Feature
The Gates Budget
It is less risky than the strategy upon which it is based.
Bob Gates has been around Washington for many years, and it showed in the way he unveiled the defense budget. Recognizing that he was about to propose a number of changes that perhaps were not as radical as they first appeared, but nevertheless would upset key service proponents, major contractors, and their congressional supporters, Gates chose to release the budget’s most controversial “headlines” before submitting the details to Capitol Hill. In so doing, he avoided the damage done by leaks that invariably accompany the widespread internal dissemination of detailed budget documents called Program Budget Decisions, or PBDs. Instead of being placed on the defensive by key congressmen worried about their pet defense programs, Gates therefore was able to seize the high ground and focus the debate on his major budgetary themes. Congress has thus far been remarkably passive in the face of his proposals, industry likewise is keeping its own counsel, and service critics have swallowed their bile.
Gates first advertised his inclinations in a major Foreign Affairs article that appeared while he was still George W. Bush’s secretary of defense. He argued that the Cold War rationale underlying the procurement of major weapons systems had been overtaken by events, and that the military should reorient itself—and its programs and budgets—to the demands of fighting “irregular” wars that were likely to confront it for the foreseeable future. Consistent with that view, Gates fired the secretary of the Air Force and the service chief of staff, ostensibly over a nuclear weapons snafu but actually because they resisted the acceleration of programs to acquire unmanned aerial vehicles critical to operations against terrorists and insurgents but which threatened the primacy of piloted aircraft.
On January 27, 2009, Gates expanded upon his views in an appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, and he has been following up with speeches and testimony ever since. Gates has been accused of applying a scattershot approach to defense cuts without having an overarching strategy. He is also accused of pursuing a “divide and conquer” strategy to silence contractors; they lose work in one program but gain in another, or work is lost in one part of the country but gained in another.
Actually, Gates does have a coherent strategy; whether it is the correct strategy is something reasonable people can and should debate. Similarly, Gates’s approach to weapons systems is far from scattershot; in fact, many of the proposals he is putting forward are no different from those that Don Rumsfeld contemplated early in the Bush administration. The events of 9/11 diverted Rumsfeld from focusing on weapons programs; in his first two years as secretary of defense, Gates likewise left the management of the defense program and budget to his able deputy, Gordon England.
FIRST, HOWEVER, TO THE STRATEGY. It is Gates’s view that the United States will engage in irregular forms of warfare for the foreseeable future. No serious conventional military competitor has emerged on the international scene, and that includes China. Whether in terms of defense spending or in terms of conventional military capability, Gates rightly asserts, the United States military is far and away the most powerful force on the face of the earth.
Where the military is indeed challenged, however, is in the realm of irregular warfare. As the conflict in Iraq has made clear, insurgents can employ readily available, indeed store-bought, technologies to inflict tremendous damage on American forces. The very name “improvised explosive devices” (universally called IEDs) testifies to the tight decision loops in which terrorists and insurgents operate. As the great military thinker John Boyd tirelessly pointed out throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the key to defeating an enemy is to get “inside” his decision loop; for at least several years, insurgents in Iraq did exactly that to the United States military.
Gates therefore argues, with some justice, that the United States must find ways to fund, develop, and acquire systems that will enable it to confound its irregular opponents and work inside their decision loop. To that end, he not only seeks to reform DoD’s weapons acquisition program, but also wishes to reinvent the entire weapons acquisition system, so that devices that can defeat insurgents can be fielded with sufficient speed to confound their operations. And Gates points to the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle as an example of both aspects of the changes he seeks: a weapons system that indeed confounded the enemy by employing a design that defeated IEDs, and one that was acquired with unusual speed because it was fielded outside the normal, bureaucratically stolid, ossified weapons acquisition system.
Gates rightly asserts that the military focused far too heavily on another major conventional conflict at the expense of recognizing, and planning against, the threat that insurgents posed for the United States and its allies. Don Rumsfeld had the same view; he too argued that there was a need to balance the prevailing emphasis on conventional operations with a response to the challenge of irregular warfare. But Gates may be swinging the strategic pendulum too far in the direction of the latter. In so doing, he may be repeating the mistake that America’s military has made for generations: planning the next war on the basis of the last one, or, in this case, the current one.
