On July 16, 1945, sixty-five years ago today, an advance team of
one American OSS officer with two enlisted men jumped into a
previously prepared landing zone outside of Trang Quang, near the
small village of Kim Lung in the part of northern Vietnam known
as Tonkin. They were code-named the Deer Team. A French officer
and two of his Vietnamese enlisted men accompanied them. The
entire operation was aimed at following up contact with and
assisting a Vietnamese independence organization known in brief
as “Viet Minh” and its leader Ho Chi Minh — previously known as
Nguyen Ai Quoc, among other names.
The group had been preceded in May by an Air Ground Aid
Section (AGAS) officer, Lt. Dan Phelan, who was extending an
Allied air crew recovery operation. This American lieutenant was
posted northeast of the LZ. The landing zone preparations had
been directed by a Chinese American, Lieutenant Frank Tan, and
his radio operator, Mac Sinn. They were part of a long-term
intelligence operation known as GBT, begun earlier in the war in
the Pacific with the aid of some Texaco employees.
Ho Chi Minh had traveled earlier to Kunming, China, in
February 1945, specifically to further contact with the Americans
through the good offices of GBT. Ho walked from his headquarters
at Kim Lung to Ch’ing-hsi on the Chinese border, a distance of
well over 100 miles avoiding Japanese patrols. He was then driven
by truck to Kunming, where he met with various American
intelligence officers through his GBT contact.
Eventually Ho was moved up the ladder to a meeting with the
well-known Maj. General Claire Chennault, commanding the 14th Air
Force and formerly the CO of the famed Flying Tigers. Chennault
gave Ho an autographed photo that pleased the Viet Minh leader
greatly. Ho also received a symbolic gift of six .45 cal Colt
semi-automatic pistols and ammunition from OSS stocks. These
pleased him even more.
From this point on the facts of story of these contacts
differed even among the American participants, including the
caliber and type of pistols mentioned, and the presence of
Sgt.1st Class William Zielski, who is never seen in any photos.
This is to say nothing of the views of the Vietnamese and French.
They disagree on just about everything, from the details of what
was said and done as well as the motivations for actions that
were taken. The following are some things on which there is a
degree of agreement.
Perhaps the most important result of Deer Team’s visit to
Ho Chi Minh’s rough camp was the life-saving treatment that one
of the group’s members, Pfc. Paul Hoagland, an American medic,
gave to “Uncle Ho.” His skin yellowed, his complexion haggard,
the seemingly old man (Ho was only 55 at the time) had difficulty
rising from his bed to greet his visitors.
The American officer in charge of the Deer Team, Maj.
Allison Thomas, assigned Hoagland to care for the Viet Minh
leader. The army medic would later say that he made a good guess
and decided Ho’s symptoms of high fever and diarrhea might be a
combination of malaria, maybe some dengue fever, and, of course,
dysentery. Hoagland had quinine and sulfa drugs in his bag and
after boiling some tea water to replace fluids he said he told Ho
all would be well.
Thanks primarily to the sulfa drugs and quinine, Ho
returned to health with amazing quickness. Later he would joke
that he never thought he was very ill in the first place.
Whatever the actual affliction, the man’s stamina proved
extraordinary. Years later the propaganda line from the Viet Minh
held that the Americans were unable to help, but a local farmer
following instructions from Uncle Ho had gathered herbs in the
forest — and that was the source of their leader’s
recovery.
The training of the Viet Minh volunteers — gathered about
6 km away at Tan Trao — in military deployment and weapon use
was a bit of a challenge. Three more OSS troopers were dropped in
a little over a week later along with a great deal of equipment.
Fluent French-speaking Lieutenant (soon-to-be Captain) René
Defourneaux, the second-in-command, would shout instructions in
English. These orders were then translated into rudimentary
Vietnamese by Sgt. Henry Prunier, who had arrived in the advance
team with Thomas. An enthusiastic, if slightly confused, group of
Viet Minh volunteers would do their best to comply with the
orders.
The truth was that the majority of these guerrillas had
already learned about handling rifles and mortars from captured
French ordnance. Typical Vietnamese, they were too polite to tell
the Americans. In any case, it gave the Viet Minh fighters a
chance to be responsive to the desires of these Americans who
were clearly friends of their “Uncle.” From the sidelines, in his
usual colonial white suit, black tie and black fedora, stood the
impassive Comrade Van — better known in later years as General
Vo Nguyen Giap.
Within days of arriving Maj. Thomas was “requested” to
attend an important conference with Uncle Ho. It didn’t take a
genius to know something was wrong. In a firm but non-belligerent
tone, the still ill Ho informed Thomas that he would have to send
back the American-uniformed French M.5 (special operations)
officer, Lt. Montfort. The two sergeants (Phac and Logos) could
stay. As it turned out under what was referred to as “light
questioning,” Phac admitted he was also M.5 and was actually a
lieutenant. All three joined a group of refugees who were
“escorted” to the Chinese border.
There remains a question as to whether Thomas knew
Montfort’s complete story. He certainly must have known he was
M.5, but beyond that Thomas insisted he had known only that
Montfort was a French officer who because of his multiple
language skills could be helpful in working with the Vietnamese.
Ho, in his typical way, allowed the American his excuse, but
nonetheless made it clear he wanted no more “cleverness.”
The other two OSS sergeants, Lawrence Vogt and Aaron
Squires, who had arrived with Defourneaux provided the necessary
manpower to pick up the pace of training. In addition, an
improved system of recovering downed allied flyers was in
operation in the region following-up the initial work of the AGAS
and GBT nets. The Viet Minh fighters became relatively proficient
in the use of American weaponry. Even Comrade Van seemed pleased,
though he never showed it.
The only real problem apparent to Thomas and Defourneaux
was that the Viet Minh really didn’t want to enter into a
full-scale guerrilla operation against the Japanese. A few
hit-and-run raids were fine. One unnecessary and bloody attack
was later led by Giap at Thai Nguyen after Japan’s surrender. But
there were clear signs the Viet Minh leadership for the most part
wanted to hold back their men and equipment for their ultimate
target — any return of the French colonialists.
The point became moot by the middle of August with the
dropping of the U.S. atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and
the subsequent surrender of the Japanese. The Deer Team had done
its job. After traveling to Hanoi with Ho and a victorious parade
of Viet Minh forces, the team broke up and shipped out for
eventual demobilization.
What might have happened if the military opening with Ho
and Giap had been exploited is a matter of conjecture. Many say
it was an impossible situation. The U.S. was France’s ally and
France wanted to reestablish its previous Indochina colony. Uncle
Ho and the Viet Minh were never going to allow that to happen,
nor would they end or moderate their communist ambitions.
Nonetheless, the OSS jumped in during that very wet summer
of 1945 and did its job. It would be repeated again in other
forms by new agencies and units as U.S. special operations forces
carried on their dangerous but rarely heralded missions in other
wars in other places.
