There appears to be one thing on which all parties can agree
regarding Afghanistan. No one seems to be getting along with each
other. Hamid Karzai took Barack Obama’s tongue lashing in March
on the subject of graft in Kabul exactly as one would expect. The
make-up trip to Washington was pure show. Karzai has barely
concealed his contempt for a man he has confided to friends is a
political novice.
Starting things off was the leaked Nov. ‘09 cable from
Ambassador Karl Eikenberry saying, “President
Karzai is not an adequate strategic partner.” Eikenberry and
Karzai no longer talk. No one wonders why. The cable also trashed
General Stanley McChrystal’s surge strategies, so presumably the
American ambassador and the general also don’t talk very much
anymore. After the exposure in print of McChrystal’s aides’
disparaging remarks concerning White House understanding of the
political military issues in Afghanistan (and the apparent
agreement of McChrystal himself regarding those remarks), the
discipline of internal diplomacy appears non-existent.
Then there is the oft-repeated rumor that President Obama’s
special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard
Holbrooke, also doesn’t have a friendly relationship with
President Karzai. Of course there is nothing really new in that
situation because there are many people with whom Holbrooke
doesn’t get along. Being brilliant but overbearing has been the
knock on this gentleman for many years.
There are many simplistic answers given when the question
is asked as to why such conflict and turmoil seems to be standard
operating procedure for this part of the world. Aside from the
ever present dust, heat or cold of which most visitors complain,
the explanation offered by White House and DoD insiders is the
conveniently irrelevant, “Well, you know, Karzai’s brother is
tied to the drug trade, makes millions of dollars from U.S. aid
programs, has a private army, etc. And by the way, the Taliban
are being paid off not to attack NATO supply convoys.” Hmm, that
surely explains everything.
On top of all this the Afghan Minister of Interior and the
head of the National Directorate of Security, aka the chief
intelligence officer, have resigned as a result of the Taliban
launching some rockets into President Karzai’s peace
jirga. There is a consensus in Kabul’s press circles
that no one in Afghanistan really believes that’s why they quit.
But at least the explanation served its purpose and didn’t scare
the horses, as Queen Victoria would have said.
Nobody was upset at the departure of the two excellent
English-speakers other than the CIA and SIS (MI-6) chiefs of
station, as well as perhaps their Russian counterpart. There’s an
old Afghan saying that roughly translates into meaning you can’t
tell the players without a scorecard. It’s quite applicable in
this case.
Hanif Atmar, the former interior minister, started off in
the late 1980s as a member of the KGB-trained Khad secret police,
the mainstay of the Kabul government during the Soviet
occupation. Unfortunately young Hanif lost one of his legs
fighting the mujahedeen and fled to London with others of the
waning communist era under President Najibullah. Atmar attended
the University of York where he studied information technology
and international economic development. Eventually this led him
to the posts of minister of rural development and subsequently
interior minister under his fellow Pashtun, Hamid Karzai. Here’s
where the scorecard comes in.
Amrullah Saleh has been an old friend of the United States
ever since he was deputy intelligence chief for the late great
British/American paramilitary asset, Ahmed Shah Massoud, the
Northern Alliance leader. Though an ethnic Tajik from the north,
Saleh made the transition to the Karzai entourage in 2004 as head
of Afghan intelligence joining his fellow northerner, Abdullah
Abdullah, who was foreign minister.
Karzai and Abdullah always were competitive and the
relationship disintegrated when Abdullah decided to challenge for
the presidency. Obviously Saleh was tainted by his earlier
relationship with Abdullah and the Northern Alliance’s close U.S.
contact. Karzai wanted that special relationship to be strictly
his alone. Pakistani intelligence (ISI) presumably are happy to
see Saleh go as he had been actively campaigning against them at
every turn regarding their aid to the Taliban.
Suitable for a man who had spent a good portion of the '90s
managing a neighborhood restaurant in Chicago, Ahmed Wali Karzai,
the president’s half-brother, apparently had worked out a “live
and let live” arrangement with Hanif Atmar, so at worst he is of
two minds with the passage of the former KGB-trained minister of
interior. Not unexpectedly neither the Russian rezident
in Kabul nor any of the numerous British Foreign Office reps who
had close relations with the York alumnus have offered
comment.
Musical political chairs is an old Afghan tradition. It
provides work for all who are worthy and many who aren’t. The
intrigue around the Karzai court apparently has infected the
American and British side just as earlier Afghan politics played
havoc with Russian efforts to secure the country to their end.
Vietnam often has been mentioned in explaining Afghanistan; the
number of casualties may be smaller, but unfortunately the
endless intrigue and backbiting of Saigon seems to be well
replicated in Kabul.
