It’s doubtful anyone would find objectionable a U.S.
government advisory that states, “The Taliban is a movement based
on strict Islamic religious beliefs that influence all aspects of
societal behavior.” Yet somewhere that document should also note
that if the U.S. and its NATO partners are to remain in
Afghanistan fighting the Taliban, they’ll need to accept there
always will be a sanctuary for Taliban leaders and fighters in
Pakistani territory. That is a fact of geography as much as
politics.
The Durand Line, named in 1893 after Sir Mortimer Durand,
was established by the British to define the border between what
is now Pakistan and Afghanistan. No reference was made regarding
the existing Pashtun tribal demarcation spreading outward on both
sides of the line. Some of the most famous units of the old
British Indian Army fought the tribesmen for domination of the
area. But it was always recognized that peace could be maintained
only with the acquiescence of the tribes that made up the broad
Pashtun tribal alliance. Why would any responsible intelligence
assessment contemplate that the situation could be different
today?
This unfortunate fact was driven home when al Qaeda and
their Taliban allies escaped the hard charging U.S. forces that
had driven them through the mountains of Waziristan into Pakistan
in a supposed classic hammer and anvil strategy. The only problem
was that the Pakistan security forces provided only a very porous
anvil as bin Laden’s and Mullah Omar’s experienced irregulars
slipped through with Pashtun clan cooperation.
Pakistan’s multi-faceted central intelligence instrument,
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has been a principal conduit
for foreign contact with Pashtun tribal resistance, though
American and British special operations teams have made some
inroads. This is the same situation that existed during the
Soviet invasion. Back then it was through ISI cut-outs and
contacts that the U.S. funneled most of its support to the
mujahedin. The Taliban grew as a movement out of the
Pashtun clan structure and the ISI was there as an accommodating
supplier of equipment and technical advice. This liaison
continued after the Taliban formed their government in Kabul. All
this was well known to U.S. intelligence when the Afghan
expedition was launched in 2001.
There is a conspicuous disconnection of logic when
commentators become apoplectic over news that Pakistani
intelligence officers, businessmen, and religious leaders have
had continuing contact with the Taliban. Of course such
intercourse exists. It existed long before there was a Taliban as
such. There are kindred tribes and clans on both sides of Sir
Mortimer Durand’s artificial border. The real issue is not that
such close relations continue to exist in this modern day, but
rather how the U.S. copes with this fact of conflicted
allegiances.
Pakistan’s ISI deals with this problem by structuring
multiple levels of operational contact and support. On the far
end is the Mehsud clan of fierce fighters mostly from South
Waziristan, though they seek to extend their operations north in
the Swat Valley. They maintain alliances with militant groups in
Punjab such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taibi and lead the
movement called Tehrik-y-Taliban Pakistan to counter Islamabad’s
control of the federally administered tribal areas and elsewhere
as suits their political interests.
In October ‘09 the newly appointed TTP leader, Hakimullah
Mehsud, claimed responsibility for an attack in Rawalpindi and
ISI headquarters in Lahore. This supposedly was in retaliation
for an ISI-approved American drone attack that killed the
previous Mehsud clan chief, Baitullah Mehsud. Obviously there is
no love lost between the ISI and the Mehsud Taliban.
On the other end of the spectrum are the traditional clans
of Pashtun fighters who worked closely with the ISI, and the
Americans, as mujahedin during the war against the
Soviets. A community of former leaders and their families
continue to live under ISI protection in Quetta, Pakistan, and
provide a support structure for sub-tribes all along the border.
Important among these old Pakistani allies are the Haqqani of
North Waziristan and the Northwest Frontier province. The
appropriate sections of ISI maintain covert liaison with all
these groups even though they may be active anti-U.S. and
anti-Kabul government insurgents, as certainly are members of
Haqqani network.
The Economist has stated that within the Pashtun
nation there are 60 tribes and 400 sub-tribes and uncounted
clans. Pakistan must have a special relationship with the tribal
forces along the 2,640 km. border between it and Afghanistan. The
highest priority for Pakistani intelligence is to maintain the
traditional tribal alliances that provide the first line of
defense in the northern territories against India. It is ISI’s
job to make sure it has adequate penetration of and a degree of
influence on the clan structure of the Pashtun tribal
amalgamation — and thus where possible the various
Taliban-linked forces.
Islamabad’s military leadership believes the future of the
ISI — and through it, Pakistan — requires a Pashtun, and thus
Taliban, entente. For the U.S. to conceive any future role
relative to Afghanistan without this fact in mind is
operationally illogical and ultimately self-defeating.
