-
What Is It About Benghazi?
May 15, 2013 | 165 comments
-
The Socialist Dragon Slayer
April 9, 2013 | 42 comments
-
What Did Arafat Get for Killing U.S. Diplomats?
March 1, 2013 | 50 comments
-
Al Gore’s $500 Million Trojan Horse
February 20, 2013 | 109 comments
-
Further Reflections on Benghazi
February 18, 2013 | 73 comments
Special Report
Saved by the Bomb
Reflections prompted by Mr. Obama’s Nuclear Security Summit.
In looking for superlatives to describe the two-day Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called it “the largest (such) conference (hosted by the United States) since the one that came together (in San Francisco) around the founding of the United Nations in 1945.”
There is some irony in linking the two events.
The San Francisco Conference attracted more than 7,000 participants from around the world, including 282 delegates and 1,444 accredited officials from 50 nations.
As the delegates met in May and June of 1945, the war in the Pacific was far from over and — even though Germany had surrendered on May 7 — it seemed that the European continent could be poised on the brink of another disastrous war. The fact that a third world war did not follow hard on the heels of World War II had little to do with the formation of a new world organization dedicated to the peaceful resolution of conflicts between nations… and it had everything to do with the explosion of the first atomic bombs. Western Civilization — it may be argued — was saved by the bomb.
In the closing months of the war in Europe, the United States did not have sufficient forces on the ground in Europe to beat the Soviets to Prague and Berlin, and the U.S. command, in any case, was still hoping to enlist Soviet assistance against Japan. Thus, even as Germany fell, Eastern Europe and most of the Balkans came under Soviet domination Still more, as the United States turned its attention to the Pacific theatre, the rest of Europe had little to protect it against the menacing presence of the Red Army, with more than two million soldiers.
In words that would reappear in a more poetic and memorable way in a speech to be given eight months later, Winston Churchill, a few days after V-E Day, sent this note to his Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who was attending the U.N. conference in San Francisco:
Today there are announcements in the newspapers of large withdrawals of American forces to begin month by month. What are we to do? Great pressure will soon be put on us at home to demobilize partially. In a very short time our armies will have melted, but the Russians may remain with hundreds of divisions in possession of Europe from Luebeck to Trieste, and to the Greek Frontier on the Adriatic. All these things are far more vital than the amendments to a World Constitution which may well never come into being till it is superseded after a period of appeasement by a third World War.
Averell Harriman, U.S. ambassador to Moscow at this time, voiced the same view. He told U.S. Navy Secretary James Forrestal that “half and maybe all of Europe might be Communist by the end of next winter.”
More than bringing about Japan’s surrender, the atomic bombs that were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945 fundamentally altered the balance of power within Europe. With the United States in sole possession of a weapon that could obliterate whole cities or armies, it placed our closest allies under the cheap but effective protection of American nuclear power.
It is also a critical piece of this story that the United States had a new president in Harry S. Truman who was not afraid to use the bomb or to get tough with the Russians. In becoming president following Franklin Roosevelt’s death on April 12, 1945, Truman knew nothing about the bomb and little about foreign policy, but he was capable of independent and decisive action. As the British historian Paul Johnson described him: “The new President, Harry Truman, was not a member of the wealthy, guilt-ridden East Coast establishment and had none of Roosevelt’s fashionable progressive fantasies. He was ignorant, but he learned fast; his instincts were democratic and straightforward.” Early in his relationship with V. M. Molotov, Stalin’s foreign minister, he ripped into the veteran diplomat (one of the few original Bolsheviks still in power) with a ferocity that reportedly caused the Russian to turn “ashy.” In Truman’s recollection of the scene, Molotov complained, “I’ve never been talked to like that in my life,” and he, Truman, snapped back: “Carry out your agreements and you won’t get talked to like that.”
At Truman’s urging and under his sponsorship, Churchill, then seven months out of office, traveled to Fulton, Missouri, to give his “Iron Curtain” speech at Westminster College on March 5, 1946. In doing so, he greatly improved upon the earlier note which he had penned to his foreign secretary at the San Francisco conference:
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Beyond that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I might call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to the Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow.
The atomic bomb was therefore a deus ex machina that helped to protect U.S. interests and U.S. allies in the four-year period following World War II when the U.S. had a monopoly on nuclear weaponry. However, that same period also underscored the importance of strong leadership and the willingness to confront an evil and determined adversary. During the Berlin airlift, Truman demonstrated his willingness to go to the brink of war (possibly using nuclear weapons against Russian oil fields) to defend against Soviet aggression.
No weapon is strong enough in the hands of a weak leader. Let us hope this is not a lesson that is lost in the rethinking of nuclear policies that is going on today inside the Obama administration.
About the Author
Andrew B. Wilson, a frequent contributor to The American Spectator, writes from St. Louis.
Letter to the Editor View all comments (98) | Leave a comment
More Articles by Andrew B. Wilson
More Articles From Special Report
http://spectator.org/archives/2010/04/14/saved-by-the-bomb
Follow us:
ADVERTISEMENT
Current Issue
- The (Real) Great Divide
- Sarah Palin’s Rack
- A President Loses His Power
SPONSORED LINKS
FLASHBACK TO: 1995
-
Pope Culture
A man of faith in a godless age is hitting Americans where it hurts.
-
Why the GOP Does Not, Like, Totally Suck
Mr. and Mrs. American Spectator Reader, let P.J. O’Rourke talk sense to your kids.
-
Dames at Sea
-
In the Absence of Guns
In Britain, defending your property can get you life.
-
The Metaphysical Martini
-
Counting the Costs of Clintonism
The debacle of this president’s administration is both a cause and a symptom of the decline of American values. Unless Congress impeaches him, that decline will go on unchecked. An eminent jurist surveys the damage and assesses the chances for the recovery of our culture.
-
Chuck McHagel
It won’t take long for conservatives to scratch this presidential wannabe off their 2008 scorecard.
-
The Legacy of Old John and Mother Fresh-Roasted
-
It’s the Best Time of the Year
The American Christmas, like the songs that celebrate it, makes room for everybody under the rainbow. Is that why so many people seem to be hostile to it?
-
The Bush Crack-Up
Was the President done in by the economy, or by the politics of the economy?
Clip of the Day
ADVERTISEMENT
John Dietrich| 4.14.10 @ 6:49AM
Mr Wilson please do some research on your statement: "the United States did not have sufficient forces on the ground in Europe to beat the Soviets to Prague and Berlin." This is a debatable point. Much of the U.S. postwar policy was formulated in Moscow. See The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy.
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 10:44AM
Actually, we did beat them to Prague--Third Army was halted by Eisenhower just outside the city, and it was several days before the Red Army took possession. Elsewhere along the Western Front, there were places where the Western Allies were almost unopposed, while the Germans fought fanatically against the Soviets.
Could we have gotten to Berlin? Doubtful, in that the two main Soviet Fronts encircled Berlin before assaulting it. But we could have gone farther East than we did. U.S. troops arrived at the Elbe and were ordered to stop. German forces backed against the Elbe continued to resist the Soviets in order to give German civilians as well as their own wounded a chance to get into the Western zone.
