By Ivan Osorio on 4.15.09 @ 6:07AM
Card check or no, the Employee Free Choice Act would be a bigger
financial disaster than its opponents ever imagined.
The announcements by Senators Arlen Specter (R-Penn.) and Blanche
Lincoln (D-Ark.) that they intend to vote against cloture on the
so-called Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) has taken the
legislation out of the headlines for now, as EFCA supporters seem
short of the 60 votes needed in the Senate to end debate.
But EFCA opponents should not become complacent. Organized labor
and its allies in Congress continue pushing this bill, and they
are not about to go quietly. And this legislation may be even
more damaging than even its opponents think.
EFCA would make secret ballots in organizing elections a dead
letter by mandating the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to
certify a union as exclusive bargaining representative for
employees at a company as soon as a bare majority of employees
sign union cards. This process, known as "card check," exists
under current law, but requires that employers forgo a secret
ballot election.
Under EFCA, employers would have no say, and the union would be
certified as soon as it collected signatures from 50
percent-plus-one of employees. Union organizers ask workers to
sign cards out in the open, often under pressure. Many employees
will sign cards just to be left alone.
EFCA's card check provision helped provoke a backlash against the
legislation as people found out more about it. However, EFCA's
second provision, which has not received as much attention, but
could be even more devastating economically.
Just how damaging? Enough to force some healthy companies into
bankruptcy, according to one businessman whose company could be
severely affected. Specifically, EFCA's binding arbitration
provision could lead to newly unionized companies being forced to
assume unsupportable new pension liabilities. Thus explained
Brett McMahon of the construction firm Miller & Long,
speaking at the Heritage Foundation this week.
EFCA supporters have tried to sell the legislation's binding
arbitration provision as a guarantee of first contract. In fact,
it's a recipe for a government-imposed contract. Under this
provision, the company and the newly certified union have 90 days
to negotiate a contract.
If they have not reached a contract after that time, they must
negotiate for another 30 days, at the end of which period a
federally appointed arbitrator may step in and impose a contract.
This creates perverse incentives for union negotiators to stall,
and thus get a lot of what they want through arbitration.
McMahon describes this 120-day period as "a good time to start
liquidating," since newly unionized companies would then be
required to enter into union pension funds, most of which are
supposed to back multi-employer defined-benefit plans. "The
problem's they have no money," he said.
Employers who wish to back out of such plans must pay a
withdrawal fee, because, unlike single employer private pension
funds, multi-employer funds are insured primarily by the
participating employers, not the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC). This is an especially bad deal for workers,
who could face huge losses when their pension funds default.
Unlike single employer plans, which the PBGC insures for up to $54,000 per
worker per year, the PBGC can only pay out to a miserly
$12,870 per year.
For the company, it means millions (in some cases billions) in
new liabilities, which must be stated under FASB 157 mark-to-market
valuation rules, which, as my colleague
John Berlau has noted, force companies to overstate
liabilities by making them price assets at what are essentially
liquidation prices.
Thus, otherwise healthy companies can suddenly find themselves
burdened with pension obligations they cannot support. To
illustrate how bad these could get, McMahon cited the example of
United Parcel Service,
for which the least expensive option was to pay $6.1 billion
to get out of the
Teamsters' Central States pension fund.
One particularly pernicious reason so many union pension are
underfunded is shareholder activism. McMahon cited the example of
the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS),
which, as a result of eschewing investments in politically
incorrect industries such as tobacco, has suffered opportunity
losses of 17 to 18 percent.
As Diana Furchtgott-Roth of the Hudson Institute notes in a
recent
study, "collectively bargained pension plans…perform quite
poorly relative to plans sponsored unilaterally by employers for
non-union employees."
McMahon rightly characterized shareholder activism as a
dereliction of fiduciary duty by pension fund administrators.
"Their duties are fiduciary. Their duties are to the people who
put their money in their trust," he said. "They don't act
properly" by making investment decisions based on political
criteria, rather than on which investments can provide the best
returns.
Shareholder activists often seek to promote a broad leftist
ideological agenda, often in concert with other left-liberal
constituencies, as the new Blue-Green
Alliance makes clear.
With several major American companies struggling to manage with
legacy costs, of which pensions form a significant part, the last
thing the nation's economy needs is for more companies to become
burdened with such costs. As EFCA supporters promise better pay
and benefits for workers if the legislation is passed, workers
themselves should consider what EFCA would really deliver.
You can't get better pay and benefits when jobs disappear.