The fact that no “peer competitor” is discernible today does not mean that there will be none two decades hence, when the production lines of weapons approved and developed today would still be operating at full tilt. In the first place, we tend to assume that if a country is quiescent today it will always remain quiescent; that is what we assumed about Iraq on July 31, 1990. That is what appears to be our current assumption about North Korea, despite its missile tests. Saddam Hussein proved us wrong; can we assert with certainty that Kim Jong Il, or some successor, will not do the same? Moreover, 20 years or even less may be all that another competitor needs to pose a serious threat to our allies, if not ourselves. Fewer than 20 years after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the Nazis moved into the Sudetenland. With technology advancing far more rapidly (Moore’s Law neither existed nor could have 70 years ago), the emergence of a peer competitor could take closer to a decade rather than two. Gates is betting that will not happen. How safe is his bet?
IN LIGHT OF HIS STRATEGIC VIEW, the secretary of defense has opted for the F-35, an aircraft designed for air-to-ground operations (and one that actually is a multi-national program), in place of the air superiority F-22 fighter. He has chosen to modify DDG-59 Aegis destroyers for the missile defense mission, instead of procuring far more expensive DDG-1000 destroyers, which were not designed for missile defense. He has canceled the vehicle portion of the Army’s excessively complex Future Combat System but is retaining the unmanned aerial portion of that system. He is delaying the introduction of a new long-range bomber. He proposes to end the production line for the C-17 airlifter. He is canceling procurement of a second aircraft to demonstrate the utility of the Airborne Laser, a key element in missile defense. He has opted for a less complex but less expensive satellite posture. And he has increased the DoD’s emphasis on procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles such as Predator and Reaper.
Gates’s cuts and changes are far from revolutionary, however. Don Rumsfeld contemplated terminating the F-22 production line as early as 2002. Rumsfeld pushed for the expansion of the unmanned aerial vehicle program, notably the Global Hawk as well as the Predator, in the face of entrenched Air Force resistance. He canceled two “Cold War” Army systems, the Crusader and the Comanche helicopter, earning him a reputation as an “anti-Army” secretary. He initiated the Littoral Combat Ship, which is intended to operate in lower-intensity (and irregular) environments and which Gates has retained. Finally, Rumsfeld was deeply concerned about the stagnant acquisition system and indeed about the entire bureaucracy. He supported the notion of progressive or “spiral” development of systems to minimize costly overruns and design flaws.
Under Rumsfeld’s leadership the DoD created the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) in 2004, and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in 2006, both of which were intended to “work around” the standard acquisition process and both of which continue to function under his successor. Rumsfeld also introduced the merit-based National Security Personnel System, which promoted howls of outrage from civil service unions and has been the subject of endless lawsuits. And he supported changes to the military retirees health benefits program, which has been consuming ever-larger slices of the defense pie.
Bob Gates has been in office for two and a half years, and he too is responding to the failings of key programs and a still unruly acquisition system. Yet he is not being revolutionary in this regard. He simply is expanding upon the work of his much-too-unfairly vilified predecessor.
GATES WILL FIND, as Rumsfeld did, that proposing solutions does not mean that they will be realized. The services still have their back channels to Congress, as do other interests, be they defense industry officials, veterans’ groups that want no changes to the health program, or civil service unions. And Congress has yet to pronounce on the budget.
The Air Force is seething at the secretary’s attempts to terminate or cut back on their favorite programs, all of them manned. It is unhappy that the secretary does not see the value of more F-22 jets with supercruise capability and instead prefers the air-to-ground F-35. It desperately wants a new bomber. It has difficulty understanding why, as the Army expands by 70,000 troops and is expected to remain heavily engaged in Afghanistan while maintaining a residual posture in Iraq, the additional C-17 aircraft to lift the Army overseas suddenly no longer are required. Regarding the C-17, Air Force officers do seem to have a strong case.