Whether it would have made a difference in the Post-War settlement is dubious. U.S. and British propaganda succeeded too well in promoting the image of "Our Heroic Russian Allies", the threat from which was not recognized by the vast majority of British and American citizens--who were much too war weary by that time to be interested in a new war against a former ally.
In addition, by May 1945, preparations for the invasion of Japan were under way. With losses at Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa firmly in mind, the Combined Chiefs of Staff realized they were going to need a lot more troops in theater, and the only place to get them was Europe. Almost immediately after the German surrender, the U.S. began transferring divisions to the Pacific, even as it was releasing long-serving veterans from the Army under the "point system".
The demand for troops in the Pacific provided an irrefutable and pragmatic reason not to dispute the division of Europe with the Soviets.
Howard| 4.14.10 @ 1:21PM
Another point is that we had a rather high rate of desertion at near the end of the European theater. The Battle of The Bulge featured great heroism, but also great cowardice. The US gladly let the Soviets chew up the Germans. And if a few Russians perished, well, stuff happens.
Bob Miller| 4.14.10 @ 2:27PM
The US Ninth Army under General Simpson was closest to Berlin and Simpson asked permission to take Berlin. General Eisenhower denied the request based on concern over logistics, and possibly previous high level understandings between with the USSR.
See, for example:
http://news.google.com/newspap.....41,6304233
http://ww2history.suite101.com.....in_in_1945
My father served in the US 701st Tank Battalion, which supported the 102d "Ozark" Infantry Division, part of the Ninth Army.
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 5:01PM
Simpson probably would not have gotten there ahead of the Russians, but he could have moved further east than he did, which would have established "facts on the grounds" to use in post-war negotiations with the Soviets.
Kenny| 4.14.10 @ 7:22AM
Great cloum, Mr. Wilson, especially your conclusion that "No weapon is strong enough in the hands of a weak leader."
American, indeed world security, security has nowhere to go but down under Obama.
Purpleguy| 4.14.10 @ 11:43PM
to your reasoning, Reagan made us less safe by negotiating treaties with the Russians to reduce nuclear stockpiles ... are you sure you're right?
Stuart Koehl| 4.15.10 @ 7:36AM
The first thing to understand is SALT I and II did not at all reduce nuclear stockpiles, but put nominal limits on how rapidly they could expand. The United States observed a self-imposed moratorium on expanding its forces, but the Russians built to the treaty limits and beyond (their cheating is now well documented), and since there was no on-site verification, there was no way to enforce anything.
Reagan's first treaty, the INF Treaty, eliminated just one class of nuclear weapons, intermediate range missiles, which were inherently destabilizing and threatened the coupling of the U.S. deterrent to NATO. It was in the U.S. interest to eliminate that class of weapons, and the INF Treaty did that, largely because of Reagan's insistence on on-site verification.
The subsequent START agreement created a theoretical framework for what was going to happen anyway. With the collapse of the USSR, the Soviet Union could not maintain its arsenal at Cold War levels, and many of its delivery systems (which were liquid fueled) were deteriorating badly and becoming dangerous. Concomitant reductions in force to a lower--but still high--level were acceptable, especially when accompanied by on-site inspection.
Almost all of the weapons dismantled by the Russians were "first strike" systems (SS-18, SS-19), while those eliminated by the U.S. were primarily second strike (with the exception of the 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs we had deployed). The net result was an improvement of the U.S. situation (which would have happened in the absence of the Treaty) and greater global stability.
Arms reductions per se do not improve stability and can greatly undermine it. SALT II was one example; the Naval Treaties of the 1920s were another. Moreover, it is axiomatic that no weapon system is voluntarily relinquished unless it is already obsolete.
Purpleguy| 4.15.10 @ 9:51PM
I would think even you would admit nuclear weapons are in a weapons class all their own? As such, anything that reduces the number, power, or strength of them is a good thing - not stability in the world, but reduction in the nuclear threat. And, that's a bad thing?
Nick| 4.16.10 @ 12:00AM
So moronic, you had to say it twice, huh?
Nick| 4.16.10 @ 12:09AM
Also, I seem to remember bleeding heart Useful Idiots, like yourself, savaging President Reagan after he walked away from Reykjavík, in '86.
Now, he is your hero?
Gee, I don't believe you.
Stuart Koehl| 4.16.10 @ 3:12PM
When I was in college, lo those many years ago, when Helen Caldicott and her ilk roamed the land pushing the Zero Option, I had a T-shirt printed that said:
BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
(Make the world safe for conventional war)
Think about that.
Purpleguy| 4.15.10 @ 9:51PM
I would think even you would admit nuclear weapons are in a weapons class all their own? As such, anything that reduces the number, power, or strength of them is a good thing - not stability in the world, but reduction in the nuclear threat. And, that's a bad thing?
Stuart Koehl| 4.17.10 @ 8:00AM
Silliness. It is precisely because nuclear weapons are in a class of their own that they have not been used and yet have served to maintain a much higher level of peace and stability than the world would ever have known.
Louis Jenkins| 4.14.10 @ 8:43AM
Wow! A great article. The weapon gave America four years to rest (so to speak). Unfortunately the Red Dawn was to come around once more by 1950. I read an article that was written by a English chap yesterday, and he particularly pointed out that the Reds were Hitler's main objective. Much like Churchhill's desire to maintain India, Hitler wanted to turn the land of USSR into Germany's vassal state. That would not have been good, but the bomb at least gave us four years of reprieve for the coming Iron Curtain and the Cold War.
Tim*| 4.14.10 @ 10:10AM
They held up lead recon & ranger task force elements of The Great United States 1st Army near Leipzig and my dad and his troopers were turned south and met the Russkies in Czechoslovakia at Torgau on The Elbe River.
Ken (Old Texican)| 4.14.10 @ 10:19AM
In 1988, having sold my company, I wrote my first novel. I did almost an entire year of full time research. The research was very important to me for two reasons.
One, I had come into possession of the "Kearny Report", from Oakridge Labs, (The US Nuclear center), and discovered that nuclear war was not "unthinkable" at all, but in fact a very real possibility....and not the "end of history".
I wanted to inject that reality, with a lot of factual data from an unimpeachable source. (The report can even now be purchased at amazon.com.) I wanted to pass on the hard earned know-how so that my readers might have a chance to survive and re-build a free America after.
Second, I planned a five book series based upon a rebuilding of the country, with a lively adventure in doing so.
(Fortunately, the "wall" came down and the Soviet Union came apart before the second in the series was completed.)
In the course of my research, I learned more than I ever wanted to know about "nuclear strategy and tactics for "deterrence".
...The Obama administration has broken every "rule of thumb" that worked very well for over 60 years.
I must ask myself why.
Ned| 4.14.10 @ 10:46AM
Why? Because he, and every adult he knew as a child, and nearly all the adults he's associated with since he reach the age of maturity (note that I did not say, "since he matured") have been and still are hard core Marxists...
