Recent judgments about the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) have become instant dogma as far as media commentators and
thus the public are concerned. Some may end up as truth, but
others are on rather shaky ground. Conventional wisdom is not
necessarily a good intelligence guide:
• "The Chinese do not want another war to start with North
Korea because hundreds of thousands, maybe millions, of North
Koreans will flee across the border to China and Beijing doesn't
want to be responsible for these refugees."
Beijing may not want another war to begin between the U.S. and
the DPRK, but it's not for that reason. The last thing they want
is the American dollar to be depreciated by new major war
expenditures. The Chinese hold so much U.S. paper now that the
lost value of these holdings would be immense. As for the N.
Korean refugees: When did it occur that the People's Republic of
China had such a soft heart as to be unwilling to use their own
military and security forces to drive unwanted Korean refugees
back from where they came?
• "Kim Jong-il is crazy and can't be expected to make logical
decisions."
Kim Jong-il may have some exotic tastes -- lobster, cognac, women
and westerns (actually he seems to prefer musicals) -- but that's
not crazy. He's just your average, everyday, pampered potentate
who is quite convinced (by his father, among others) that the
United States wants to take over the DPRK in order to add it to
its existing "puppet," South Korea. He also has an army of 1.5
million who will fight fanatically for any reason he evolves and
can sell to his nearly equally loyal, if ambitious, generals. Kim
is petulant, a bit paranoiac, puffed up, but not "crazy."
• "The U.S. can stop North Korea from shipping weapons and
perhaps sensitive nuclear hardware to other countries by
embargoing its ships."
Even if Washington eventually can get the United Nations to
strengthen its sanctions, and granting it may be easier for
Pyongyang to ship by sea, that is certainly not the only way N.
Korea can export banned goods. As has been pointed out often,
China is the DPRK's primary trading partner and it is from that
country that Pyongyang now receives most of its food and energy
supplies. In turn, much of the exports to China in the form of
minerals and certain manufactured products also go by way of
rail. The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has considerable
commercial interests in many economic areas. What would stop it
or other Chinese entrepreneurs from accepting rail shipments from
N. Korea with convenient bills of lading and then shipping them
to third countries?
• "The North Korean army has antiquated artillery and
tanks that would be no match for the American and South Korean
weaponry, to say nothing of air assets."
One has to hope this is true, but the suspicion exists that the
difference in quality of ground weaponry is at the very least
equaled by the North's clear superiority in numbers. As far as
ground-to-air missiles are concerned, the Chinese and Russians
have for many years assisted in their development to defend key
installations.
• "The DPRK currently has at least several nuclear devices
that could be dropped by air on selected South Korean and
Japanese targets. This does not include the in-progress
development of nuclear-tipped missiles of medium to long
range."
This is perhaps the least understood but the most problematic of
issues accepted at the core of North Korea's war-making
potential. As a "doomsday" scenario or simply an opening salvo in
an offensive war declaration, the first use of N. Korean nuclear
weapons just doesn't make military sense. To be fair, however,
much that the regime of the Kims has done doesn't make sense in
normal terms of logic. But there is the rub. North Korea under
Kim Jong-il defies the classic sense of logic yet it fits
perfectly with its own logic as an extraordinarily self-defensive
nation. The question therefore exists as to why Pyongyang would
go to so much trouble in defying the world by building a nuclear
arsenal when it could gain so much by not taking that route. The
answer may lay in lack of intent to use the weapon while enjoying
the respect it offers -- respect that is more important than
immediate national economic benefit. Of course, it is also the
ultimate instrument of leverage.
It is clear that both the accepted claims and counters suggested
are themselves open to challenge. The important thing is to
remember all that passes as conventional wisdom should be
challenged -- even the challenges to that wisdom.
topics:
North Korea, Kim Jong-il
