By George H. Wittman on 10.30.09 @ 6:07AM
The spirit of the Cold War makes Moscow feel good about itself.
What exactly did Western leaders and pundits think would happen
as Russia regained economic stability and again gained leverage
in the world of international politics? What did they think would
be the outcome of a weakened United States undercut by lack of
support by some Western European allies?
What they didn't contemplate was a rebirth of the spirit of
the Cold War among Russia's leaders. They certainly didn't think
that Russia's defense strategists would rush toward development
of new multiple warhead and inflight retargetable missiles. Why
would the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces believe they ever would
have a priority need for such weapons at a time when a clearly
non-confrontational U.S. administration is willing to turn its
efforts toward major reductions in strategic armament?
A Cold War mentality has marked Vladimir Putin and his
stalwart security, intelligence and military cadre that
constitute the siloviki, and this has
infected Russia's perception of dealing with the external world.
Of course this is hardly unexpected. Putin and his generation of
dedicated former Communist Party members grew up in and were
educated by the old Soviet system. Back then they were the young
heart and soul of their nation. That the "old folks" mismanaged
Russian dominance was not the fault of Vlad and his now
middle-aged buddies.
After nearly twenty years of struggling through evolution
of a new format, Russia -- with its modernization and expansion
of its oil and gas industry -- is ready again to accept an
international leadership role. Russia didn't lose its scientific
genius. It didn't lose its traditional nationalism. Russia, with
the continuation of its substantial oil and gas income, has
weathered the global financial breakdown rather better than
expected. Why not show the world it's back in the game? What
better way than bulking up their military capability and
politically challenging American strategic ambitions?
It would be wrong, however, to place the full
responsibility for Russian resurgence on Vladimir Putin. In spite
of his authoritarian personality, Putin works within and through
what is by now a well-structured system. Even his
self-manufactured evolving rivalry with his own former aide,
Dmitry Medvedev, provides a useful image of democratic contest.
Whether real or not, the reported competition between the leaders
keeps alive a valuable good-cop, bad-cop negotiation potential.
The Russians clearly have not lost their facility in
international political chess.
Iran now has become a major piece in the new Russia/America
match. Washington appears to have lost sight of the fact that
Russo-Iranian energy relations go back to the period of the Shah
and the building of two trans-national gas pipelines, IGAT-1 and
IGAT-2. Bringing Persian gas into the Soviet Union was a major
project that continued through both the Shah's administration and
the later clerical governments. That Russian engineers are now
assisting in Iranian nuclear energy development should come as no
surprise.
Russia has no security fears of Iran. If anything, Russia's
intelligence service gains considerable information on the Middle
East and South Asia matters from their liaison with their
counterparts in Tehran. In turn the Russians have been quite
effective in restraining UN economic sanctions and gaining time
for Iran to develop its nuclear weapon capability. It's a
mutually profitable arrangement between two neighbors. It would
not be inappropriate to say Russia and Iran have a "special
relationship."
Putin's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, has let it be
known that he considers Ahmadinejad's tirades against Israel to
be mere bluster. He believes the Iranians -- from the Supreme
leader down -- have no intention of attacking Israel with nuclear
weapons. It is Russian thinking that Iranian strategy is based on
having the ability to threaten rather than attack.
Russia's ambition is to gain some form of strategic
political-military parity with the U.S. even if it can't match
every aspect of American strengths. Moscow wants to regain
effective dominance over the regions (now republics) of the
former Soviet Union (FSU) as well as impress Western Europe with
its overall power. In the meantime, the construction of new
pipelines bringing Russian gas westward can have the effect of
building an energy noose around Europe's neck.
This form of political economic maneuver combined with an
implicit show of military force is akin to earlier centuries of
European strategic thinking. It is adequate to make the FSU and
ex-Soviet Bloc nations of Eastern Europe take notice. The Russian
leadership holds essential the image of their country carrying a
big stick.
As part of this tactic Putin and his friends seek to
impress on their fellow Russians that the good old days of
rivalry with the Americans are back -- though just short of the
implication of a Cold War revival. It's Moscow's version of
"having one's cake and eating it too." One wonders if there is
anyone in the current White House who understands the subtleties
and complications of what is happening?
topics:
Vladimir Putin, Nuclear Weapons, Dmitry Medvedev
