It was bound to happen; Pakistan’s voting public expected it to
happen; the politicians, national and local, waited for it to
happen; the Army and intelligence service have been alert to the
potential of its happening; in other words no one in Pakistan
finds the current political crisis a surprise. Nor should they.
The civilian government of Asif Ali Zardari is fighting for its
life. Supreme Court Chief Justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, has been
returned to his old post after widespread violent demonstrations
by lawyers, students and members of the political party of
Zardari’s rival, Nawaz Sharif. President Zardari is faced with
the possibility of a resumption of the charges of corruption that
were dropped at the time of his late wife’s, Benazir Bhutto,
return to run in the national elections and Chaudhry’s removal
from the bench by former President Musharraf.
Each time in the past when the military turned governmental
administration back to civilian politicians, the hope was that
the civilians could control their seemingly inbred instinct to
self-destruct. The root of this self-destruction of course is
corruption, but it is not simply financial malfeasance. The
corruption of Pakistan’s political process is broad in character
and extent.
Favors based on family and tribal affiliation are the usual
genesis. Power through government position has material benefit
in itself and these are the rewards traditionally doled out by
Pakistani politics and politicians. The extent and blatant
character of this phenomenon is so embedded in the national
psyche that it has become accepted as custom as much as the
gratuities that accompany the status.
Unfortunately this custom doesn’t really work that well as a
social discipline and the result is a bastardization of
democracy. Organized mob action is what passes for democratic
debate over contentious issues. When dissent reaches the point
that normal civil life is endangered, the Army takes over the
government.
In an odd way it is as if the civilian community counts on this
military intervention periodically to reestablish political
stability. The problem is that the periods of civilian central
governance appear to be incapable of lasting very long. As a
result democracy in Pakistan increasingly takes on the character
of long periods of military rule interrupted by interludes of
partisan civilian contest.
It is clear that the relatively brief tenure of Afif Ali Zardari
as president is under serious attack by Nawaz Sharif, former
prime minister and leader of the opposition party, PML-N. Chief
of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kiyani, waits in the wings along
with the ISI, the nation’s intelligence service that he
previously headed, ready to have the military once again assume
overall responsibility for Pakistan’s administration.
Pakistan’s military admittedly is more concerned with the
security of the community of citizens than the traditionally
self-involved civilian political parties. While individual rights
are theoretically weakened under military law and order
governments, the reality in Pakistan is that it is more the
political parties and their professional practitioners that
suffer the most in restriction of activity. The result is that
for a period of time the civilian population usually breathes a
sigh of relief when the military takes over and muzzles the
political parties.
The internal security of Pakistan is riven with disparate groups,
politically and tribally, that have their own agendas. There are
several paramilitary organizations aimed at everything from
redefining the border with Afghanistan, to attacking Indian
positions in contested areas, to protecting the Taliban and
jihadist groups operating cross border and internally.
No matter who is running the Pakistan government, it is the
military and intelligence service that actually set the agenda
and pursue procedures for dealing with security concerns.
Dominant in priority issues remains the fear of encroachment
/invasion by India on Pakistani-claimed territory. This will not
change no matter the announced commitment to restraint of the
Taliban, al Qaeda and other radical Islamic movements.
The mobs who came into the streets to demand the reinstatement of
Chief Justice Chaudhry concerned the military only to the extent
that their presence might escalate into broad scale violence. The
police remained in control and there was no reason for Army
intervention. If, however, a future occurrence is perceived to
threaten internal security — whatever the reason — the Army
will once again move to take charge.
If history is any guide, and another military coup already has
not occurred before the publication of this column, one can
expect the return of a military-led government in Pakistan sooner
rather than later. How soon really depends on the military
leaders’ decision-making as to what they believe endangers their
nation. There doesn’t appear to be much, if any, civilian input
to those deliberations.
