Burma’s agony continues. On Sunday the military dictatorship
held a rigged election to cloak itself in civilian garb. The people
of Burma will continue to suffer under one of the worst governments
on earth.
Gen. Ne Win seized power in 1962. Nearly a half century
later the country is ruled by a junta headed by Gen. Than Shwe. The
military’s crimes are many. It has imposed a corrupt and brutal
dictatorship; conducted a genocidal war against dissident ethnic
groups; suppressed civil and political liberties; kept the country
desperately poor; and enriched well-connected allies at public
expense. The government even impeded international assistance after
devastating Cyclone Nargis in 2008.
The regime has repeatedly attempted to rebrand itself. For
instance, the junta once called itself the State Law and Order
Restoration Council, SLORC, but shifted to the State Peace and
Development Council. Alas, the only peace the SPDC believes in is
of the grave and the only development it supports is of junta
members’ bank accounts. The generals occasionally ousted and
imprisoned each other.
In 1990 the junta foolishly held an election. Like the
Nicaraguan Sandinistas and Polish Communists, who also called free
ballots, the Burmese military overestimated its popular support.
The Burmese people decisively rejected the regime, overwhelmingly
voting for Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League
for Democracy. So the generals voided the result, suppressed the
NLD, and quarantined Suu Kyi, subjecting her to house arrest for 15
of the last 21 years.
There has been no mellowing over the years. In 2003 the
regime promised a “roadmap to discipline-flourishing democracy,”
which emphasized discipline over democracy. The SPDC ruthlessly
suppressed protests led by Buddhist monks in 2007. The following
year the junta stuffed ballot boxes in a referendum on its
authoritarian constitution, drafted without popular input. The
generals routinely harassed Suu Kyi and sentenced many of her
supporters to long prison terms. The regime reached ceasefire
agreements with a number of rebellious ethnic groups, but since
then has begun demanding that the forces disarm, a nonstarter for
people who have suffered from unlimited military barbarity for
decades.
The junta’s latest strategy is another election, for a
two-house national parliament and 14 state and regional assemblies.
However, this ballot was rigged from the start to prevent any
chance of the opposition triumphing. First, there was no
independent election commission and no foreign observers were
allowed. No electioneering, let along criticism of the government
was permitted. The media is largely controlled by the government;
even nominally private publications are censored. So are sermons by
monks. The cost of registering to run alone exceeded the per capita
GDP. Elaine Pearson, deputy Asia director for Human Rights Watch,
complained: the vote was “being conducted in a climate of fear,
intimidation, and resignation.”
Second, some 2000 imprisoned democracy activists,
including Suu Kyi and many other NLD members, were deemed
ineligible to run. Political parties were required to expel members
with “criminal” records, including for political offenses, to
contest the ballot.
Thus, the NLD, the nation’s only legitimate governing
force, refused to participate. The generals then dissolved the
party (along with nine others). NLD activists responded by urging a
boycott. The regime threatened to jail them while promising
development projects to neighborhoods where residents marked their
ballots ahead of time. The government also barred people from
participating in many eastern ethnic areas, while in others
rebellious groups refused to participate.
Third, the regime turned military apparatchiks into
civilian candidates. Through the misnamed United Solidarity and
Development Party the generals fielded candidates to contest all
1,163 offices at stake. The equally misnamed National Unity Party,
representing Ne Win, the original dictator who was ousted in 1988,
put up 999 candidates. Richard Horsey, a former UN official,
contended that victories by some of the latter would demonstrate
that the military is not monolithic, but the NUP no more represents
the Burmese people does than the USDP. Both military factions are
paranoid, xenophobic, and despotic.
In contrast, the National Democratic Force, a rump group
of former NLD-activists, only contested 163 seats. A number of
other small parties, including several ethnic-based organizations,
ran a few candidates. A number of independents also stood for
office. Still, Burma’s foreign minister, Nyan Win, claimed: “Such a
large participation made it crystal clear that the elections become
virtually inclusive.”
Fourth, parties were required to affirm support for the
2008 constitution imposed by the SPDC. That document reserves
one-fourth of the lower house and one-third of the upper house to
the military, allows the “civilian” president to turn power over to
the military, creates a National Defense and Security Council, and
permits the military-controlled Union Election Commission to
dismiss legislators for “misbehavior.”
Authority will not be transferred. The generals will
remain in charge. The Burmese people are not fooled. Ashin
Issariya, a founding member of the All Burma Monks Alliance,
observed: “It will be the same faces and the same system that we
have been living with for decades. The name ‘elections’ does not
change anything for us.” Long-time NLD activist Win Tin said the
election “will just help the military get what they want — to rule
for a century or more.” Dot Lay Mu of the Karen National Union
warned: the generals are using the poll to “consolidate and
prolong” their control.
