For the average American the events of 59 years ago are ancient
history, but that is not the case for the aged, but still
powerful generals in the North Korean Army. They remember well
their youth and those first months of their war. Re-fighting it
has been their dream.
It took only three days after their attack began on June 25,
1950, for the North Korean army to slash past the Republic of
Korea’s (ROK) poorly equipped and trained units and capture the
South’s capital city of Seoul. The Russian trained and equipped
forces of the North found little opposition among the ROK
soldiers already weakened by political propaganda efforts
undermining their loyalty to the unpopular ROK government of
Syngman Rhee.
The U.S. Task Force Smith made up of the under-strength
1/21st of the 24th Division arrived
in-country from Japan on July 1 and had traveled by truck and
train north for four days. They were supposed to link up with an
ROK regiment, but it was nowhere in sight. The hardscrabble hills
near Osan that they were told would be their defensive positions
barely allowed the smallest of foxholes for protection. The
theory was that these 431 men would hold up the advance of the
tanks and troops of the North Koreans. They took 155 casualties
on that day and during their stumbling fighting retreat over the
next five days to the nearest American lines.
Large segments of the ROK Army defected and civilians by the tens
of thousands fled south on foot. For the first several months —
or until the American forces were able to reinforce and
reconstitute their forces around the Pusan perimeter — the North
Koreans were well on their way to cleansing the peninsula of all
foreign and ROK presence. It could happen again if Pyongyang
decides the timing is propitious for an attack
General George Casey, Army Chief of Staff, recently stated quite
frankly that it would take ninety days to move forward an
adequate force to block an attacking North Korean army. Using
this official military assessment as their guide, there is no
reason to believe the NK military leadership would hesitate to
assure their Dear Leader of an effectively full occupation of the
Korean Peninsula within that time period.
The NK forces would have to plan on capturing a considerable
portion of their fuel supply as they moved forward blitzkrieg
fashion as they had done once before. While this may seem unduly
optimistic, it is not illogical in terms of strategy —
especially with a revanchist General Staff and a well-equipped
army of 1.2 million eager to go on the offensive.
From the U.S. standpoint air strategy would include an immediate
destruction of all known DPRK nuclear facilities by conventional
explosives at the same time as oil and refined product facilities
were being hit. It would have to be accepted that U.S. air assets
would suffer serious losses in this effort to stall the NK
offense and at the same time destroy their nuclear capability.
If the 28,500 U.S. and 650,000 ROK forces currently on alert in
South Korea were unable to repeat the 1950 success in holding a
defensive perimeter, the DPRK could gain control of the entire
peninsula without a single nuclear explosion. The next step would
be a negotiated settlement in which the Chinese would play a
major part. Kim Jong-il and his heir-apparent, Kim Jong-un, would
rule a united Korea and be heading toward recognition as an equal
power to Japan.
The North Koreans know that their “first-use” of a nuclear weapon
would bring total nuclear destruction to their nation. The U.S.
gains nothing tactically or strategically by using its own
considerable nuclear arsenal.
Most disturbingly, if the regime of Kim Jong-il really has come
to the point of desiring to re-fight the war of 1950, a
full-scale conventional war is an available alternative. With the
admitted delay of three months for adequate U.S. reinforcement,
as stated by General Casey, the chance exists once again for a
non-nuclear attack from the north.
There is another encouragement to such an invasion. The
government in Pyongyang has every reason to believe that the
appeasement-oriented Obama Administration certainly will delay a
definitive response; thus giving more than adequate time for the
North Korean buildup.
Would the Chinese act economically and politically to curb the
DPRK enthusiasm for the attack? Possibly, yes, but this factor
already would have been taken into consideration by Pyongyang.
The underlying guidance of the spirit of North Korea,
Juche, broadly meaning self-reliance, was the theme of
the leadership of its founder, Kim Il Sung. This more than
anything will drive his son and grandson’s decision making. The
Kim dynasty is perceived to be at stake, and they will do
anything to keep themselves in power.
