Call it nation-building, call it counterinsurgency, the
neocon way of war is based on the antihistorical idea that the
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are capable of resolution
within those nations’ borders. It willfully ignores the
conclusive influence that the intervention of foreign
terror-sponsoring nations has.
Many of us who supported military action in Afghanistan and
Iraq weren’t neocons then, and by condemning nation-building now
aren’t turning coat.
Literally from the moment the towers of the World Trade
Center fell, I have written that the nations that sponsor
terrorism are our enemy, and that we cannot win this war unless
and until we force them out of that business.
On 9-11, I wrote a column that was published the following
day in the Washington Times. In it, I said, “Nations
that sponsor or harbor terrorists are our enemies. We have to
treat them accordingly. We must act against them, using whatever
force is necessary to destroy the threat.”
The only other people to cast the war in those terms were
Michael Ledeen in his 2002 book, The War Against the Terror
Masters, and retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen. Richard B. Myers in his 2009 book, Eyes on the
Horizon. I am honored to be in that small company.
Unless our national leadership quickly joins us, the terror
sponsors will win this war and America will cease to be the land
of the free.
From the beginning, I have argued that this war is as much
an ideological war as a kinetic one. And, with equal consistency,
I have been opposed to nation-building.
In Loose Canons on April 30, 2002 I wrote that Bush’s
thinking had become dangerously confused. On September 4, 2002, I
wrote that even if we dealt with the terrorist threats in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the war would not be over until we ended —
forcibly or otherwise — nations’ sponsorship of terrorism. And,
on March 20, 2006, in a Loose Canons piece entitled “Endgame
Conservatives,” I explained comprehensively the problem with the
neocons’ war plan, that it placed us on the strategic defensive
and precluded victory.
I explained that nation-building is not “neoconservatism”
but actually “neo-Wilsonianism.” That it is, at its core, a
colonialist strategy bound to fail anywhere, not just in the
Muslim world. That if you do not fight a war in a manner
calculated to win it decisively, you will lose it
inevitably.
It is immoral — and contrary to the nation’s security —
to spend American lives in nation-building. In the Muslim culture
it’s doubly so, because the religion prohibits democracy. Under
sharia law, the separation of church and state is prohibited. The
Koran prescribes a comprehensive law that encompasses both
religion and government.
And that’s the point of failure at which neocon
nation-building and the military idea of “counterinsurgency”
merge.
The commander of the International Security Assistance
Force for Afghanistan reports regularly to Congress. In the April
2010 report, there is little but bad news. The classic text,
“Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice” by the late
David Galula, shows why the Bush-Obama nation-building strategy
is failing in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few examples from the ISAF
report and Galula’s work illustrate the problem.
Galula wrote that for an insurgent to succeed, he must have
a cause — political, religious, economic or social — that the
counterinsurgent cannot also espouse. The Taliban’s cause is the
re-imposition of Islamic fundamentalism. It is already a dominant
force in neighboring nations such as Iran and perhaps Pakistan.
That cause is apparently succeeding in Afghanistan. The April
ISAF report says, “[Taliban] organizational capabilities and
operational reach are qualitatively and geographically
expanding…. The strength and ability of [Taliban] shadow
governance to discredit the authority and legitimacy of the
Afghan Government is increasing.”
The Karzai government offers no cause that can seriously
compete. Vague promises of democracy and economic development —
made by an unpopular government seeking to bring the “good
Taliban” into the fold — cannot compete with the undiluted
Islamic fundamentalism the Taliban offer.
Galula wrote that support for an insurgency from other
nations can take five forms. The Taliban receive them all. First,
moral support “…by the weight of public opinion and through
various communications media.” The Taliban receive it almost
constantly in Islamic media and by word of mouth from the
terror-sponsoring nations.
Second on Galula’s list is political support “with pressure
applied directly on the counterinsurgent, or indirectly by
diplomatic action in the international forum.” The Kabul
government is not quite and international pariah, but American
politicians may soon make it so. From Iran and Pakistan comes
direct pressure on Karzai that accomplishes its isolation.
Third is technical support, fourth is financial, fifth is
military support. All three come directly to the Taliban from
Iran and elements of the Pakistani government. Financial help is
even more prevalent.
