The Presidential Palace in Mogadishu, Somalia, continues to
exist only because 6,000 African Union troops are assigned to guard
it and nearby government buildings. Al Shabaab, the al Qaeda-linked
rebel group. is the current “really bad guy,” as one aide official
has explained while attempting to classify the many murderous gangs
that proliferate that impoverished country.
The Islamist Al Shabaab has been brought to the attention
of the world not only because of its well-reported ambitions of
taking over Somalia, but for its wider goals of jihad
internationally. This Somali terrorist group and its allies
controls a large portion of the capital, Mogadishu, and most of the
rest of the country. In declaring its allegiance to al Qaeda, al
Shabaab has gained a guarantee of world press attention. The actual
number of al Shabaab fighters has been estimated by British
military sources to be around 7,000. Of these about 3,000 are
reportedly organized guerrillas and the rest act as local police
for both civil and religious control.
The recent bombing of the Muna Hotel in Mogadishu located
near seaside less than a mile from the heavily fortified
Presidential Palace was a favored meeting place for government
officials and parliamentarians. Of the approximately thirty killed,
six were officials. It was a carefully planned operation aimed at
intimidating government supporters. To insure security before
government forces could capture them, two of the attackers
committed suicide by detonating their explosive vests. The
coordination and unrestricted killing is the mark of typical al
Shabaab fighting tactics that apparently have been influenced by
various veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
While there is a tendency to view al Shabaab’s structure
as a unified command, it is divided geographically into three
relatively autonomous units, with the strongest in Mogadishu and
south-central Somalia. Juba Valley, a long time hot bed of
insurgency, represents a fourth group aligned with but not a member
of al Shabaab.
There is little evidence that al Shabaab has yet reached
an operationally unified approach. On the contrary, there remains
considerable disagreement tactically among the several elements
based on clan and ideological differences. There is little sign of
material support from al Qaeda, though its links with the Somali
organization are strengthened by strictly personal relationships
and frequent travel to and from Yemen.
Money continues to flow into Somalia through the
traditional hawala personal transfer system and with
increasing international links to the Somali diaspora. Certain
elements in the immigrant African and general Islamic community in
the U.K. and U.S. find exciting the prospect of assisting what they
envision as a “revolutionary” al Shabaab. There is, of course,
considerable speculation over the money extorted through piracy and
an al Shabaab connection. For the most part, however, there is a
consensus in intelligence circles that the proceeds of piracy first
pass through a clan hierarchy.
The religious orientation of al Shabaab appears to be one
of convenience. Although it embraces a form of Wahhabism that is
Sunni derived, it applies this ideology as it finds convenient in
order to accomplish its purpose of jihad and recruit
followers. Local units of al Shabaab apply their own interpretation
of Sharia law in the belief that they are both the true civil and
religious authority. There have been reports, however, coming out
of central Somalia of orthodox Sunnis banding together to counter
al Shabaab’s drive to dominate the religious
application.
To create an effective buffer against Somali insurgency of
all hues, it will be necessary to provide substantial and
consistent aid to President Sheik Sharif Ahmed’s Transitional
Federal Government. This means a program that will enable the TFG
to offer the basic services that are the responsibility of all
governments. Increasing the size of the African Union Force
(AMISOM) to twice it current size to a total of 12,000 troops would
allow the TFG at least to gain administrative and security control
of Mogadishu from al Shabaab.
There is the view, of course, that the divisions in the
country have been exacerbated by Western recognition of the TFG and
that such action should be shelved in favor of “constructive
disengagement.” This would be followed, in theory, by
acceptance of an al Shabaab Islamist state “as long as it did not
engage in violence or terrorism.”
With al Shabaab seeking to rule through intimidation by
the gun, there is no way to institute civil authority other than to
surrender to or outfight them. The Somali terrorist group has
announced through its bombings last July in Kampala, Uganda, that
killed 76 innocent civilians that it was “just the beginning” (as
al Shabaab put it in a statement) of the internationalization of
its ambitions.
The signs are clear that al Shabaab intends to expand its
operations even while consolidating its domestic position. The
Somalis of al Shabaab are descendants of those outlaws and
murderers known for generations throughout Somalia and nearby
regions as t’era-shifta. At various times in the recent
past these shifta have sought to operate under the guise
of political change. Nonetheless they continue today their ancient
practice of robbing , maiming and killing indiscriminately while
taking no prisoners except to enslave or sell them. It has been
thus for hundreds of years — and remains so today. “Constructive
disengagement” is not in their DNA.