ObamaNazis Suck Ass| 4.14.10 @ 11:58AM
its real simple why: because he is a TRAITOR and he hates America
Christopher Holland| 4.14.10 @ 10:10PM
Obama is the biggest narcissist on the planet, he thinks he can change the world with one reading from an autocue. He is also a gigantic fool who doesn't have a clue what he is doing, and he is surrounded by brown nosers who have no capacity to tell him what is going on in the real world, even if they wanted too. All these things suggest a disaster is coming soon. Watching Obama's foreign policy is like watching a monkey play with a hand grenade - there is only one possible outcome.
Jimmy Carter was the same. He went to Europe soon after he was elected and told people there that everything that had happened before was wrong, and he was going to change it. But at least the Europeans told him no, that was not the case at all. But I doubt if they are saying that to Obama, they are still caught up in the 'I hate George W Bush' emotional trap.
Stuart Koehl| 4.17.10 @ 7:16PM
"Obama is the biggest narcissist on the planet"
Bigger than Kim Jong Il? That IS big.
goldman| 4.14.10 @ 11:33AM
The world was not saved by the atomic bomb. It wasn't necessary to defeat the Japanese, though it was most likely used to intimidate the Russians. Eisenhower opposed its use:
"...in [July] 1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. ...the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent.
"During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude..."
- Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, pg. 380
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 3:53PM
I can refer you to several recent works on the subject, beginning with Thmas Allen and Normal Polmar's "Code Name: Downfall", and more recently, D.M. Giangreco's "Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan". Both books make extensive use of ULTRA communications intercepts and Japanese archives. Both show that, even after the extensive firebombing of Japan beginning in March 1945, the Japanese war cabinet was uninterested in surrender, and was in fact taking steps for a final decisive battle for the Home Islands.
Even though the top sixty Japanese cities and towns were systematically reduced to ashes by Curtis LeMay's XXI Bomber Command, even though its sea lines of supply were totally cut by a combination of submarine blockade and aerial mining, the Japanese government had resolved to fight to the end.
While this was going on, U.S. forces were fighting a grinding battle of attrition on Okinawa, a battle whose ferocity was accepted as a foretaste of what would happen, first on Kyusho (Operation Olympic), then on the main island of Honshu (Operation Cornet). On Okinawa, the Japanese traded casualties with us on almost a 1-for-1 basis, causing U.S. planners to predict very high casualties for an invasion of the Japanese mainland.
Since Japan has a mountainous coast, the number of potential invasion beaches was small, and the Japanese high command correctly guessed where U.S. forces would be landing. In the spring of 1945, they began pulling first line units out of Manchuria (hollowing out the Kwantung Army, which made the ultimate Russian attack a walkover) to reinforce the home islands. Through a combination of ULTRA and aerial reconnaissance, the U.S. watched as the Japanese strengthened their defenses at the precise points we intended to land. It was estimated that, on X-Day, the force ratio might be 1-to-1 or even less. By way of comparison, the U.S. outnumbered the Germans on Omaha Beach by something more than 3-to-1.
To redress the situation, Gen. George C. Marshall proposed using nuclear weapons in a tactical role, dropping up to six bombs (Nagasaki-style plutonium bombs) behind the beaches to "soften up" the defenses. U.S. troops would land seventy-two hours later and move through the blast zone (nobody knew much about radiation back then). Even so, the casualties were estimated in the tens of thousands for the landings, and upwards of one million for the entire campaign. The Japanese casualties would have amounted to several million people, mainly civilians.
What were the alternatives to invasion or the use of the atmomic bombs against Japanese cities? Only blockade was viable, and even then, U.S. casualties would have been heavy. The Japanese had several thousand warplanes stashed in hangars carved out of caves, and enough bombs and fuel to mount a massive kamikaze campaign against our ships. Off Okinawa, roughly 25% of all kamikazes hit their targets, sinking eighty ships and damaging more than 300 more. The situation off of Japan would have been an order of magnitude greater.
Nor would blockade have spared Japanese civilians. As any competent historian can tell you, in a siege or blockade, the soldiers starve last.
The Japanese government already had plans in place to divert all food supplies to the military and essential civilian workers. The sick, the elderly and the very young would either be killed or allowed to starve. Deaths from disease and malnutrition would have exceeded two or three million--and even then, there is no guarantee the Japanese would capitulate.
Could the Russian intervention have caused the Japanese to surrender? They were deeply shocked by the Soviet "betrayal", and the Russians had an easy time in Manchuria. But suppose that the U.S. gave up on invasion and did not use the Bomb, and the Russians attempted to invade Hokkaido? The Kuriles were small, and effectively undefended. Hokkaido was much larger and heavily defended against a potential American invasion via the Aleutians (we had been feinting in that direction, hoping to divert Japanese attention from Kyushu). The Soviets were not experts in amphibious warfare, they lacked a large, blue-water navy in the Pacific, thus had few fire support ships, landing ships, amphibious tanks or any of the other essentials for a sea invasion. There is every reason to believe that this attack would fail, and such a failure would simply reinvigorate the Japanese will to resist.
But, suppose the Soviets won. A Soviet-occupied Japan would not be an economic miracle or a beacon of democracy in East Asia. It would have been an outlying bastion of Soviet power, and a base from which to project that power into the Pacific. Not something in U.S. interests.
At the end of the day, neither conventional bombing nor blockade nor a Soviet invasion would have brought about the rapid surrender of Japan. Even the use of the first bomb on Hiroshima was not enough to bring the Japanese government to its senses--the Army Staff, in fact, told Hirohito the bomb was a one-off stunt, and now that they knew what it could do, the Americans had taken their best shot; the war must go on. It took the systemic shock of the second bomb to cause Hirohito to employ his power to force a capitulation--one which almost did not happen, as die-hard factions in Tokyo staged an abortive coup to take the Emperor hostage and destroy the recording of the surrender message. It failed only because an air raid blackout plunged the imperial palace into darkness, preventing the rebels from reaching their objectives.
Regarding Eisenhower's rather fatuous remarks, it is important to remember that Ike was not in the planning look for Pacific operations, had not been tracking Japanese military and diplomatic communications, and really wasn't in a position to know. I would be rather with Paul Fussell, who at the time was an infantryman staging in the Pacific for Operation Olympic. He later summarized his feelings in an essay entitled, "Thank God for the Atomic Bomb". Thank God, indeed.
The bombing of Hiroshima killed some 70,000 people and injured perhaps as many more; the Nagasaki bomb landed away from the city center, and the hilly terrain of that city deflected much of the blast, resulting in about 40,000 dead.
By way of contrast, the conventional fire bombing raid against Tokyo on 9 March 1945 killed more than 83,000 people and injured an additional 30,000. By the end of the War, some 600,000 Japanese had been killed in bombing raids, but only the two atomic bombings were capable of forcing the Japanese to surrender.
BernardL| 4.14.10 @ 4:26PM
A very concise and cogent reply, Mr. Koehl - very well done. Our armed forces celebrated the bomb with enthusiasm. It's easy for some people to play Monday Morning Quarterback with our armed forces' casualties in the tens of thousands. I believe the term unconditional surrender means only one thing in reference to an enemy bent on enslaving us and the bomb achieved it while saving lives on both sides.