The junta’s objective is another image makeover. Today the
SPDC is widely reviled around the world and subject to U.S. and
European sanctions. The generals hope to gain greater international
acceptance.
The international response to the junta has been divided.
The U.S. and Europe have campaigned against the regime, but Burma’s
neighbors have refused to join in. China supports the generals
irrespective of how many people they kill. India is economically
active in Burma and, along with Malaysia and Singapore, trains SPDC
military officers. Other countries, including Thailand, have
refused to do more than apply limited pressure, valuing Burma’s
natural resources more than Burmese human rights.
Now Asian governments are lauding the poll while Western
governments are unsure how to respond. Some analysts argue that
even a flawed election presages possible political
liberalization.
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson of MIT and Harvard,
respectively, wrote: “History shows that gradual, half-hearted
reforms of this sort are exactly how many autocracies successfully
transition to democracy.” However, the examples they cite are less
than convincing. Great Britain and early America were republics
which distrusted direct democracy, not dictatorships. Chile
immunized participants in the military regime, but returned power
to an elected civilian government. Taiwan allowed the established
though previously outlawed opposition party to contest newly free
elections. Burma matches none of these. Egypt may be closer, but
that nation remains unfree a half century after Col. Abdul Nasser
became a civilian.
Allowing a genuinely free vote for a civilian government
with some independent powers even while the military maintains
control over security agencies might permit a gradual evolution to
a more liberal system. But allowing a few dissident civilians to
assume powerless positions in a system controlled by the same
authoritarian apparatchiks, only wearing suits rather than
uniforms, is unlikely to yield any noticeable difference in
governance.
Some analysts posit that the process may empower younger
military men. Younger does not necessarily mean reformer, however.
Observed journalist Bertil Lintner, “Lower and middle-ranking army
officers remain immensely loyal to the leadership, knowing full
well that they can only rise to prominent and privileged positions
by showing that they are even more hardline than their superiors.”
Anyway, the aging process guarantees personnel turnover. The faux
elections add nothing. So too when it comes to dreams of economic
liberalization and government transparency: such policies will
change only if the military wants them to change, not as a result
of the vote.
If Suu Kyi is released after her house arrest formally
expires on Nov. 13 — and she is allowed to resume active political
activities, along with other democratic activists — then there
might be at least a little hope for a little change. But if most of
those who have been fighting for liberty remain imprisoned,
opposition political activity remains proscribed, and criticism of
the government remains prohibited, then even Suu Kyi’s release,
though welcome, would signal no change.
Still, Lex Rieffel and David I. Steinberg, of the
Brookings Institution and Georgetown University respectively,
argued that “With smart, nuanced policies, however, the U.S. and
other Western countries could help to ensure that the November
election is a major step toward a democratic and prosperous Burma.”
What policies they do not say. Since the ballot changes nothing
substantive, it is hard to imagine policies which could to turn the
vote into a positive step forward.
The fact that the faux election offers no prospect of
change doesn’t mean the West should maintain its policy of
isolation and sanctions. This strategy has manifestly failed.
Today’s only winner is China, which has achieved disproportionate
influence in Rangoon.
Attempting to reinforce isolation and sanctions is a
dead-end. For instance, the administration is now pushing for a
UN-sponsored commission to investigate Burma for war crimes. It’s a
fine idea, but one that will never get past Beijing in the Security
Council. Given the prevalence of human rights abusers in the
international body, General Assembly or Human Rights Council vote
is no more likely.
It is time to move in the opposite direction.
Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, said the ballot “will be without international
legitimacy” but called for “dialogue” as “the best way forward”
among difficult options. He hopes for the rise of new players and
structures, but that’s more dream than reality. The poll alone is
no reason by itself to reverse policy. The U.S. should not aid the
junta’s attempt to disguise its malign character. Brutal
authoritarians were in control on November 6, before the vote.
Brutal authoritarians remain in control on November 8, after the
vote.
After a decent interval, however, Washington should
consult with Europeans and leading Asian states to forge a united
strategy to press Burma for reform. The U.S. government needs to
recognize that its ability to influence events in Rangoon is
limited. Broader international support, especially in Southeast
Asia, is required for any hope of progress.
No policy offers much likelihood of success. But promising
to eschew attempts at coercive regime change while offering rewards
for political liberalization may provide the best, if still not a
good, strategy to promote real change. For instance, Jared Genser
of Freedom Now argued: “It is only through a facilitated process of
tripartite dialogue among the junta, Suu Kyi and the National
League for Democracy and the country’s disparate ethnic groups that
any real reconciliation and progress toward democracy will be
made.”
Burma poses one of the world’s greatest humanitarian
challenges. The latest “election” changes nothing. The Obama
administration should treat the new “civilian” government no
different than the old military regime. But Washington nevertheless
should acknowledge the failure of its past democratization efforts,
and look for a new way forward.
