The North Koreans have perfected what is called in football
a double reverse. The DPRK has long been master of the political
maneuver of altering its position twice so to end up exactly
where it started. It has just done so again.
With North Korea's "Dear Leader" returning to a modified
schedule, there appears no question that Kim Jong-il is slowly
but definitely recovering from what appears to have been some
form of stroke. He had effectively left the scene with George W.
Bush as U.S. president and now reenters the political world with
Barack H. Obama having taken over the White House. This evolution
finds Pyongyang in the less than desirable position of perceiving
itself as less important than before to an American
administration.
From Pyongyang's standpoint it is a time to take a step
back from the earlier negotiations in order to test the new and
perplexingly naïve Obama Administration. It is difficult to
assess how the period of Kim Jong-il's illness altered the
leadership hierarchy in the DPRK. It is clear, however, that
there is an effort by N. Korea to shift negotiations with the
U.S. back to an earlier time in the course of the recent six
party talks that includes in addition to the two principals:
China, Russia, Japan and S. Korea.
As it did with the launching of short range missiles toward
the Sea of Japan in the midst of nuclear arms talks in late May
2007, Pyongyang once again seems to be using an expected test
firing of its long range missile, the Taepoding-2, theoretically
capable of reaching Alaska, as a form of greeting for the
announced early visit to Asia of President Obama and his new
secretary of state, Hillary R. Clinton. It would be similar to
one of those crushing hits on rookie football players that remind
them that they are now playing in the "big time."
Whether or not the North Koreans actually launch the
missile from its test facility at Dongchangri near the Chinese
border, the message will have been sent to the new American
administration that the DPRK should not be overlooked in
President Obama's plans for "a new view" of U.S. foreign policy.
Realizing a potential international perception of weakness
resulting from Kim Jong-il's illness, North Korea's leadership
cadre want to return to a priority position in the White House's
foreign political thought process.
By threatening to break its military agreements with South
Korea, the North has created an environment of danger that would
surround a later long-range test firing. Pyongyang has put a
great deal of serious thought into resetting the table before any
future six party nuclear talks involving the newly arrived Obama
government. Leverage is the aim and the North Koreans know how to
play the game.
If a long-range missile is launched, it is also a
commercial reminder that North Korea is still a player in the
international arms scene; even if it only lands 200 miles off
Japan's coast, as the earlier Taepodong-2 did in 2006. Naturally
it would be more effective in every way, military, political and
commercial, if such an intercontinental test launch were a
spectacular success. The missile actually only has to be
reasonably near operational, however, in order to set up the new
nuclear negotiations with a favorable edge for Pyongyang.
The Obama administration will be entering any new
negotiations without the Asia careerist who was the last
administration's principal negotiator. Korea-wise Christopher
Hill has been inexplicably shunted off to be the new U.S.
ambassador to Iraq. The negotiations over the years with North
Korea often have been influenced by the personalities
involved.
In national security affairs and sports some players are
indeed indispensable, and the imperturbable Ambassador Hill
certainly had approached that status during the Bush years.
Professionally Christopher Hill did not satisfy either the far
right or the far left. He showed, however, he could play the
complicated N. Korea game as well as the Koreans. There appears
little reason for his transfer at this stage of
Washington/Pyongyang relations.
The rule of thumb since the earliest days of the Korean War
armistice has been that while the N. Koreans do not negotiate
under pressure, they also will not negotiate without pressure.
The recognition and exploitation of this extraordinary balance
has been a long and difficult road. It would be best if the new
secretary of state and her boss had remembered this hard-earned
lesson.
Putting in new players at this crucial juncture of the game
would appear to be strictly a gesture to Mr. Obama's liberal
left. Such an action only can produce an unexpected chop block.
As has been said before, "Welcome to the NFL, Mr. Obama."