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 5:05PM
There is also a lamentable tendency to see the Japanese as victims in all this, not taking into account their brutal conquest and occupation of China and Southeast Asia, where Japanese troops killed several million Asian civilians--not with nuclear weapons, but the old-fashioned way, with rifles, bayonets and swords. Among other things, the bombs put an end to this slaughter, which goes unknown and unrecognized in the West.
The Japanese sowed the wind, and reaped the whirlwind--sympathy for them is utterly misplaced, particularly as they themselves have never acknowledged the magnitude of the crimes committed by Japan (in which it stands in marked contrast to Germany).
Tyler S.| 4.14.10 @ 6:38PM
The victims of war know no nationality. Civilians killed are victims whether Chinese, Japanese, German, or British. The Japanese in WWII killed many innocents. Well, that is a burden the soul of their nation must bear. We too killed many civilians, though, and even though I think it ended the war sooner and saved lives on the whole, that does not alleviate the taint to our own national soul. You don't get a free pass on moral behavior because the immoral choice is the best available. We made the best possible choice in a terrible situation, but we still perpetrated evil in doing so. The children of Hiroshima and Nagasaki didn't invade anyone. Many of them probably had no real concept of what the war was or why it was being fought. Our country killed them, just the same. That they were led by evil men makes them no less victims. As for their lack of remorse, we cannot force others to be righteous, just human beings. We can only strive for such qualities in ourselves.
Nick| 4.14.10 @ 7:10PM
Tyler S.,
Our country has no "taint" on our "national soul."
I don't agree with targeting civilians. But, I understand why the generals of that age believed the only way to stop the Jap war machine, was to destroy their cities.
That is where the weapons were made. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were military targets.
To compare those civilian deaths to the Chinese that died during the "Rape of Nanking" shows a lack of knowledge of the subject.
Christopher Holland| 4.14.10 @ 10:27PM
Intellectual and moral crap. The children of Hiroshima and Nagasaki didn't invade anybody - so f$%^ing what! There was a a war on and the longer it went on, the more people died. It had to be won before it could end, and the only way to win a war is to kill so many of the other people that they give in. Standing around with your hands in your pockets whining about peace and snivelling about morality helps nobody - it is a moral cop out, it is gutless. Yes, war is hell, innocents die, people suffer, it all sucks. But you think I can't work that out for myself, I need you to tell me?
Nick| 4.14.10 @ 7:22PM
Mr. Koehl,
"As any competent historian can tell you, in a siege or blockade, the soldiers starve last."
What a coincidence. I have been reading Eusebius' "Church History" over the past week.
He quotes extensively from Josephus' account of the siege of Jerusalem, in A.D. 70. Anyone who knows this history (or the discriptions of the siege of Jerusalem, in 586, in Jeremiah and Ezekiel), know the horrors of starving an enemy.
Especially, when they start eating their children.
Dropping the bomb was the least of the evils we had at our disposal.
Stuart Koehl| 4.15.10 @ 7:45AM
You don't have to go back that far. As a teenager, I saw it happen in the Biafran Civil War (1967-1970) in Congo. The Congolese government was blockading the breakaway province, and people were starving. The newspapers and television were full of pictures of hollow-eyed, bloated-belly children, and we were deluged with messages urging us to send food to Biafra.
But even at that age, I knew that the Biafran rebels would simply seize the food and give it to their troops. I argued with my teachers that sending food to Biafra merely prolonged a war the Biafrans were not going to win, and increased the number of civilians who would die of starvation and disease.
Apparently, this is a lesson people never manage to learn.
Christopher Holland| 4.14.10 @ 10:17PM
Eisenhower was dead wrong - Japan was not trying to surrender with minimum lose of face. The allies offered the Japanese surrender terms at Potsdam that were quite reasonable, especially considering that Japan was in no position to negotiate over anything. The Japanese were beaten, but they refused to surrender, and the result was the atomic bombing. The Japanese have no one to blame but themselves for that.
Eisenhower was a great general and a great President, but he made his share of mistakes and thinking that the Japanese were willing to surrender was one of them.
Stuart Koehl| 4.15.10 @ 7:46AM
As I said, I was out of the loop, and in this he was not only speaking out of his hat, when he wrote his book he had his eye both on his legacy and on post-war U.S.-Japanese relations.
Ken (Old Texican)| 4.14.10 @ 11:52AM
Goldman,
I had read that years ago. Thank you for the reminder.
The decision made by President Truman...right or wrong... was an upshot of the decisions of his predecessors (FDR and Churchill among others) having demanded "unconditional surrender" by the Axis powers.
...Truman also knew more accurately how many Japanese had already died as a result of the fire-bombing of their cities. In his mind, his only choices were "worse or worser", given those surrender demands/expectations of the democracies.
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 3:55PM
As more information about the run-up to the invasion of Japan, as well as the other alternatives, becomes available, the more the wisdom--as well as the mercy--of the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki become apparent.
All other options not only would have increased U.S. casualties, but would have resulted in an increase in Japanese civilian casualties by an order of magnitude, at least.
Drew | 4.14.10 @ 12:56PM
While this may be an interesting history lesson, it is not until the last paragraph that we get to the heart of the matter:
No weapon is strong enough in the hands of a weak leader.
Followed by the veiled - yet curiously unsupported - implication that President Obama is such a "weak leader."
When Harry Truman gave the order to use atomic weapons against Japan the United States had produced a total of THREE nuclear weapons. One was the test device detonated at Alamogorda, the other two were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. In essence - by dropping the bomb on Nagasaki, Truman had ordered the US to "eliminate" the last of its nuclear weapons? No?
The US currently has at least 5,500 such devices. Each of which is considerably more powerful than anything available in 1945.
To suggest that the President, by reducing (concurrent with a similar reduction by Russia) this total by a few hundred is evidence of "weak leadership" is frankly - stupid.
Margie| 4.14.10 @ 1:23PM
Why it's stupid is his reason for doing it. Like Newt said, it's fantasy. He actually believes that by so doing, our enemies will do likewise. Sure. They'll be good. What a farce!
Tyler S.| 4.14.10 @ 2:24PM
Actually, I'm pretty sure he's thinking "We'll still have enough nukes left to make human beings extinct several times over, but so does Russia, and they're not keeping very good track of theirs, so getting them to reduce their stockpile is a good thing, especially since we wind up no worse off (does the ability to destroy 15 planets instead of just 10 really help us when we only have the one?)."
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 5:39PM
Let's just say that deterrent policy is about more than simply the number of warheads, or even the number of delivery systems (you can google my articles on the subject at The Weekly Standard), but depend on a wide range of variables, including the credibility of the threat, the survivability of deterrent systems, and to some extent, a degree of ambiguity about what sorts of actions would trigger a deterrent response.
The smaller the number of weapons in the deterrent force, the less survivable the force becomes, which in turn creates (a) an opportunity for cheating by the other side; and (b) the temptation to launch a disarming counterforce strike. Obviously, when small stockpiles are deployed on each side, the marginal advantage conveyed by each illicit warhead is much greater than when there are many thousands of weapons on a side. Thus, when stockpiles were set at about 12,000 weapons each, the marginal value of sneaking in a few dozen extra warheads was minimal. But when there are fewer than 1000 warheads on each side, a few dozen held back can make a substantial difference; it's also much easier to hide a few dozen weapons than a few hundred, so cheating is easier.