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Pingback| 6.1.09 @ 6:47AM
Multinational Corporations » Blog Archive » The Gates Budget - Spectator.org links to this page. Here’s an excerpt:
jerryofva| 6.1.09 @ 9:14AM
On the surface Secretary Gates' budget priorities make a lot of sense. I personnally disagree about the F-22 vs F-35 decision but I don't have any problems with much of the budget realignment. However, I think that a lot the decisions are based on first order thinking.
It is true that at the present time no nation has the power to challenge the United States in conventional combat. However, that is a result of a rational cost-benefit calculation. By improving our irregular warfare capabilities at the expense of conventional capabilities we change that correlation of forces calculus and open up possibities for potential adversaries to challenge us on the battlefield. This will make conventional war more likely and the outcome more uncertain and more costly
Americans are prone to this kind of first order national security thinking. We tend to think that the keys to fighting the next war are found from lessions learned at the terminal stages of the last war. This attitude is summed up by the a quote by Brig Gen Robin Olds as he flew escort into North Vietnam: "I have it on good authority that we will never fight like this again."
Ryan| 6.1.09 @ 10:13AM
I think Gates is mostly right on the F-22 - as sweet as that plane is, there is only so much value to "air superiority" in the current military climate. China's ONLY overreach MAY be Taiwan, and whether or not that takes place is extremely dubious. The Russians are far more friendly than they used to be and have more problems within their own borders and really don't pose much of a military threat.
My complaint of Rumsfeld has always been his reliance of Spec Forces type operations in the Middle East, when the solution was more boots-on-the-ground and holding areas, which historically has been the ONLY solution to winning a war. Precision strikes are nice, but pointless if you don't command the area with a human presence (hence the need to beef up the army).
North Korea may be the only ongoing conventional-war concern right now, but this time they don't necessarily have the Chinese and the Russians completely on their side, and technologically they are probably still stuck in 1950s-60s warfare. However, it's still going to take a massive personell force moving into NK to deal with that issue, something the Chinese can probably only practically accomplish at this point.
Gates is actually doing fairly well, and is the only bright spot in the midst of a woeful leftist administration.
jerryofva| 6.1.09 @ 10:24AM
Ryan:
The F-22 is formidable strike aircraft in its own right and is superior in that role to the F-35. The F-35 has minimal air-to-air capability and is not an effective counter to other 4th and 5th generation fighter aircraft. The F-15 is 30 years old and is growing very long in the tooth. It would be like going into the Viet Nam war with the P-51 and F-4U as our primary air superiority aircraft. While there are newer F-16 and F/A-18E variants they are no match for aircraft like the Su-30/35 now widely available in export markets. The only argument in favor of the F-35 is that it maintains our industrial base.
JP| 6.1.09 @ 10:27AM
I agree with Jerry. Fighting and sustaining a conventional war takes a years of preparation, and an intact supply chain. The TO&E for a "light force" is very different from a "heavy one".
But I can also see Sec Gates dilemna. One could ask, where in the future will this "conventional war" be fought? Saudi? Iran? South Korea? Europe? If so, what trends justify this way of thinking?
To see the how difficult strategic thinking is, consider what a policy paper written by someone in Foggy Bottom would have looked like in 1905:
"... and with regards to relations with the House of Hohenzollern and the House of Hapsburg, I suggest the US take the following meausre which should give the US a firm diplomatic foundation with these 2 empires well into the 1920s...."
Of course, the Second Reich, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Russian Empire dissolved by 1919. One can easily think of similar problems circa 1946, as well as 1985. The world changes quickly.
Yet, we still had to fight (at least initially) a conventional war in Iraq in 2003, and I believe that even then our military was given a task, but didn't have the tools to complete it. The so-called "Shock and Awe" campaign was a bust, as the Army didn't have the same forces at its disposal as it did in 1990-1991. One could also argue that the Iraq campaign should have been mainly a counter-insurgency campaign, and not a conventional one.
