When President Obama delivers his long-awaited speech
in Egypt on Thursday, he will be fulfilling his
inaugural pledge to “seek a new way forward” with the Muslim
world. But finding areas of mutual interest may prove far more
difficult than the president imagines. That is because, in recent
years, the Middle East has seen the crystallization of regional
politics around two distinct ideologies. Call it the new
bipolarity.
In one corner, there is a radical camp made up of Iran and Syria.
It is animated by the idea of “resistance” against the West, and
counts terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas as its fellow
travelers. In the other are the comparative moderates, led by
Egypt and Saudi Arabia and consisting of Jordan, the Palestinian
Authority, and most of the Gulf States, who represent a more
pragmatic approach to the region’s problems.
The differences between the two could not be starker. The radical
camp supports terrorism as a legitimate political tool, views
political compromise as unnecessary, and aims to undermine —
either directly or by proxy — the stability of America’s allies
in the region. For evidence, one need look no further than Egypt,
where members of Hezbollah — Iran’s chief terrorist surrogate —
were recently arrested for planning to carry out attacks and
smuggle arms into the Gaza Strip.
While the regional pragmatists certainly have no love for Israel,
they at least favor degrees of normalization with the Jewish
state, and promote reasonable options for negotiating peace. They
also view the rising tide of Islamist terrorist groups as a
mortal threat to both domestic and regional stability.
This regional divide was on dazzling display during the recent
Arab summit in Doha, Qatar. The meeting ended early, after a
single day of debate punctuated by disagreements on nearly every
regional and international issue. In fact, just about the only
thing the gathered Arab leaders could agree on was their defiant
support for their honored guest, Sudanese President Omar
al-Bashir — a pariah recently indicted by the International
Criminal Court for crimes against humanity in Darfur.
Tellingly, those in the region’s radical camp viewed such a
stalemate as progress. Syrian President Bashar al-Asad crowed
that the event was “the most successful summit of the last 20
years.” Such sentiments speak volumes; the radical camp, simply
put, does not seek progress as currently defined in Cairo, Amman,
Riyadh, or Ramallah.
The tug-of-war now taking place in the Arab world threatens to
envelop other states as well.
Lebanon, for example, is currently teetering. Four years ago, in
the aftermath of the so-called “Cedar Revolution,” the
pro-Western March 14 coalition was elected on a platform that
championed the non-interference of outside actors in Lebanese
politics. But when Iranian-sponsored and Syrian-supported
Hezbollah overran Beirut in May 2008, the March 14 coalition
capitulated, granting Hezbollah and its backers a political veto
in national politics and effective immunity from oversight by the
elected government. Not surprisingly, these developments
emboldened Hezbollah and its supporters, who are now poised to
make additional gains in the upcoming June parliamentary
elections.
Qatar, meanwhile, already appears to have cast its lot. After
years of trying to balance friendly relations with Iran with a
strategic partnership with America (the country currently houses
our regional military headquarters), Doha now gives clear signs
of drifting towards Iran. It brokered the May 2008 agreement that
ended the Lebanese political crisis — a deal that gave the
political advantage to Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria. In the midst
of the January 2009 crisis over the Gaza Strip, it also convened
a contra-summit prominently featuring both Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hamas’s Damascus-based leader, Khalid
Mashaal. Indeed, Qatar is fast becoming the preferred gathering
spot for the resistance camp.
So far, Washington gives little indication that it recognizes the
new cold war brewing between radicals and realists in the greater
Middle East. Today, the Obama administration is simultaneously
engaging the radical regimes in Tehran and Damascus, even as it
courts the regional governments who fear them.
Such a policy is unsustainable. If Washington wants real regional
engagement, or realignment, the White House will need to
recognize the two camps now dueling for geopolitical influence —
and then clearly and unequivocally choose sides. President Obama,
in other words, may plan to engage the Muslim world, but he will
need to pick which camp he prefers.