Also, when there are many delivery systems using different modes of operation, it is extremely difficult to destroy enough of the enemy's weapons in a disabling first strike to eliminate his ability to launch a devastating second strike. If there is a technological breakthrough that renders one part of the deterrent triad vulnerable--whether its a new ASW sensor, or a highly effective ABM system, or a new integrated air defense system, then the entire deterrent not only loses credibility but actually invites attack.
A vulnerable deterrent is actually destabilizing. The classic example is Roosevelt's deployment of the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor, in order to deter Japanese aggression in East Asia. Certainly, the Fleet would be able to intervene in the western Pacific much easier, but on the other hand, the Japanese could attack our ships at Pearl Harbor, whereas in San Diego, the battle fleet was secure. So, moving the fleet to Pearl actually encouraged the Japanese to think about a preemptive attack they could not otherwise have made.
If we are going to have a small strategic deterrent, then we must invest in the means to make it more survivable, which would mean things like mobile ICBMs and a National Missile Defense System. To ensure the credibility of the deterrent in the face of enemy defenses, we would also have to develop a new generation of decoys and penetration aids, stealthy cruise missiles and new ballistic missile submarines. Our aging warheads need to be modernized or replaced with smaller ones that exploit the improved accuracy of our delivery systems and address new target sets, such as deeply buried, reinforced bunkers and weapon manufacturing plants.
A final issue to consider is a small stockpile invites competitors. Throughout the 1950s, down to the late 1960s, the USSR never really attempted to match the U.S. nuclear arsenal, because the U.S. had a tremendous lead, and gave every indication that the nuclear competition was open-ended; i.e., we would maintain our proportional lead over the USSR no matter what. When McNamara adopted MAD and limited our ICBM force to 1500 missiles, the Soviets saw the opportunity to catch up--and eventually surpass--the United States, with the ultimate objective of attaining an effective counterforce capability. This they almost did by the end of the 1970s, and only Reagan's definitive change in nuclear policy prevented it.
We might keep this in mind when considering China, which presently has a very small strategic nuclear arsenal, but which might consider breaking out from its self-imposed restraint if both the US and Russia limit themselves to 1000 nuclear delivery systems or less.
Tyler S.| 4.14.10 @ 6:54PM
Those are all very interesting and valid points, and it may be true that the excessive number of nukes is less pointless than I initially thought (though much of what you say is both hypothetical and arguable). Nonetheless, I think we do more for our security by reducing the number of poorly guarded Russian nukes lying around. China, like the US and the former USSR, is a nation, on whom MAD will actually work. MAD has no power over a nut job terrorist who gets his hands on a poorly guarded Russian nuke, however. To them, our stockpiled nukes are no deterrent whatsoever.
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 7:09PM
However, START will not remove or dismantle one nuclear warhead; it merely requires that warheads beyond the treaty limits be "deactivated", which means being removed from the active inventory and placed into storage. They can be "re-activated" at any time, provided they are maintained while in storage (tritium trigger mechanisms, for instance, are subject to radioactive decay and must be renewed).
As for the advantages of a MAD strategy with regard to China, during the Cold War, MAD did little to inhibit the Soviets, and much to inhibit the United States, so the mutuality was almost entirely one-way: our deterrent, ultimately, deterred only ourselves.
Purpleguy| 4.14.10 @ 11:50PM
Wrong - hundreds of tons of weapons grade plutonium and uranium will be downgraded and used as fuel in nuclear reactors. Today, 1/3 of all the lights on in the US are a result of deactivated nuclear material recycled as fuel. The US has a whole division in the DoD to dismantle, ship and demilitarize nuclear material... This is a VERY good thing, if y'all would stop playing politics for 10 minutes and consider how this makes the world safer.
Stuart Koehl| 4.15.10 @ 6:06AM
WE have done this. And we have been buying up WEP and WEU from Ukraine, Belarus and Khazakstan. But we have no assurance that the Russians have followed suit, or intend to do so under START II. In fact, under START I, both the US and Russia retain far more warheads than are nominally permitted, as these are not "active" warheads they are not counted.
In any case, the number of weapons per se is not relevant to the critical issue of stability.
Drew| 4.14.10 @ 6:31PM
Maybe the question you need to ask yourself is: Why does American Spectator persist in offering up descriptions of historical figures and events (from Winston Churchill to James Monore) - accompanied by the (usually totally unsupported) inference that somehow our current President is different from them, and therefore bad?
This is not education, or even intellectual discourse. It is pure sophistry masquerading as a political discussion.
One may make many reasonable arguments about both the correctness of Truman's decision to deploy the stomic bomb against Japan; as well the benefits of stability our maintenance of an atomic weapon arsenal has provided over the past sixty five years. If Obama was suggesting that the US eliminate, totally and unilaterally, our atomic weapons one might reasonably argue that decision on those grounds. But he's not doing anything vaguely like that.
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 7:10PM
Because history is a hard teachers, and you ignore its lessons at your peril.
victor| 4.14.10 @ 8:43PM
"Drew":
"If Obama was suggesting that the US eliminate, totally and unilaterally, our atomic weapons"
Obama is not suggesting any such thing, only that the US, as long as he is in the White House,
will never use or threaten to use them against anyone who shoots at us first.
That is unilateral disarmament.
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 10:09PM
As a general rule, a good deterrent policy is specific about when you will shoot, and ambiguous about when you will not shoot.
Purpleguy| 4.14.10 @ 11:52PM
And, Obama said, all means are still on the table to retaliate from any attack with all our means.... but I guess y'all missed that sugar plum, huh?
Stuart Koehl| 4.15.10 @ 6:16AM
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states on the one hand that the United States retains the right of first use of nuclear weapons, but on the other hand that we will foreswear the use of nuclear weapons against signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since most signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty do not have or want nuclear weapons, this is tantamount to saying that we will not use nuclear weapons against states that do not have nuclear weapons. The only exceptions of note would be Iran and North Korea (unless Obama is considering nuking Israel).
But many of the NPT states are potential adversaries, and many possess or can develop other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons--which are not covered by NPT.
This creates the perception that the United States would not respond with nuclear weapons to a CBW attack on the U.S. or its allies--and a reciprocal response is impossible, since the U.S. and its allies destroyed their chemical and biological weapons. A hostile power could then get the impression it could attack the U.S. or its allies with non-nuclear WMDs with relative impunity--a highly destabilizing situation.
In reality, public opinion would probably force any U.S. President to respond with nuclear weapons to a mass casualty WMD attack, and though saner heads around the world know this, others might not. Consider that the Korean War started largely because the United States stated the Korean War was outside its sphere of influence.
Misperception and miscalculation are how wars start, which is why deterrent policy should be explicit regarding what will trigger a response and ambiguous about what will not.
