In the arcane world of covert intelligence operations recruiting
assets among enemy targets is a priority. To recruit an agent in
a position to influence the actions of the target is an even
higher priority. Why is it then that the White House treated as
new and unique the issue of developing relations with so-called
moderate elements among the Taliban?
The answer appears to lie in the strong desire of Barack Obama to
create the impression not only that he is bringing something
different to the table of Afghan affairs, but also that he is
able to pursue non-lethal mechanisms to “solve” the Taliban’s
effort to regain control of Afghanistan. If any of this
motivation is true, President Obama surely must know he is rather
late in this contemplated effort.
The British military and intelligence already tested this path in
the south. The Bush Administration had already authorized covert
ops policy along these lines. Pakistani intelligence maintains
extensive contact with both moderate and radical Taliban
elements. And the Saudis have had long-term dealings with the
Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, going back to before 1994 when the
Taliban wrested governance away from the corrupt leadership of
post-Soviet Afghan officials.
Comparing the Taliban to al Qaeda in Iraq who were forced out of
Al Anbar Province by the U.S. military working with local tribes
is a non sequitur. The Taliban is made up for the most
part of local Pushtun tribal fighters indigenous to the regions
in which they operate. The experience in Iraq was quite
different.
Considerable hand wringing has occurred over reports such as the
March 26 New York Times article
that said, “Support for the Taliban, as well as other militant
groups, is coordinated by operatives inside the shadowy S-wing of
Pakistan’s spy service, the Directorate for Inter-service
Intelligence.” From whom else does anyone think the United States
has gained intelligence that there might be “moderate” elements
eligible for defection within the Taliban ranks?
There are always economic factors that plague insurgencies. They
existed among the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War. A program
called “Resources and Population Control” was established to
exploit this VC vulnerability. Local corruption, however,
destroyed any possibility of success of that venture as shall
similar efforts announced by President Obama as part of his
supposedly new civil assistance approach in Afghanistan. What’s
worse than the Obama Administration willful ignorance of history
leading them to “reinvent the wheel” is the slavish manner in
which the military brass offers no objections.
The one Vietnam program that could be instituted in an Afghan
version is the extremely successful “Phoenix Program” aimed at
capturing or killing VC cadres. This deadly program was held by
North Vietnamese leadership after the war as the most successful
of the American efforts to disrupt Viet Cong insurgent activity.
(See p. 602 of Stanley Karnow’s Vietnam: A History.)
Obama’s Afghan plan bears striking similarities to the
humanitarian efforts attempted during the period of American
involvement in Vietnam. Those well-meaning civil and economic
programs went for naught in the end. And the amounts of money
spent and personnel assigned in Vietnam were far greater than
what is envisaged by President Obama for Afghanistan.
While the White House has a very experienced military and
diplomatic team in General David Petraeus and Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke, the president’s inner political circle appears quite
limited in its ability to process adequately the results of its
own team’s efforts. As a result, all action in Afghanistan is
judged on the basis of how it conforms to the president’s
domestic political interests and not to strategic analyses of
field assessments.
Al Qaeda was referred to by Barack Obama in terms that suggested
it was the manipulating force behind Afghan and Pakistan Taliban
activity. This misstatement was created to show a direct link
between 9/11 and Obama’s policy now in those countries. It seems
there is a disconnection between Obama’s speechwriters and NSC
staffers, who know full well that the Taliban is locally larger
and far more powerful in Afghanistan and Pakistan than its al
Qaeda foreign guests.
The Taliban leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan has shown its
operational patience. Inasmuch as President Obama already has
indicated he is not committed to his announced course if it does
not appear to be working, it’s in the Taliban’s interest to keep
up steady harassment and await the breaking of Obama’s will.
Barack Obama is clearly not at ease as a wartime president. He
seeks to characterize all his actions, one way or another, as an
exercise in international understanding even when American troops
are in the midst of battles abroad. Enemies such as the Taliban
sense this military timidity. How the American president reacts
in this case is being watched carefully worldwide. So far the
enemies of the U.S. are not in the least intimidated. But perhaps
that’s Barack Obama’s intention!