The April ISAF report says, in part, that the Afghan
insurgency “…has a robust means of sustaining operations.” It
mentions the availability of weapons and the fact that the
Taliban has “consistent streams of money to sufficiently fund
operations.” The money comes in part from the opiate trade and,
“Externally, funding originates in Islamic states and is
delivered via couriers and halawas,” an Islamic informal
banking system.
That report also says, “Most concerning, Iran continues to
provide lethal assistance to elements of the Taliban, although
the quantity and quality of such assistance is markedly lower
than the assistance provided to Shia militants in Iraq. Tehran’s
support to the Taliban is inconsistent with their historic
enmity, but fits with its overall strategy of backing many groups
to ensure a positive relationship with potential leaders and
hedging against foreign presence.”
How can the counterinsurgency succeed unless these sources
of outside support are cut off? It can’t.
Most telling, Galula wrote, “The cruelty of the
revolutionary [i.e., insurgent] war is not a mass, anonymous
cruelty but a highly personalized, individual one. No greater
crime can be committed by the counterinsurgent than accepting or
resigning himself to, the protraction of war. He would do as well
to give up early.” We have been nation-building in Iraq for six
years and in Afghanistan for nine. It’s too late to give up
early, but not too late to be defeated.
The Pentagon report says, “Insurgents’ tactics, techniques
and procedures for conducting complex attacks are increasing in
sophistication and strategic effect.” The strategic effect is
enormous: it prevents achievement of the first goal of any
counterinsurgency campaign — establishing security for the
populace — by hampering our operations from those bases. No
counterinsurgency can succeed without establishing local
security. In that, the Afghanistan campaign has already
failed.
Elsewhere in Afghanistan, the Taliban are conducting a
targeted assassination program, killing people — even whole
families — who cooperate with American and Afghan government
forces.
In Iraq and in Afghanistan we haven’t been fighting the
enemy: we’ve been fighting his proxies, bogged down on the
battlefields the enemy has chosen, allowing them to control the
pace and direction of the war.
If you were to choose an ideal country for an insurgency,
Afghanistan would be at the top of the list.
There, are ideal for the insurgent: an ethnically diverse
population loyal only to tribes and sects, highly dispersed, with
no loyalty to or confidence in the central government; a
highly-motivated insurgency which is actively supported with
funding, arms and training by Iran and other terror-sponsoring
nations; a weak economy; and a prolonged inability of the central
government to provide security or basic services. All this adds
up to a metaphysical impossibility for Obama’s fourteen-month
Afghanistan counter-insurgency to succeed.
It will have taken a decade, from September 1, 2001 to
September 1, 2011 for the curtain to come down on the neocons’
malignant nation-building idea. Counting Vietnam, Afghanistan
will mark the third time America has been defeated as much by
itself as by an insurgency.
If we had a different president, this defeat could be
avoided. But Barack Obama will not do any of the things we need
to do, quickly and decisively.
This war can still be won, but not with soft words for
Islam or the waste of more American lives in nation-building.
This is hard saying, but it needs to be said.
We need to pull our ground forces out of both Iraq and
Afghanistan as soon as the logistics can be managed. And when we
do, we need to tell the world that the game has changed.
Iran and Syria should be told, only once, that their
dedication to terrorism is intolerable and that if they do not
cease immediately (and of course, they won’t) they will suffer
undefined consequences. There should first be a declaration of
war and then those undefined consequences should begin, delivered
at night by the vast variety of stealthy weapon systems we have
(and can build).
Islam — and all our Arab “friends” — cannot be reformed
by non-Islamic peoples. But we can and must attack the ideology
that goes under the name of Islam. If we give our fullest
attention to denigrating the ideological Islam — which precludes
the freedoms we preserve in our Constitution — we can engage
defeat the Islamists in the ideological war that is essential to
winning against the terrorist nations. If our Muslim friends
cannot accept this, so be it. It must be done regardless.
Before we can end state sponsorship of terrorism, we must
first elect a conservative to the presidency. In order to do
that, we must settle the nation-building argument between neocons
and traditional conservatives. It’s an argument worth having, so
let it begin.
