There has been considerable speculation behind the visit to
Lebanon of Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The generally
accepted theory is the egocentric desire of the Iranian leader to
bask in the Lebanese sunshine of acceptance as a “protector”
against Israel.
With armed Hezbollah militia acting as a local praetorian
guard, Ahmadinejad launched himself into public appearances as if
he were running for local office. The Hezbollah-guided crowds
needed little encouragement to give the diminutive Persian a heroic
reception. One would have thought the screaming Lebanese had lost
their traditional love of secular advantages in favor of Iran’s
austerity. One unimpressed local journalist marked the people’s
reaction by noting cynically, “No matter how they stand
(politically) my Lebanese love rock stars.”
Ahmadinejad certainly received his rock star welcome and
his propagandists played the visit internationally for all it was
worth. But the official Iranian flacks had overlooked the timing of
the Chilean miners rescue that occupied TV worldwide. In the end,
though, it didn’t really matter. The boss didn’t notice anything.
He was in his element grinning and waving at the crowds while
shaking his rhetorical fist at Israel.
Behind the scenes, however, is the fact that Syria is
increasingly unhappy with the growth of Iranian influence in
Lebanese politics. The deal among Hezbollah, Iran, and other Moslem
political groups in Beirut always was supposed to be that Damascus
would exercise the lead role in Lebanese political life. Recently
Syrian intelligence is reported to have substantially infiltrated
Hezbollah, aided by a considerable increase in military supplies
from Damascus. Ahmadinejad’s presence in Lebanon was supposed to
counter this and be a reminder to certain Hezbollah leaders of
where their original training and support had come.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s heralded visit was as much a
regional statement as it was for local Lebanese consumption. The
Iranians have a three-pronged offensive in progress: Shia alignment
in Iraq, Hamas allegiance in Gaza, and Hezbollah’s ruling desires
in Lebanon. The Syrians see this as the first steps in an attempt
by Tehran’s clerical leadership’s plan for a Greater Persia — and
Damascus doesn’t like what it sees.
The years of competition between the Syrian and Iraqi
wings of the Baath Party were abruptly changed with the dissolving
of Saddam Hussein’s control over Iraq. The Shia of that country
never had an important Baath status. It was Saddam’s Sunni brethren
who dominated and supported Iraq’s Baathist pseudo-socialist
character. Syria played host to thousands of Sunni Baathists during
the U.S. invasion and occupation.
The Shia Alawite leadership of Bashir al-Assad has no
interest in allowing the evolution of Iranian Shia suzerainty over
Syria’s neighbors, Iraq and Lebanon. It must be remembered that
Syria is a majority Sunni country. The al-Assad leadership clan is
far more instructed by its regional Alawite sect affiliation than
its Shia religious consciousness. And this is to say nothing of the
long-term friendly coexistence between the Lebanese Maronite
Christian Franjieh clan and the extended Assad family going back to
the days of 1957 when Hafez al-Assad was a Syrian intelligence
officer in charge of protecting the fleeing Suleiman Franjieh (the
elder).
None of this has much meaning for Ahmadinejad, who is is
intellectually and politically not in the power class of the
clerical leadership in Tehran. He will remain around only for as
long as Iran’s Supreme Leader and his military power center, the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, wish him to do so.
The Iranian president’s theatrics in Lebanon inadvertently
fit right in with Bibi Netanyahu’s warnings on Iranian intentions
against Israel. From supporters of Obama to opponents of Sarkozy,
there have been urgent calls for the Israelis to dial down their
rhetoric of fear of the Persian bomb. Perhaps someone should have
told Ahmadinejad that the more he rants for the benefit of his
followers, the more he loses in terms of Western government
restraint on the Israelis.
Parades in Beirut and speeches in a village overlooking
the Israeli border serve the purpose of the clerical leadership in
Iran in terms of flexing their regional muscle. They want to keep
Damascus alert to Tehran’s outreach and international status. It
also reminds the United States, and the West in general, that they
have more than Persian nuclear development to worry about while
they are pressing ahead with sanctions.
Greater Persia may seem a dream to some outside of Iran.
But in Iran and the region it seeks to dominate, it’s real enough.
Just ask anyone in Bashar al-Assad’s entourage. They still believe
in a Greater Syria!