The NPR statement was thus both misleading and unnecessary, and contributes to a growing degree of instability in the global security situation.
Dai Alanye | 4.14.10 @ 1:42PM
In the final analysis what counts most is your enemy's assessment of your determination, not the number of weapons or their type.
Our concern ought to be the fact that "stupid" works in the oval office.
Ken (Old Texican)| 4.14.10 @ 1:24PM
Drew,
I sincerely hope your mommie's basement is not in a "target rich" area for jihadists.
IT IS THE "DETERRENT SIGNALS", ignoramus.
"Signals" have proven to keep the missiles in their silos for over 60 years.
Ask mommie to move to the country....upwind.
Tyler S.| 4.14.10 @ 2:28PM
Thar's really not a proper use of "Deus ex Machina" either, (even beyond the creepier implication of calling nukes god) its a situation developed in early plays where a god character suddenly appears and solves all the character's problems instantly by simply magicking them away without any real resolution.
GW| 4.14.10 @ 11:42PM
No, but it is like a Greek story. A magical superbomb to end a war 6 years in the making? One that would bring an entire Empire to its knees and have it surrender without needing to invade? It had to be absolutely unreal to live in that time period and witness how the war ended. Thank God for the nuke, otherwise I might not be here today (my grandfather fought in WWII in Europe and just might have had to go to Japan [where American casualty estimates were over a million] if we invaded the main islands).
Tim*| 4.14.10 @ 2:56PM
The Japanese defense of their mainland would have been costly , with regards to American casualties , so we dropped two Big Ones on them to break them. So American warriors , such as my dad , heading for the invasion of Japan , didn't have to go in and break them.
" He'll make a fine president. He was the best clerk who ever served under me. "
Douglas MacArthur on Dwight D Eisenhower's election as President.
Bob Miller| 4.14.10 @ 3:19PM
Spare us any more examples of MacArthur's egotism.
Tim*| 4.14.10 @ 3:31PM
" Duty, Honor, Country. Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be. "
Douglas MacArthur
" Americans never quit. "
Douglas MacArthur
Bob Miller| 4.14.10 @ 5:15PM
Now you're on a better track, Tim! MacA had his positive and negative qualities.
Tim*| 4.14.10 @ 3:42PM
" While Eisenhower served as Chief of Staff after World War II, MacArthur undermined his efforts to slow down mobilization and later to unify the armed services. He willingly admitted though that MacArthur was smart, decisive, and a brilliant military mind. Working under him was frustrating, but also an invaluable learning experience. "
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 4:01PM
Brilliant, but also high erratic, vain to the point of megalomania, prone to claiming credit for other men's ideas, exceedingly quick to transfer blame for his command failures to his subordinates, and cordially loathed by almost all of the officers and enlisted men who served under him.
Tim*| 4.14.10 @ 8:36PM
"Patton received many eulogies from the reporters who had followed him, including a tribute from a UPI writer who wrote, "Gen. George S. Patton believed he was the greatest soldier who ever lived. He made himself believe he would never falter through doubt. This absolute faith in himself as a strategist and master of daring infected his entire army, until the men of the second American corps in Africa, and later the third army in France, believed they could not be defeated under his leadership."
Also ,
" Privately however, Patton was often quick to remind Eisenhower that his permanent rank in the Regular Army, then still a one-star brigadier general, was lower than Patton’s Regular Army commission as a two-star major general. "
Also ,
" Eisenhower ranked the capabilities of U.S. generals in Europe. Omar Bradley and Carl Spaatz he rated as the best. Walter Bedell Smith was ranked number 3, and Patton number 4, followed by Mark Clark, and Lucian Truscott.
Bradley himself had been asked by Eisenhower to rank all the generals in December 1945, and he ranked them as follows: Bedell Smith #1, Spaatz #2, Courtney Hodges #3, Elwood Quesada #4, Truscott #5, and Patton #6 "
Note* Dad served in The 1st Army under Hodges ,where Dad and his troopers received The Presidential Unit Citation for being the first unit to hold the Germans ,at The Battle Of The Bulge on The Northern Shoulder At Manschau and Konzen Station.
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 10:12PM
Your dad deserved a better commander than Courtney Hodges, a mediocre non-entity promoted way above his talents because of his ability to suck up to Omar Bradley, another mediocre general whose reputation was inflated by Ernie Pyle, who single-handedly turned Omar the Tentmaker into the "GI's General". Frankly, Bradley was probably no more than an adequate corps commander, and utterly hopeless at the head of XII Army Group.
Tim*| 4.15.10 @ 9:24AM
Hodges was a Mustang , like Dad .Both understood and knew about combat , up close and personal and both were heavily decorated Combat Field Officers .
Where'd ya do your up close and personal combat ?
Stuart Koehl| 4.15.10 @ 3:05PM
Being a grunt doesn't qualify you to be a general. There is a Peter Principle in the military as well as in civilian life. A perfectly good sergeant may be a bad lieutenant; a perfectly good lieutenant may be a lousy captain; a good captain may be a poor lieutenant colonel, and so on down the line.
After thirty years of studying the matter, I think I'm qualified to make those judgments. After all, just how many bullets did Eisenhower hear fired in anger?
Tim*| 4.15.10 @ 10:06PM
Let's review here . You're an Armchair General ,who never served a lick of combat and hold yourself out as " qualified to make judgments " 'cause you studied the matter.
Now hear this.
"It was the First Army that captured Cherbourg, first great continental port to fall. It was the First Army that broke the German defensive crust at St. Lo, turning the battle of France into a hare-and-hounds chase. Some Patton divisions were in the attack, but the main wedge was First Army troops. It was the First Army that took Paris. The American Fourth Infantry Division of the First Army had to boot skylarking French tankmen into town to claim the glory of liberating their own capital. The Third Army was miles away and heading toward Metz.
It was the First Army that first entered Germany on September 11,1944. It was the First Army that captured the first German city, Aachen. It was the First Army that first crossed the Rhine river by the epic seizure of the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen. It was the First Army that made the longest armored march in history in a single day during the smash from the Rhine, a feat accomplished by the late Maj. Gen. Maurice Rose, Commander of the 3rd Armored Division.
It was the First Army alone that attacked simultaneously in two directions, taking more than 260,000 prisoners in the "Rose pocket" in the Ruhr to the west while driving steadily eastward toward the Elbe river. And it was on the banks of that stream that the First Army first made contact with the Russians, ending Europe's greatest squeeze play and the war. "
Read "Is Paris Burning " that's my Dad ,who beat The French into Paris.
Stuart Koehl| 4.16.10 @ 3:15PM
Let's review here: Dwight David Eisenhower never heard a shot fired in anger, never commanded troops in combat, yet was made Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force.
Either you are saying he was unqualified, or you have a double standard.
With regard to First Army leadership, just two words:
Huertgen Forest.
Enough said on that.
Mike Giles| 4.14.10 @ 3:43PM
Before any comments are made about the need to use the bomb, I suggest you read a history of the battle of Okinawa. That battle - and the manner in which the Japanese fought it - guaranteed that the US would use the bomb. The thought of the casualties the Allies would sustain in an invasion of the main islands of Japan, were simply unacceptable - which is what the militarists who ran Japan were counting on.
