Revolutions tend to be processes rather than singular events.
What has happened in Iran is no different. The process of recent
public demonstrations, though a surprise to many in its
beginning, should be no surprise as it continues in various forms
that not unreasonably could be characterized as a “revolution.”
Nonetheless, revolution is a war — sometimes lengthy and with
many casualties. In other instances, lamentably fewer, the
process can be relatively brief and bloodless. So far Iran has
shown itself more prone to the former than the latter and that
does not bode well for peaceful change.
Whether the American administration likes it or not, it will be
expected by Iranians of various stripes who are out of power that
the United States will actively support their effort to overthrow
the regime in power — or at the very least not object to their
efforts to do so. The U.S. since World War II has presented
itself as the defender of world freedom. The protesters in Tehran
could be forgiven if they mistakenly believe that Washington
would offer its support if asked.
This complicates things for President Obama, who has shown no
inclination to fight anyone for anything other than in defense of
a direct attack on the U.S. As a consequence, the Iranian
insurgents will have to construct their revolution in such a way
as to not count on assistance from what reasonably could be
considered their most obvious benefactor.
Perhaps this is just as well because hesitant support for
revolution is often more dangerous for the recipient than clear
inaction. It is obvious that the current Iranian government
believes it has little or nothing to fear from an American
administration that has shown itself willing to overlook the
serious bully-boy tactics of Tehran’s security forces. Confident
as the Persians are in their ability to outmaneuver anyone else
in the Middle East, and especially Western interests, the Iranian
leadership fully intends to continue to repress all dissent and
move on to nuclear weapon acquisition.
The dissident individuals and groups coming off a serious public
defeat have two factors going for them — one negative and one
positive. Most obviously the populace in general suffers from the
harsh government reaction. Ordinary citizens with strictly
parochial interests do not want to become embroiled in activities
that might disrupt their lives. For them the recent protests have
taken on at best a bittersweet character. These ordinary folk
will seek to avoid any involvement, direct or indirect, in any
continuing rebellion. At worst they will collaborate with
security officials in unmasking covert opposition action and
personalities.
On the positive side the remaining opposition cadre, not yet
exposed, will tend to develop a more cohesive character and a
more effective strategic and tactical operation. While security
service oppression increases the difficulty quotient of dissident
activities, it also hardens and makes more dynamic that same
opposition. This has held true in the past in Northern Ireland
and other classic sites of continuing anti-government uprisings.
In the case of Iran there is a definite need for the opposition
to establish reliable covert entrees into both the security
services and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. It is of
little value at this time to bring into the streets
— if it could be done — a repetition of the thousands of
unarmed protesters who valiantly, but ineffectively, earlier
challenged the elections and government of Ahmadinejad. The
government has just shown it can easily handle smaller
demonstrations.
It must be recognized that the protests were not anti-clerical.
This important character of the anti-government assemblage
indicates their motivation was less a desire for secular
democracy as it was a movement of several anti-Ahmadinejad
factions backed by old-line clerical elements from the 1979
revolution. These included the former president, Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, his immensely wealthy family, and the
long-time clerical backing of Moussavi from the religious center
of Qum including the reformist Ayatollah Khatami.
It is clear that there is little in the anti-Ahmadinejad protest
movement that suggests a desire to alter the basic anti-Israeli,
pro-Hamas, pro Hezbollah, nuclear weapon developing policy of
Iran. If anything, the objection is to the unsophisticated
character of the current government’s rhetoric. What does
definitely exist, however, is the competition among existing
clerical and secular groups eager to gain, or regain, control
over governance of the country. This situation poses a serious
challenge to outside interests such as the United States even in
choosing which opposition factions to covertly aid.
As in most revolutions the future of change in Iran will depend
on whether the opposition forces can coalesce operationally in
such a manner as to physically overthrow the existing power
structure now that elections have been ruled out. To gain U.S.
and European support it has to be determined if any new
government will change the current Persian foreign and defense
policies. Among Moussavi supporters and their diverse allies it’s
not yet been shown that commitment to such change exists.
