Perhaps we’ve all been brainwashed by Hollywood’s version of
international assassination operations, but from the standpoint
of logic alone one assumes that a professional service or
individual does not take on the physical and political dangers of
killing someone unless there is a clear benefit to the action. So
what’s the story behind the assassination in Dubai that occurred
on January 19 and wasn’t
made public until last week?
Retribution for earlier crimes may be considered a benefit,
but the crime itself would appear to require justification of
broad, and usually, continuing effect. This is, of course, the
so-called revenge motive. “An eye for an eye” is biblically
sourced. The Israelis would seem to be well suited for such a
justification. But then the action must have some relativity in
terms of time and importance.
If all that is so, how does the assassination of Mahmoud
al-Mabhouh fit in? We are told that he participated in or
personally carried out the killing of two Israeli soldiers back
in the late eighties. Rumors are circulating that he had been
“involved” in recent times in the arms business for Hamas.
There’s no doubt he had risen to be a relatively important
individual in that organization, but no particular focus had been
placed on him that would signal a reason for murder at this
time.
For the moment let’s just accept the thesis that for one
reason or another Mr. Mabhouh was worthy — as films and
television would say — of getting whacked. We have been told
that the Dubai police (actually British-trained Special Branch)
have determined that an assassination team of eleven people was
involved. Doesn’t that seem like an exceptionally large group
that would be needed to kill one man? Isn’t one of the principles
of a professional “hit” to keep the operation as simple as
possible while using the fewest possible team members?
The point of the small, simple operation is that fewer
things can go wrong and fewer people can make mistakes. Eleven
operators in what once was called an “executive team” are
possibly required if other activities are expected to be
necessary. Such efforts as diversionary tactics, communications
degradation, surveillance and other similar functions would
certainly justify increased numbers of participants above the
more normal 3-5 person team. Heavy surveillance, though, doesn’t
seem to have been necessary. Mr. M had been traveling to Dubai
regularly from Damascus and apparently always stayed at the same
hotel. Nor was a diversion or control of communication
needed.
Operating in a modern environment such as Dubai might
require establishing several alternate escape routes by air and
sea, but this contingency structure requires additional time to
establish rather than an enlarged team. The tactical plan for
exfiltration appears to have depended most importantly on a delay
in the eventual discovery of the dead Mr. Mabhouh. This delay in
discovery would allow for evasion and escape through regular
civilian transport. In passing it should be noted that the victim
was found in a sealed room with the door electronically locked
from the inside. Reportedly the target was killed in the evening
of January 19 but not discovered until late the following
morning.
At this point one must question the method of killing that
was used. According to the Dubai police, the target was smothered
with a pillow. Another account, this time by Hamas, stated that
in addition to suffocation Mr. Mabhouh was electrocuted first.
How these two instrumentations worked is not explained, but they
were apparently effective — if inexplicably exotic. Perhaps some
form of locally assembled taser device was used to initially
subdue the target, who was then suffocated with the
pillow.
All of which brings up the question of why this target was
selected in the first place. Mahmoud al-Mabhouh’s brother has
suggested that Mr. M had been the subject of a failed poisoning
effort some years ago, but no evidence has been put forth. Hamas
sources have indicated that two Palestinian double agents were
involved in luring al-Mabhouh to Dubai. These men, according to
Hamas, are both Fatah members. Fatah denies any involvement and
says Mr. Mabhouh was done in by rival elements in Hamas
itself.
Israel’s external intelligence service, Mossad, is now the
media’s favorite sponsor of this operation. Naturally, Mossad
says nothing one way or another. Why should it? The British,
French, Irish and Germans are all going through the expected
outrage against the possible Mossad use of those countries’
passports in identity kits for the assassination team. The U.S.
has ” deplored” the affair in appropriate diplomatic style, while
anti-Israeli and anti-Hamas elements internationally have had a
propaganda field day.
It may seem naïve to question the circumstances and process
of the killing of the not-well-known Mahmoud al-Mabhouh. He was,
nonetheless, an important player in the dark and dangerous world
of Israeli/Palestinian covert war. He may have been a
professional Hamas killer himself. However, there is just
something fishy about this whole story of eleven-plus operators
needed to kill one man by suffocating him with a pillow in a
hotel room. But maybe we’re all too influenced by Jack
Bauer.