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 3:59PM
The best book on the subject is George Feifer's "Tenozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb". Feifer makes the connection explicit: the tenacity of the Japanese defense on Okinawa was seen (correctly) by U.S. commanders as a model for the defense of Japan, and made them loathe to engage in an invasion of the Home Islands. The Battle of Okinawa made the use of the Atomic Bomb inevitable.
Tim*| 4.14.10 @ 4:20PM
"He was a thundering paradox of a man, noble and ignoble, inspiring and outrageous, arrogant and shy, the best of men and the worst of men, the most protean, most ridiculous, and most sublime. No more baffling, exasperating soldier ever wore a uniform. Flamboyant, imperious, and apocalyptic, he carried the plumage of a flamingo, could not acknowledge errors, and tried to cover up his mistakes with sly, childish tricks. Yet he was also endowed with great personal charm, a will of iron, and a soaring intellect. Unquestionably he was the most gifted man-at arms- this nation has produced. -William Manchester on Douglas MacArthur"
Bob Miller| 4.14.10 @ 5:17PM
George Washington did well, with a lot less to work with.
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 5:42PM
True, and I can think of a few others who certainly surpass McArthur: Winfield Scott, Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, Nathan Bedford Forrest, George S. Patton, Creighton Abrams, Curtis LeMay and perhaps even David Petraeus.
Rick Z| 4.14.10 @ 5:30PM
MacArthur was the nation's most effective public relations agent of his time. Think of Europe: Patton, Eisenhower, Montgomery, Bradley, Mark Clark, Alexander, etc, etc ...... Think of Pacific: MacArthur ... and ???
...............
MacArthur's mistakes: .......
1) Incompetent defense of the Philippines (Air Force destroyed on the ground, artillery not at invasion sites, inadequate supplies at Corregidor. .....
2) Refusal to recognize the effectiveness of US led guerillas in the Phillipines.
3) Totally in error about the Japanese invasion of New Guinea, which was the path into Australia. .... The defense of the Kakoda Trail (which is a national holiday in Australia) was derided by MacArthur as being a laggard effort. It was exactly the opposite. ....
4) On the road back, the Phillipines could have been bypassed, just like most other islands were, until the inner defenses (Okinawa, Iwo Jima).
5) MacArthur wanted to use Atom Bombs to stop the North Koreans.
6) MacArthur was Pacific Commander of US forces ... and did not have effective defenses of South Korea ... including anti-tank, communications, artillery. US forces were not physically fit.
7) Public Insubordination to President Truman.
8) The Inchon landing succeeded ONLY because it was unopposed. It took TWO Tidal cycles to get the forces ashore, past extensive mud banks. MacArthur's staff was unfamiliar with the landing craft available. A much more suitable location was 20 miles away. Just lucky the NK's were not there.
9) When our troops pushed to the northern border of North Korea (Yalu River), MacArthur was convinced the war was over, and ordered munitions to be recrated, for shipment back to the US. That was when the Red Chinese attacked, throwing the US/UN forces back to South Korea.
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 5:43PM
I will agree that Mark Clark was the Douglas MacArthur of the Mediterranean Theater. I don't mean that in a good way, either.
goldman| 4.14.10 @ 5:42PM
A very interesting discussion. Clearly, conventional bombing of Japan would have been disastrous for Japanese civilians, principally, and probably quite costly for American soldiers, in the event of an invasion. That being said, weren't there other targets in Japan that were more clearly military targets? Was the US seeking to "break the will" of the Japanese people or the militarist regime? Seems to me this is an important distinction. Any thoughts?
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 6:01PM
Conventional bombing "would have been" disastrous for Japanese civilians? Were you not paying attention? I said six hundred thousand (600,000) Japanese civilians died in conventional bombing operations in a space of just eighteen months. It's hard to get more disastrous than that.
On the matter of military targets, there are two things to consider. The first is the difficulty of hitting a point target in World War II. We spoke of "precision bombing", but that was a relative term. In World War II, the Circular Error Probability (CEP)--the circle into which 50% of all bombs dropped will land averaged 1000 meters on a good day. Given cloud cover and heavy flak, that would fall off to 2000 meters. If you lived within 2 kilometers of a military target, bombs were going to land on you.
The second is the nature of the Japanese war economy. The Japanese farmed out much of their component production to small home factories. These parts would then be delivered to dispersed subassembly facilities, and the completed subsystems would be shipped to a few final assembly plants. The latter were hard to hit, but the home factories were interspersed throughout their cities. By this, the Japanese made whole cities into legitimate military targets. That Japanese cities were constructed largely out of wood made area incendiary bombing a logical mode of attack for us. That Japan neglected to develop effective fire fighting forces and air raid shelters, and never attempted to evacuate non-essential civilians from their cities only made the carnage worse.
For details, you can look at the US Strategic Bombing Survey, or consult the following secondary works:
Curtis LeMay and Bill Yenne, "Superfortress: The B-29 and American Airpower"
Kenneth P. Werrell, "Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers Over Japan During World War II"
Barrett Tillman, "Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan, 1942-45"
E. Bartlett Kerr, "Flames Over Tokyo: The U.S. Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan, 1944-45"
Kerr cites a number of Japanese military and government authorities who were debriefed by U.S. military intelligence after the surrender:
G. Aguri, Minister of Finance: "Most of the minor aircraft parts were made in small plants which were scattered in large or medium size cities".
R. Sugiyama, Naval General Staff: "Furthermore, owing to the destructio of large factories, and the loss of small factories scattered throughout a city in the way of home industries, the production of parts decreased rapidly and thus hindered the entire war program".
K. Konishi, Ministry of Transportation: "Aircraft engine part makers and subcontractors were mostly destroyed by these raids, which together with the losses incurred by dispersion and evacuation gave a fatal effect upon the production of aircraft".
T. Wada, Fuji Denko Seizo (an electrical manufacturing company): "But as regards our subcontracting factories, which numbered about 400, 225 factories were seriously damaged and their reconstruction was considered very difficult. This caused us great difficulty in obtaining finished and semi-finished parts, resulting in a sudden drop in production. The same circumstances prevailed throughout the industries of the whole country, and therefore it can be concluded that the air raids had a grave consequence on the resistive power of Japan".
Christopher Holland| 4.14.10 @ 10:45PM
600, 000 Japanese civilians died in just 18 months. Too bad for them, but look at the alternatives. The nazis gassed 250,000 Jews from the Warsaw ghetto at the Treblinka death camp in 6 weeks, and another 50,000 a few weeks after that. That is after 100,000 died from disease and starvation. Most of the 50,000 left died when the nazis finally destroyed the remains of the ghetto in 1943.
Compared to the Warsaw ghetto, the bombing of Japan was nothing.
Stuart Koehl| 4.14.10 @ 6:04PM
As for breaking the will of the people, by 1944 our experience with the bombing of Germany had totally disillusioned us on that point: the modern state has the power to compel people to endure bombing, and though they may grumble, they don't panic and stay at their jobs.
