It seems inconceivable that the gorge known as the Khyber Pass
which was such a danger to British supply lines in the 19th
century days of the Raj is once again just as dangerous in the
21st century. The trucking companies complain they are forced to
pay hundreds of thousands of dollars in ransom yearly to Taliban
kidnappers of their drivers and their rigs. They say it would be
a higher price if they didn’t also pay for protection by the
Afghan police and Pakistan border guards.
One way or another these amounts and most of the rest of
the very expensive NATO presence in Afghanistan are paid for
primarily by the American taxpayers and to a lesser, but
important, extent by their British counterparts. Herein is the
key obstacle to any strategic, and necessarily costly, plan to
secure Afghanistan against the Taliban. The multi-billion dollar
expenses involved in all aspects of this conflict do not have an
ascertainable end point in a war of occupation in which
replacement of U.S./UK and other NATO forces is to be
accomplished by an as yet mostly nonexistent fully functional
Afghan Army.
The principal supply route for NATO forces in Afghanistan
is the 1,260 mile trip from Karachi, Pakistan to Kabul. The one
thing that can be guaranteed regarding this treacherous pathway
is that it has brought economic rewards to Pakistan as well as
the Taliban. It doesn’t take much imagination to see that that
the American commitment to Afghanistan is a valuable asset to the
economy of the region even as the civilian casualties mount in
the battles with the Taliban.
Adding to the complexity of the character of this conflict
is the highly questionable trustworthiness of the Pakistan and
Afghan police forces, both charged with the responsibility to
ensure the protected flow of commerce. One could say, of course,
that there is no reason why the gendarmerie shouldn’t benefit
when everyone else does.
It became apparent last year that transiting through
Pakistan on the Karachi-Peshawar-Kabul route via the Khyber Pass
was increasingly uneconomic, militarily and commercially. Over
300 petroleum tankers and new military vehicles reportedly were
destroyed on this roadway between the end of ‘08 and the spring
of ‘09. While such losses can be, and were, counted as acceptable
combat casualties, when the cost of this destruction is added to
insurgent, police, and plain criminal extortion, the economics of
maintaining the supply lines to fight the war becomes an
influential consideration.
Spreading the wealth as well as seeking a more secure
supply route has shifted over a quarter of the ground shipment of
NATO military requirements via the north through Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. While this longer and more expensive route tends to
avoid Taliban tithing, it still must take into consideration
“transit fees” through tribes in their northern political
alliance. It all adds up.
The argument has been presented that, like it or not, the
ransoms paid for lives and property actually are a competitively
economic way to broadly disperse financial aid. Of course, this
is the same argument put forth relative to opium poppy
cultivation and trafficking. While this might make sense in
regional terms, it certainly doesn’t play well in Washington or
London — to say nothing of Peoria.
These tactical factors of the economics of war fighting
were not part of the requirements laid on General McChrystal in
the preparation of his operational plan for pacification of the
Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Nor was the fact that along
with fighting increasing thousands of Taliban, U.S. and British
forces will have to deal with the oft times deadly rivalries
between and among Pushtun tribes.
This problem of internecine conflict within the Pushtun
tribal structure has been a recurring issue since the first
American and British special operations forces launched their
efforts in 2001 — and long before. Payoffs early were part and
parcel of counter-Taliban operations. This is traditional
anti-insurgency tradecraft, but it has grown from specific
operational rewards to continuing economic, social and political
subsidization.
One of the “new” ideas being considered as a strategic
alternative is to pressure provincial leaders into competing for
funding rather than having Kabul direct the financing. This is
seen as a way to take away the influence of corrupt central
government authority while the Afghan Army takes over greater
responsibility for security.
Two problems: The Afghan Army is years away from reaching a
combat level equal to taking on the Taliban. And who says the
provincial governments aren’t as corrupt as the one in
Kabul?
Bottom line: There’s no inexpensive way to fight a war in
Afghanistan either in lives or money.