The debate goes on.
Old Texican| 6.1.09 @ 10:31AM
I too must respect Secretary Gates' priorities.
I consider it a case right now of: "killin' them alligators all around us"...and keep trying to drain the swamp...second priority.
One other thought: Changing those destroyers into "missle/anti-missle" platforms makes a LOT of sense.
Ryan| 6.1.09 @ 12:47PM
The problem with the F-22 is its expense and the matter that we don't need that many. Seriously. TWO can take on something like 10 F-15s (not exaggerating). Also, who are we going to throw them at? The only real enemies who can put anything in the air that can pose a remote threat are more or less friends or aren't doing much against us.
The F-35 is substantially cheaper and does a role we need WAY more, which is air-to-ground. We're particularly going to see this in case something boils over in North Korea.
Yes, the F-22 is the most amazing airplane EVER, and is probably two generations ahead of everyone.
We just don't need air superiority as much within the near fuure. We need air-to-ground.
jerryofva| 6.1.09 @ 1:17PM
Ryan:
If air-to-ground is the most important mission for the future then why bother with the F-35? The primary threat to ground support aircraft comes from guns and LO has minimal value. We would be better off with procuring more F-18E/Fs the F-35s. The F-18E carries much more ordinance then the F-35 can while maintianing a LO configuration. If you strap bombs on it then it will look like a Hornet anyway.
Tim| 6.1.09 @ 2:42PM
What about the infantryman? How about some new armor, better rifles, better kit. These unglamorous bastards are schlepping all over Iraq and Afghanistan fighting and winning. Why can't we give them some relief?
Oldpilot | 6.1.09 @ 2:51PM
You wrote: 'As the great military thinker John Boyd tirelessly pointed out throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the key to defeating an enemy is to get “inside” his decision loop; for at least several years, insurgents in Iraq did exactly that to the United States military. '
Interestingly, I've just spent some days trying to pin down just when Boyd did formulate and name the OODA Loop. Apparently it was early in 1978. He really did his agitating in the 1980s and early 1990s for the most part. I am writing an MA dissertation on Boyd and counterinsurgency, and the first several pages are now online. Click on the website link associated with my name.
You are quite right of course that Al Qaeda, including AQI, has been inside the American OODA Loop for ten years or more. The US military successfully applied Boyd's thinking to the April 2003 invasion of Iraq, and also to the 1991 liberation of Kuwait and even to the November 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. We can do it wonderfully well on the offensive. It's when we are attacked by the nimble David that we wind up holding our head like Goliath. Blue skies! -- Dan Ford
Richard Baker| 6.1.09 @ 2:52PM
Gentleman:
And how do we cope with the Chinese or Russians springing a technological surprise/advance on us similar to the Me-262 and that shock on the P-51/-47 pilots in WWII? Remember, the only reason it wasn't effective against us was because Hitler demanded bomb racks and that delayed or retarded it's operational debut. Don't believe our adversaries will make that same error. Even the bad guys learn from mistakes.
Grzmlyk| 6.1.09 @ 3:06PM
Good points on both sides.
Richard Baker| 6.1.09 @ 3:20PM
Tim:
The Grunts have everything they need. This $25,000 rifle that the Army wants may be wonderful. however, but multiply the total force (to include Guard and Reserve) by the cost and the M-16/M-4 is still cost effective and useable. The problem in Iraq/Afghanistan is terrain, similar to Korea, and fighting a highly irregular force. Unless we're going to have Monster Man teams, such as used by the 1st Special Service Force at Anzio, roaming the countryside, we're doing all that can be done. Never want to fight the other guys plan. Get inside his loop,not become it.
Old Texican| 6.1.09 @ 3:20PM
I'm sorry Mr. Baker
You are uninformed. As a pilot, (these days), fighting Hitler's best jets, was a shock for about one mission over Germany.
The P-51 and P-47 pilots just had to adjust their "deflection degree setting" to account for the increased speeds of the germies.
