The core element in the American relationship with Europe is
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. After
President Barack Obama's recent trip to Europe it is not
unreasonable to inquire as to the relevance of that organization
to U.S. military and political interests.
Often quoted has been the justification for NATO in Europe given
by its first Secretary General, Lord Ismay: "to keep the Russians
out, to keep the Americans in, and the Germans down." It doesn't
appear to be working anymore.
The Russians have thoroughly penetrated West Europe as their
major supplier (controller) of energy. The Germans are calling
the tune when it comes to both European economic and military
matters. And the United States has proven itself to have little
in common with continental Europe other than near total failure
of memories of past glories and obligations therein. The concept
of "an attack on one is an attack on all" has aged to the point
of atrophy.
The European Union's new defense structure already has intimated
what the future will be as it now has an established claim on the
NATO military organization's assets if the latter doesn't want to
use them. All that NATO has now is a so-called "right of first
refusal." If that isn't a planned redundancy, it will have to do
until the new De Gaulle or perhaps Bismarck comes along. NATO's
28 member countries, 22 partner countries, 43 different agencies
and organizations plus 9 logistics bodies and 5 production bodies
appear formidable in theory. In practice it is little more than
an expensive bureaucracy.
The original purpose of NATO in 1949, with apologies to the
brilliantly cynical General Lord Ismay, was to convert the WWII
alliance of Western European nations into a similar grouping to
check the post-war Soviet expansion to the west. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization has been the center of American
relations with Western Europe ever since. President Obama's
recent trip to Europe has clearly shown exactly how little that
relationship is now worth.
In simple terms, the arithmetic of American relations with West
Europe -- conspicuously excluding the United Kingdom -- is as
follows: Taking serious additional steps to stimulate the EU
economy so that it might increase its capability to assist the
rest of the world economy -- Zero! Acceptance of a fair portion
of NATO's obligation in Afghanistan -- Zero! Support for
strengthening of economic sanctions on Iran condemning their
nuclear weapon development -- Zero!
In fact, the entire basis for continued American participation in
NATO may have been undercut. Attempts to broaden NATO's role have
failed or simply been subsumed in the ambitions of the European
Union that instead of wanting the United States as an ally views
its onetime champion as a competitor.
In spite of U.S./UK efforts to drag NATO along with them in
Bosnia, Iraq, and now Afghanistan, the results have been either
negative or marginal at best. NATO may have some basing
advantages for U.S. forward defense posture, but in terms of
being an active military participant alongside US/UK forces, the
major powers in the European Union no longer see a profit.
NATO came under attack during the Clinton years and was strongly
defended by high profile generals. The thesis of the American
defenders of NATO was based on the perception of both the need
for and ability of the United States to maintain a special role
in Europe in the newly post-Soviet period. There was a logic to
that argument then, but that logic is now strained.
An oft-repeated defense of American continued military
participation has been to suggest the value to the U.S. of the
political leverage afforded by maintaining its physical presence
in Europe. This certainly has not turned out to be the case with
Germany, where the American military long has had its largest
continuing presence.
The current situation is as follows: There is no doubt the
Russians would love the suspension of NATO; that in itself could
be reason enough to keep it going. The reality, however, is that
the ineffectuality of NATO negates its value as an instrument of
American policy and severely diminishes its military worth to the
United States.
The solidarity of NATO has been severely weakened and its
viability as an effective military alliance has been endangered
by European popular political indifference. The United States
soon must ask what is in it for the American people.
