South Asia, with two nuclear armed rivals, India and Pakistan,
was called the world’s most dangerous place by President Clinton
ten years ago. Since then, with the Taliban’s ascent, the
presence of the U.S. and NATO coalition in Afghanistan following
9/11, and the extensive terrorist bombings throughout India and
Pakistan, it has only gotten worse. And last week, talks between
prime ministers Manmohan Singh and Yousuf Raza Gilani in Bhutan
produced form over substance.
Ironically, since the settlements of the ancient Indus
Valley civilization centered in Pakistan but extending well
into parts of India, much of the two countries have shared a
common bond of antiquity, language, and culture.
In the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks of November 2008,
which India has charged were carried out from Pakistani soil by
the Islamist terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, there was the
danger of miscalculation that could result in horrific
consequences. Further, there is continuing belief that Lashkar
and other Islamist terrorist cells desire war between India and
Pakistan — to create further mayhem in tribal areas and
throughout Pakistan, incite some of India’s 155 million Muslim
population, which is mainly secular, cause a Kashmiri
secessionist action, and fracture the statehood of the region.
India to its great credit has shown remarkable restraint.
Pakistan perpetuates itself in the role of the victim: the
recipient of angry, well-armed mujahedin from the Soviet era; an
outlet for Saudi efforts to spread an austere Wahhabist theology;
an American ally that bristles at what it sees as hectoring and
interference in its affairs; and an adversary of India, perceived
to have designs on its territory and a desire to undermine its
stability — a new favorite of the U.S.
As a prerequisite and to earn more support within India and
in the eyes of the world, Pakistan would be wise to mete out
appropriate, swift, and transparent justice to the perpetrators
of the Mumbai attacks, and show results in its efforts to reduce
corruption, viewed for years at colossal levels.
A breakthrough between India and Pakistan — a cooling of
tensions over Kashmir — would allow Pakistan to redeploy some of
its military to the west against the Taliban insurgency, where it
needs more training from the U.S. in counterinsurgency. While by
no means the only disagreement, the Kashmir dispute is by far and
away the most divisive issue, at least within Pakistan. With U.S.
diplomatic support, India could initiate a symbolic pullback from
the Line of Control in Kashmir, with a pledge from Pakistan to
then do the same, with intensified cooperation between the two
countries to clean out the terrorist training camps.
While initiative is needed by Pakistan, there is much that
India can do. It has emerged in the capitalist mainstream, an IT
powerhouse, the back office for the world, and an active party in
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Further, India’s deal with
the U.S. for the supply of nuclear fuel, construction of civilian
reactors, and other high tech cooperation, coupled with its
increasing influence in the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf to
the Strait of Malacca, portrays a nation that aspires to economic
and military leadership.
Although India desires this status, it must show more
acceptance of the responsibility that comes along with it. The
collective diplomatic equation of South Asia has embraced mainly
the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan, each engaged in
recriminations. India, the region’s most powerful economic and
military force, is largely at the sidelines of its own volition
— probably concerned that too much engagement will lead to
internationalization of the dispute over Kashmir, a territory
that India and Pakistan have fought two wars over since 1947, and
an undeclared conflict in the Himalayas in the Kargil region in
1999.
Relations between India and Pakistan continue to wallow,
affecting not only outsized military budgets in both countries
which undermine the funding of critical social programs. They
also make life for the U.S. and NATO coalition more difficult in
Afghanistan, since Pakistan is unable to allocate the military
resources to assert sovereignty in the tribal areas which are
known sanctuaries for Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters.
All this assumes that Islamabad is convinced that Islamist
extremism is more the enemy than India. This belief must be
embraced, to secure a safe and stable South Asia. In view of the
recent discordant talks initiated at the foreign secretary level,
and now the insubstantial meeting between prime ministers, there
is no indication of impending change to the unacceptable status
quo.