Even in the Korean conflict, many US pilots preferred the Corsairs and P-51s. They could "dance" and duck the MIGS...and get one good shot in the migs' butts.
OK present day....Missle tech is the edge...not the platform plane. Machine guns are a last resort.
Air superiority "predators" are probably the answer.
Richard Baker| 6.1.09 @ 5:11PM
The shock,sir, was to the bomber crews of the 8th Air Force. They couldn't escape or evade or maneuver as could the fighters. They were stuck in the combat box formation. The leaders of the Air Force decided to attack the Me-262 upon takeoff and landing as this was their only true period of vulnerability. Read Chuck Yeager's first book. The shock, to which I referred, was that of being on the wrong end of a technology shift. See also African tribal warriors discovering English Maxim guns at the end of the 19th century.
Old texican| 6.1.09 @ 5:58PM
Poor Mr. Baker
The 8th airforce guys were SHOVED into action before they were true pilots.
Dumb-shiit.. Mr. Yeager and I share many moments.
Those lives break our hearts.
Nevertheless...
Those remarkable young men flew the best they could...to kill bad guys.
They failed often.
So curse them to your grave...then meet St. Peter.
(oops)
AHHHHHHH... you forgot or ignored St. Peter.
OOPS..........................GO TO HELL AND NO HOPE FOR FORGIVENESS!
Maybe...just maybe one of those young men will give you a sip of water.....IN HELL!
Thom| 6.1.09 @ 6:14PM
I think guessing what we need 10, 20 or even 30 years down the road is a rather difficult enough task but there is an overarching problem with our force structure that compounds even the best and brightest. We simply don’t have the forces to do the jobs we envision. Since WWII we’ve fought 5 minor or brush wars, each time having fewer forces in the pool to support the operation(s) in question. Two thirds of our forces are composed of the Air Force and Navy, neither of which add much to irregular warfare capability but are essential to our over all capability and enable the ground forces to go where they need and operate with little of no interference from similar high tech forces. Need I point out we’ve been in Afghanistan almost nine years and Iraq over 6 now tying down over a third of our deployable ground forces that “strain” our peace time rotation deployments. We’re at war and still running a peace time rotation effort like we did in Korea and Vietnam, both of which we lost. We bled the enemy greatly in both places but they hold the ground today and one could cause immense causalities in South Korea on a moments notice and may if they can get a handful of deployable “nukes”.
The flip side of this coin is that our weapon’s systems are over 30 year old designs and nearing the end of their useful life. The F-15 and F-16 units were brought to operational level relatively quickly by our standards but both well after the need and failures of the F-4 Phantom to live up to being all things to all missions was vividly demonstrated in Vietnam. Contrary to popular propaganda, the F-22 can’t take on 10 F-15s and win in a real world ROE combat environment. Probably not even three. 187 F-22 can’t do the job of the 750 F-15s we bought; the F-35 can’t do the same jobs the F-16/F-18/A-10s can either. Precision weapons are great in their place such as a set piece battle like we fought in the first Gulf war and later in Iraq but when the battle becomes more fluid sometimes it just takes saturating an area with lethal force and lots of it. The F-35 can’t do that. It is a precision weapon platform all the way. Add to this we are using short range tactical fighters for strategic missions now save money on a heavy bomber force on the front end and paying for that on the back end having to maintain a 500 tanker force to enable both the Air Force and Navy to make interdiction missions with short ranged aircraft in lieu of purpose built strategic airframes.
At the end of the day a nation of 300 million is trying to multitask a tiny military force to fight the next fourth rate proxy for our true potential adversaries. Who is inside who’s decision loop here? If we continue on this track of trying to optimize a force structure to just take down the next fourth rate power we encounter we won’t have either the forces or the time to develop and field a force powerful enough or large enough to handle it. We have a history of doing that and it takes over a decade to test and field weapon systems now. What Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated is what history has shown time and time again. You win the wars on the ground and there is no substitute for boots on the ground.