The point of the incendiary raids was, as noted in my long post, not to demoralize the Japanese, but to destroy their ability to resist by obliterating their military industrial base--which just happened to be scattered throughout homes in large, flammable urban areas. But destroying Japan's ability to resist did not seem to affect its government's will to resist, until the two atomic bombs convinced Hirohito to intervene in the unending debate and unilaterally end the war.
Ken (Old Texican)| 4.14.10 @ 7:42PM
Guys,
good thoughts.
My boss fought in Okinawa...on the Japanese side.
His words:
"Kenneth, one airplane...one less city...how do you fight that?"
victor| 4.14.10 @ 9:05PM
That's why Harry had to do what he had to do to end the war.
Truman declared "I never lost any sleep over my decision." When asked later about having made such a glib claim, he made a stark distinction: "I lost plenty of sleep--but not over saving Japanese lives. I lost sleep worrying about our boys....and it broke my heart when just one of our soldiers, sailors or marines died."
Much earlier he had summoned Paul Tibbets, the pilit of the Enola Gay, to the White House to tell him "Don't you ever lose sleep over the fact that you planned and carried out that mission. It was my decision. You had no choice." Truman wanted no one to lose sleep over the bombings; they were to be understood as life-enhancing and necessary.
John - TMF| 4.14.10 @ 9:07PM
The brutal truth is that until the Emperor was directly threatened, and no possible defense of him could be guaranteed, the war was going to continue.
1. Air Doctrine, which posits that wars can be won from the air, and leave the ground units for occupation, etc, was flawed. While air power in an interdictive and tactical level mode is indespensible to the modern 3 dimentional battlefield, the huge bomber offensives of 1943 and 1944 were of problematic strategic success.
2. The Pacific Theater of Operations presented a cultural and spiritual challenge, as will as a direct stab in the face of the air doctrine preachers. Air power once again, became a superb way of extending tactical and interdiction missions into locations that no level of submarine or small craft attacks could deal with.
A fine example of smart air power were the B-25s, heavily laden with machine guns and even a 75mm cannon. Squadrons of them turned harbors and coves into death traps for Japanese supply ships. 500 and 1000 lb GP Bombs became deadly quasi-torpedoes as medium bomber strikes skip-bombed through up New Guinea and along the slot to Rabaul.
However, the early B-29 raids failed miserably. Then, Curtis LeMay stripped them of their defensive armament and extra crew, loaded them up with napalm, white phosphorus, and other incendiary bombs. March 1945 the raids started on Japanese cities from low altitude. Stuart already mentioned the Japanese losses of life.
As Stuart has pointed out several times the irony of the Little Boy, and the Fat Man was that their use saved many hundreds of times more lives than they took.
I was watching the "World at War" with my second son, he is the history lover like his old man, and we talked about the last episodes that coolly and very objectively reviewed the reasons for the US using the bombs.
He made a very important observation. "We would have invaded, the war probably would have gone on until the end of 1946 or so, and then we'd have been stuck empty burned out dirt, wouldn't we?"
For all of our supposed and accused racism, and hatred of things Japanese, I really do think that the American people, and especially the US government had no desire to conquer Japan by being forced to wipe out its population.
Thankfully Hirohito understood that his life was in grave jeopardy under any other circumstance than surrender.
We did what we did because we had to. All other analysis is tinkering over anachronistic feelings clouded by tainted hindsight.
"You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out..." -- William Tecumseh Sherman
Regards,
The Mighty Fahvaag
Stuart Koehl| 4.15.10 @ 7:59AM
The early B-29 missions failed because of a combination of technical and operational factors. The B-29 had been rushed into production, and suffered from low availability rates; its engines were unreliable (and often caught fire), resulting in many aborts.
B-29 crews had been rushed through training, and were committed to operations before they were ready; as a result, their bombing accuracy was poor at best.
Hap Arnold wanted the B-29 in action as quickly as possible, to quell criticism of the program, and to stake out turf for his post-war dream of an independent air force. His establishment of XX Bomber Command in China was hair-brained and ignored logistic reality. Gas and munitions could only be brought to the Chinese air bases by flying it over the Himalayas using specially converted B-29s. It took four B-29 sorties to support one B-29 bomber on one mission. Thus, sortie generation was low, and the interval between missions too long.
When B-29 operations began from the Marianas, XXI Bomber Command under Hayward Hansell suffered from the same technical and operational problems, even though they had more secure lines of supply. In addition, flying at high altitude west towards Japan, the B-29 crews encountered the then unknown phenomenon we call the jet stream, which played havoc with navigation and bombing accuracy.
LeMay replaced Hansell about the time XXI Bomber Command was getting the technical problems under control. LeMay, however, saw the advantages of low altitude area attacks (greater payload, less stress on engines, ease in finding the target), and instituted a five day blitz, after which he ran out of incendiaries. While waiting for more to arrive from the states, he reinstituted high altitude precision bombing raids against factories, ports and refineries. With more reliable aircraft and better trained crews (LeMay imported many techniques he developed at VIII Bomber Command in Europe), the results were very good.
Thereafter, LeMay employed a 2-track policy of area attacks against cities, and precision attacks against discrete military targets, later supplemented by mining missions against Japanese ports and coastal waterways.
All of these were complimentary and resulted in a rapid deterioration of Japanese warmaking potential. But none of them were sufficient to make Japan surrender.
I like the Sherman quote and use it a lot myself. I usually supplement it with one by Bedford Forrest: "War means fighting, and fighting means killing".
JmsA| 4.14.10 @ 11:45PM
Bottom line: Barack Obama is not Harry Truman--not by a long shot--and I pray future events do not reinforce the fact. Great comments on the part of everyone, particularly Mr. Koehl. Thank you.
sofa | 4.15.10 @ 2:51AM
the two atomic bombs convinced Hirohito to intervene in the unending debate and unilaterally end the war.
goldman| 4.15.10 @ 9:06AM
thanks Stuart. very illuminating indeed...
Rick Z| 4.15.10 @ 11:18AM
Less than 1% of Japanese forces were taken prisoner in the island campaigns. They fought to the death, committing suicide if no other alternative was possible.
Civilians of both sexes were organized into home defense brigades, many armed with spears, explosive knapsacks. They would have been exterminated in actual combat.
The population centers are distant from the rice producing areas. The systematic destruction of rail and sea transport would probably have resulted in mass starvation, as the meager food supplies would not be delivered to the city dwellers.
Given the fanatical fight to the death on the Pacific islands, defense of the Home Islands and the sacred Emperor would have been a religious as well as a patriotic duty.
The invasion of Japan is explored in fictional accounts, including "Lighter than a Feather" by David Westheimer (who also wrote "Von Ryan's Express"). The title is from the samurai code of bushido, "Duty is Heavier than a Mountain; Death is Lighter than a Feather". Check out the customer reviews on amazon.com.
fjdsk| 6.30.10 @ 11:39PM
beijing massage shanghai girl
weddingdress | 7.1.11 @ 1:11AM
Civilians of both sexes were organized into home defense brigades, many armed with spears, explosive knapsacks. They would have been exterminated in actual combat.