starved". It's OBESE with an emphasis on the wrong priorities: women's studies over engineering. Diversity over merit. And last but not least: educational unions and special interests over that of the students and public.
JLK| 12.19.10 @ 9:00PM
This Brooks character seems to have a lot of time for a guy who has to work so hard to make a living. His bombastic verbosity has few peers in the virtual world of angry replies to whoever does not agree with their cherished personal shibboleths.
Just because you can do a decent job of putting a few sentences together doesn't mean you are right.
I have been hearing this same old tired "Decline and Fall of the American Empire" stuff for 40 years. The most recent spasm was during the Carter years when Japan was supposed to rule the world within 20 years. Now it is again all Bush's fault. It was BUSH, I tell you BUSH who is the cause of all things evil in the world!
I get the feeling that when (obvious) Liberals see their beloved Utopian ideals slipping through their fingers they start calling for the end of Western Civilization and in the case of the Church of AGW, the world.
Get a grip. You have no idea when and if your predictions will happen. Maybe if you worked a little harder at your profession, and a little less hard at internet bombast, you would make enough money to become a greedy Conservative.
JLK
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