Thom| 6.1.09 @ 6:32PM
Old Texican, in all due respect every time we lost a B-17, B-24 over Europe or B-29 over Korea we lost over ten people either as KIA or POWs. How many single pilot German Jets did those Bomber crews shoot down? How about our fighter escorts? Most German Jets were taken at their specialized bases either trying to land or destroyed on the ground. The Me-263 Comet was hardly more than a human piloted one pass rocket and if it got one heavy bomber on that pass that was a win in their book and mine too. Speed does matter when you don’t have it and can neither disengage nor engage the enemy on your terms. Had the Me-262 been used properly from the earliest possible time, the story would have turned out a bit different. Like the Sherman tank, we overwhelmed the Germans with numbers but lost in individual combat against their tanks sometimes three to one. Numbers matter too unless it’s your turn to be one of the three sacrificial lambs. We did the same thing in the Air. The German Air Force the 8th met was a shadow of the early war one. Do you think we’ll outnumber the Chinese in the Air or on the ground Old Texican?
geek| 6.1.09 @ 7:08PM
An excellent article.
The only point missing is that too much money has resulted in avoiding making hard decisions and properly managing programs.
The list of expensive programs with huge overruns in schedule and cost and those with little to no chance of success are known. Defending these gold plated power point programs, has taken away funding for the vital yet mundane requirements for the Services.
Thom| 6.1.09 @ 7:42PM
Geek,
This is what happens when you try to design systems that have to be effective for at least 30 years and they try to replace manpower with individual system superiority. A case in point is the F-22 (over 25 years in the making) but a new F-15 with all the latest isn’t that less expensive to build either. I work in the Defense industry and have to deal with the shear bureaucracy of it every day…. It cost a fortune to deal with the moment “Federal Government” is involved. The only thing the Defense industry gets price breaks on these days is toilet paper and bullets. We build so few of anything that everything has an enormous development cost rolled into each unit that they become unaffordable in the small numbers we order. The Air Force Tanker program is a good example. All it is is a commercial airframe converted to military use but by the time all is said and done it is going to cost like an F-22 (more actually) and its primary purpose will be to support hordes of short range fighters performing long range bomber missions in lieu of a better airframe for the mission that doesn’t need as much tanker support. It isn’t really about being “gold plated” but about building something we can get our money out of 30 years into the future. That’s a long time in Technology terms. You get $1000 wrenches when you only order 1000 of them and they are different than what you can get off the shelf any where. We are trying to win our wars with superior weapons and no troops. Got to have both.
geek| 6.2.09 @ 2:40PM
The challenge is defining requirements so they can be met with a degree of rationality.
Future Combat Systems was a marketing ploy with desires for a ground vehicles of ½ the weight with no realistic consideration to survivability of the occupants. The notion that some imagined technology could or would provide protection was unrealistic. The open ended blue print was absent realistic design and cost goals. The thought that a contractor could deliver 17 different platforms was absurd, delivering 1 on time and within cost is usually a challenge. When you combine this with tanks and artillery that are far superior to anything that would present a threat on todays or tomorrows battle field, the need for most of FCS was at best questionable.
The emergence of Unmanned Aircraft as a true capability was and is a game changer. If you are looking at the future, designing advanced tactical systems that are immune from G-Forces, do not need human support systems, eliminate the risk to the pilots, have superior handling characteristics, are lighter weight and be deployable for longer periods of time, maturation of that technology makes huge sense. This would enable smaller air craft carriers and reduce the manpower the Air Force requires for force projection. The investment in advanced manned aircraft for the next 40 years is highly suspect.
The cost of military unique hardware is a fact of life for all sorts of reasons. What is not acceptable is billions of dollars expended over 10-15 years delivering little to nothing.
Lawrence Korb did an excellent run down of the major weapon programs under development from missile defense to ground combat vehicles.
