How has President Obama mismanaged the Afghanistan war? Bob
Woodward’s new book counts the ways. There’s a president retreating
after a “generals’ revolt,” domestic politics overriding any
concern with the war’s outcome and — according to the leaked
portions of the book due out today — much more. But the White
House is praising Obama’s Wars, not condemning it.
If you are confused, dear reader, take comfort in the fact
that you are no more so than our president.
Before we get to the revealing parts of Woodward’s book,
it’s time to pull back on the stick and gain a little altitude.
What Woodward’s book reveals is a president whose sole concern —
regardless of the issue — is how it will affect his domestic
political position.
Obama’s 2008 campaign was an anti-war campaign reminiscent
of George McGovern’s in 1972. When elected, Obama ordered an
immediate review of our policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, to
withdraw from Iraq and fight smarter in Afghanistan than Bush had.
This review took two months and resulted in a new policy, released
on March 27, 2009. It provided for new diplomatic “mechanisms,”
more civilian assistance to Afghanistan’s government, and
encouraged the Karzai government to seek reconciliation with the
insurgents. (Reconciliation, assumed to be a mutual goal, didn’t
attract the Taliban for the simple reason they believe they are
winning. And they are right.).
Reality caught up to that policy in just 90 days. Defense
Secretary Bob Gates ordered a new policy review on June 26, 2009.
There ensued a five-month debate that resulted in Obama’s military
advisors being divided from the president to a degree not seen
since the MacArthur-Truman dispute in 1951.
In August 2009, Gen. Stanley McChrystal submitted a
congressionally mandated report that said, in part, “Failure to
gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near term
(next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks
an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”
The report was released to the public almost instantly, possibly by
McChrystal.
Those of us not privy to the internal debate saw that
while the Obama team dithered, it was subjected to increasing and
highly unusual public pressure from Gen. David Petraeus, then
CENTCOM commander, and Gen. McChrystal, then commander in
Afghanistan. In shockingly candid interviews and speeches, the two
forced the president to surge troops into Afghanistan to support
the counterinsurgency.
At this point, the press was mildly critical of the
generals for trying to corner the president, which they obviously
were. Was it insubordination? Perhaps. But Petraeus and McChrystal
had direct responsibility to conduct the war, and had to choose
between pressuring the White House and resigning. McChrystal was
later fired for heavy-handed insubordination published in
Rolling Stone. Petraeus chose to stay — for now — and is
now stuck with pursuing a policy he knows will not
succeed.
Contrast these actions with the 2006 media-manufactured
“revolt of the generals” which quickly became a feeding frenzy. Six
retired generals (without authority or responsibility for anything)
were bashing then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, demanding his
removal. The Washington Post, in April 2006,
defended
its earlier call for Rumsfeld’s departure. The revolt failed:
Rumsfeld stayed through the 2006 election.
The new “generals’ revolt” put the media in a box: on one
hand, they wouldn’t criticize the president they’d just created; on
the other, they couldn’t take on Petraeus, who may be the most
trusted man in America. The 2006 “generals’ revolt” failed because
it was political. This revolt succeeded because it was substantive.
Woodward’s book reportedly shows why.
According to the New York Times report
of September 21, Woodward wrote: “The president
concluded from the start that ‘I have two years with the public on
this’ and pressed advisers for ways to avoid a big escalation.” The
book quotes Obama imploring, “I want an exit strategy.” The report
also quotes the book that, “Privately, [Obama] told Vice
President Joseph R. Biden Jr. to push his
alternative strategy opposing a big troop buildup in meetings, and
while Mr. Obama ultimately rejected it, he set a withdrawal
timetable because, ‘I can’t lose the whole Democratic
Party.’”
The Times report on the book also quotes Obama as
saying, “Get the forces in faster and out faster.… You tell me that
the biggest problem we have now is that the momentum is with the
Taliban and the reason for this resource request is that the
momentum is with the Taliban. But you’re not getting these troops
into Afghanistan’ for more than a year. I’m not going to make a
commitment that leaves my successor with more troops than I
inherited in Afghanistan.”
So Obama granted a “McChrystal Lite” surge — 30,000
rather than the 40-60,000 requested — and imposed the July 2011
date to begin withdrawal. Which made no sense to his military and
diplomatic advisors. The September 21 New York
Times
report says that the book reveals that Army Lt.
Gen. Douglas Lute, held over from his service as “war czar” for
Bush, harbors grave doubts about the latest strategy Obama has
chosen. Woodward reports that Lute believes “that the president’s
review did not ‘add up’ to the decision he made.” Amb. Richard
Holbrooke, Obama’s special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, is
quoted as saying Obama’s strategy cannot work.
The generals’ revolt against Obama’s political view of the
war continues. In August, nine months after Obama’s new strategy
was announced, Marine Commandant Gen. James Conway said, “In
some ways, we think right now it’s probably giving our enemy
sustenance…. In fact, we’ve intercepted communications that say,
‘Hey, you know, we only have to hold out for so long.’” Obama has
since reaffirmed the July 2011 planned withdrawal, which means we
will hear more from Petraeus, Conway, and others.
According to a September 22 Washington
Post
report on Woodward’s book, Obama granted
Woodward an extensive interview. In it, he told Woodward that he
didn’t think of the war in “classic” terms of winning and losing,
only in terms of making Afghanistan stronger rather than weaker in
the end.
It is bizarre and revealing that the White House is
supportive of Woodward’s book. The Hill newspaper
reported Wednesday quoting a White House
source that, “The president comes across in the
review, and throughout the decision-making process, as a commander
in chief who is analytical, strategic and decisive, with a broad
view of history, national security and his role.”
That quote should be entered in the Guinness Book of World
Records under the heading of “most spin in one sentence.” But it
does confirm what Woodward wrote. There’s not one report that the
White House disputes anything in Woodward’s book.
The 2010 election will be decided entirely on economic and
personal issues. But in 26 months, we will choose a president
again. By then, Iraq will have failed, Afghanistan will be
irretrievably lost, and Iran may have achieved its nuclear weapons
ambitions. Republicans would be wise to focus it on Obama’s wars
and his irresponsible, narcissistic approach to them.
Is there a war president-in-waiting out there? On November
3, one should step forward boldly.
