When in doubt journalists covering the Afghan conflict fall back
on the old “corrupt Karzai government” line. This then is followed
by a quote from an assistant secretary of something that suggests
that the U.S. government agrees with the information while
maintaining the right to withdraw such remarks at a later date.
Huh?
It’s all very familiar and quite convenient for the White
House. In spite of President Obama’s well-recognized desire to
encourage friendly relations with every Muslim leader he meets, he
has treated Hamid Karzai like the proverbial “red-headed
stepchild.” How is it possible that a former Chicago community
organizer, close friend of people like Tony Rezko, William Ayers,
and a good political acquaintance of ex-Gov. Blagojevich, can be so
upset over nearly overt corruption?
Actually Hamid Karzai should be Barack Obama’s favorite
type of guy. Karzai is the well-educated son of a major Pushtun
political leader gunned down by that Taliban gang in 1999. Hamid
“the Smooth” comes from a powerful family with property in the
middle of the lush poppy-growing area of Kandahar and elsewhere.
His half-brother learned his basic business skills running a
restaurant on the north side of Chicago. How difficult is it for
Barack Obama to understand the Karzai family?
The ambitious former general, now ambassador Karl
Eikenberry found the man he is supposed to be impressing in
Afghanistan with the good will of the U.S. to be “bipolar” and
vulnerable to a regular intake of “meds.” Somehow that doesn’t seem
to be the best public posture for the chief American diplomat in
Kabul. That Eikenberry had been in a self-developed and one-sided
feud with the former ISAF chief, General Stanley McChrystal, for
the affections of Obama is indicative of the dysfunctional nature
of the administration’s direction of its Afghan political and
military affairs.
General McChrystal was clearly wrong to allow his staffers
to shoot off their mouths about the Washington administration—but
they told the truth. The problem is that the truth isn’t going to
change. Gen. David Petraeus is stuck with the same situation and
his only choice is to focus on challenging the Taliban while
keeping President Karzai involved and interested enough to present
a paternal face to the Afghan people. This is hardly the first time
the U.S. has had to work with corrupt allies.
Petraeus knows the traditional corruption in the Karzai
government acts as a convenient excuse for a White House that
clearly refuses to take responsibility for its own inability to
handle the broader national security aspects of the Afghan
conflict. The consistent leaking of classified intelligence
information to favored journalists creates a continuing
behind-the-scenes battle fought between Obama representatives and
the combat military.
For the Obama presidency Afghanistan was supposed to be
“the good war.” Now, less than two years after his election, the
president’s political advisers have changed their collective mind
and urged their risk-averse boss to “bug out” of Afghanistan as
quickly as possible. The White House-demanded policy has been to
press forward with the war on the Taliban while at the same time
avoid killing civilians, even if it means allowing insurgents to
escape. Such a restriction has inhibited combat effectiveness and
endangered our troops.
Somehow this policy, first overseen loyally but
reluctantly by the dynamic warrior general, Stan McChrystal, is
supposed also to be pursued now by the equally dynamic diplomat
general, Dave Petraeus. This nice sounding but totally ineffectual
war-fighting concept will not work any better under Petraeus than
it did under McChrystal — nor will it ever against a dedicated and
resourceful foe.
The offensive launched this week in Kandahar Province is
Petraeus’s chance to secure that area. The Obama-urged strategy is
to strike a hard — but collateral damage avoiding — blow against
the Taliban forcing them into a defensive negotiating position.
This was the original plan unsuccessfully pursued in Marjah last
spring as the defeated Taliban simply returned covertly among the
populace. This time the Afghan Army is supposed to enforce
post-combat pacification. At least that’s the theory.
The recent elections showed how effective Taliban
persuasion can be. Small minorities of eligible voters turned out
— and their votes were scarred by illegal counting, attacks on
polling stations and general voter intimidation. Meanwhile in some
population centers, such as Paktia, a reported turnout of 111.37%
indicated glaring fraud. A fearful electorate whose true voice is
impossible to hear cannot build a democracy. And an American
administration that seeks only to pretend it’s fighting a war is
not one that encourages local people to endanger their lives by
voting.
Barack Obama is not a fighter. At best he is a negotiator
— except in this case the really hardcore Taliban see no point in
negotiating. The Americans will leave anyhow. The American
president has said so. The published timetable puts July 2011 as
the start date — conditions based. Defense Secretary Gates has
announced he will be leaving about the same time. “Conditions
based” is strictly political cover.
The departure of at least part of the American/NATO force
has to be expected by Karzai. Quixotic or not, Hamid Karzai is
smart enough to realize he has to make a deal with the Taliban or
“get out of Dodge.” Obama is already counting on the withdrawal of
U.S. combat operations by next summer to kick off his reelection
campaign. Hamid Karzai knows that, too. He is feverishly attempting
to line up cooperative Taliban offering a semblance of security and
a veneer of victory.
The only question left unanswered is whether General
Petraeus will continue to go along with this plan for the next nine
months. If he does, he will be the next Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs. If he doesn’t, someone will want him as a presidential
candidate.