It has been evident to me that absent financial pressures, ill considered and conceived programs have been perpetuated with precious little delivered in terms of advanced capability to the Services. 2 new nuclear submarines? An advanced mid air fuel tanker for manned air craft? 1 or 2 Air borne lasers 747’s to be deployed where and how? Continuing a decade Kinetic weapon to shoot down a satellite when there is no way to deploy it? All these are questions that were surfaced by Secretary Korb and to some extent by Secretary Gates.
For far too long cartoons on power point slides have been sold like snake oil
Old Texican| 6.2.09 @ 3:11PM
Mr. Baker
I apologize. I went off on you and there is no excuse.
I have had the opportunity to visit with many of those bomber pilots and crewmen that survived.
Many of our bomber pilots of WWII had fewer numbers of hours of experience than a "modern" private pilot of a Cessna 172.
Having also spent some several hours with serious strategists/tacticians of WWII, I was continually shocked by their tears at the futility of much of their "mission".
Legitimate numbers suggest that the German war industry was producing extremely well right up to the end of the war...in spite of the "strategic" mission of the bomber fleet.
...our kids died blowing up bricks...along with collateral damage of no consequence to the war effort.
If there was indeed a "consensus" among these fine men...it was: "They threw us away."
Today, as then, our "leaders" are throwing our young men away for bullcorn instead of being able to point them at the crucial choke points of our enemies.
Look:
Shut down the import of refined oil products to Iran....they stop. Literally...we stop their whole country and their government control.
Number two: blockade their crude oil EXPORTS, and they run out of cash to build nukes.
DUH!
Sooner than later Iranian working men simply sit down and think...and decide..."nope".
During WWII the Germans' key shortage was FUEL. Fuel for everything including tanks AND jets. We missed it.
All we had to do was shut down their fuel supplies, and everything in Germany ground to a halt.
...fuel trains...fuel pipelines...fuel trucks...shut down that one thing...and the war was won.
We missed it.
So...
What are we missing today?
Where is the choke point to stop our enemies?
Tenn Slim| 6.3.09 @ 8:54AM
ALL Cap and Soc Socratic discourse:
Cap: DOD budget wars, an article worthy of your Anti - War comment. For me, the point being made was we look some 2-5 years ahead in DOD development, due to the long R and D time necessary. You have to maintain a stable budget during the early years, in order to even get a product out the door. Strategizing over NEED for a DOD system as the world changes is difficult. Being a DOD Budget Seer, as Gates is expected to be, is also fraught with divineing the innards of the OBNA ever changing focus. Today, GM and cars, tommorrow, who knows. Soc, your question for today: Can Gates survive in the OBNA of ever changing focuses.?
Soc: Gates et al, DOD, will survive as long as we need them as foils. The entire DOD establishment is due for a GM type trip to the OBNA bankruptcy court. Our friends in SF, Code Pink, continue to send us memos. STOP THE WAR. Well if we can convince the UE, the Islamic Nations, that we do indeed want peace, then the DOD is due for an overhaul. Till then, we will continue to fund the monster, keeping close tabs, of course.
Cap: Needless to say, the loss of programs, projects, etc. from DOD funds means a loss of work, and how does this fit into your scheme of thing?
Soc: Right on track. The demise of the Mil -Industrial complex is the next, 2010FY target. We have control now, over most of the USA Electorate production, Fiscal, Education and enviornment. Transportation, Logging, then the DOD, await the axe.
Cap: A bleak future indeed. However, The USA Electorate does still have the final word. VOTES.
end
Semper Fi.
Leksaker | 9.8.09 @ 4:22PM
leksaker
search the internet | 9.30.09 @ 4:27PM
excellent read and for more search the net right here
Sällskapsspel | 10.7.09 @ 7:48AM
Very interestiong - good post!
Leksak | 11.24.09 @ 10:57AM
Great post!w
Leksaker på nätet | 12.17.09 @ 3:55PM
Interesting post!
Marta Uhren | 12.22.09 @ 4:55AM
Great and Interesing post..thx
Jhonny | 4.21.10 @ 5:47PM
The only point missing is that too much money has resulted in avoiding making hard decisions and properly managing programs
guo | 7.1.10 @ 5:12AM
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