By William C. Duncan on 4.6.09 @ 6:08AM
In a novel approach, the iowa supremes claim to speak for a whole
new generation.
On Friday, the Iowa Supreme Court unanimously repudiated the idea
that marriage is about something more than securing government
approval of adult desires. In the court's formulation (the
decision is on line
here), Iowa's constitution mandated a redefinition of
marriage to give same-sex couples "the personal and public
affirmation that accompanies marriage."
As disturbing as the result is the convoluted reasoning the court
employs to reach its conclusion. It is unanchored to precedent,
text and, at some points, even reality. The court signals its ad
hoc approach to constitutional interpretation early on when it
says the legal requirement of equal protection of the laws "can
only be defined by the standards of each generation."
Legal concepts are not the only casualties of the court's search
for a justification on which to rest its decision. The court, for
instance, recasts marriage as an arrangement "designed to bring a
sense of order to the legal relationships of committed couples
and their families."
Later, when the court tries to explain its role in overturning
the marriage statute by arguing that it is required to act to
protect a uniquely vulnerable minority, one piece of evidence the
court offers to show that gays and lesbians are "politically
powerless" (despite securing adoptions rights, coverage in state
anti-discrimination laws, etc.) is that they have failed to
convince a legislature to redefine marriage. What possible
limitation, other than judges' subjective will, can there be on
the court's power to disrupt social norms if it can be triggered
by a failure of the legislature to meet the demands of a pressure
group?
Perhaps the most creative improvisation comes in the portion of
the court's decision dismissing the idea that marriage has
anything to do with children's welfare.
Appellate courts in Arizona, Indiana, New Jersey, New York,
Washington and Maryland have all noted the role marriage plays in
encouraging men and women to take responsibility for each other
and the children they may create together and in making real the
opportunity of children, wherever possible, to know and be raised
by their own mother and father. The supreme court of Iowa
dismisses all of this with exceedingly strange arguments. For
instance, the claim that marriage can have nothing to do with
childrearing because bad parents are not excluded from marriage.
Or (a novel straw man), that Polk County (since the state
attorney general didn't bother to make an appearance in the case)
should have shown that traditional marriage resulted in fewer
same-sex couples rearing children if it were serious that
marriage and childrearing should remain linked.
The court goes so far as to say that "the traditional notion that
children need a mother and a father to be raised into healthy,
well-adjusted adults is based more on stereotype than anything
else." Can the court really believe that our understanding of
marriage as the optimal setting for childrearing, an
understanding inherited from millennia of human experience, is
just a plot to disadvantage homosexuals? If this assertion had
been offered two days before, one might have concluded it was a
spoof.
As an aside, the court claims an abundance of (uncited) evidence
that children will fare just fine in motherless or fatherless
homes. It does not, however, explain how this evidence surfaced
since the district court concluded from the testimony offered in
the case that "Social science literature demonstrates that
children who are reared by a married mother and father have more
positive outcomes on a wide variety of important factors compared
to children in other adequately studied family structures" and
"same-sex couples are not included amongst the 'other
adequately studied family structures' referred to."
That not just a majority, but the entire court, was unwilling or
unable to recognize the claims of tradition, of constitutional
law, or even of realities like sex differences or procreative
capacity, is troubling indeed. While improvisation may be
charming in music, it is a poor technique for legal analysis.