By George H. Wittman on 1.23.09 @ 6:07AM
A way of life that keeps the Taliban well financed.
Afghanistan, that most exotic of battlegrounds, is known for its
fierce Islamic fighters, the Taliban, but internationally even
more for the production of opium. According to reports of the
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), about 90% of
the world's heroin now comes from Afghanistan and Helmand
province accounts for one-half to nearly two-thirds of that
production. Nationwide approximately 2.3 million people are
involved in poppy cultivation and processing, a tenth of the
population.
The impression has been created of a clandestinely grown crop of
opium poppies in the hidden hills of southern Afghanistan.
Instead, Helmand's desert-like land, irrigated by a major river,
supports an agricultural industry that is over 100,000 hectares
of well-cared-for fields separated by carefully drawn familial
property lines.
The Taliban benefits two ways from the opium trade: First they
tithe the poppy-producing farmers about 10% of the value of their
crop. This is actually the traditional tax, called a
zagat (or zakat), that in the past went to the
tribal headman. Now it goes to the chief Taliban representative,
who also might just happen to be the tribal headman, depending on
his political disposition.
Secondarily the Taliban gains if there is government intercession
in the "normality" of poppy harvesting. Unless an advantage is
given to the farmer to produce something other than opium
poppies, there is a substantial anti-government backlash
benefiting the Taliban. The difference in return on poppy versus
wheat production can run as high as four to ten times in favor of
opium, depending on market factors. The opium-to-heroin
processors are in a far better position than the government to
offer "differentials" to encourage continued production.
When the government does mount a program to encourage substitute
crops, such as wheat, the farmers pay local officials to allow
them to hold back conversion on all but a small portion of their
land. The local officials are "taken care of," the Taliban and
headmen receive their zagat, and the government can
report to the UN and NATO a drop in poppy acreage.
It doesn't take a vast intelligence operation to determine the
Taliban and local officials have close ties. It's in both their
interests to keep the farmers producing. It's also important for
the smugglers to have a protected source of supply. They, too,
pay off both the Taliban and local police. It is the ultimate
socioeconomic and, in a certain sense, political symbiosis.
Last year the American command offered to bring in crop sprayers
to eradicate the extensive poppy fields in the south. This
brought an uproar all the way back to the presidential palace in
Kabul. The British military, which is responsible for Helmand,
put up the logical argument that its entire effort to win the
cooperation of the local tribesmen would be destroyed -- along
with that year's cash crop.
Even if the farmers could be encouraged to replant with wheat and
other non-offensive products, an entire crop year would be lost
and the British would be blamed by the Taliban political
operators. Another grand idea born in fertile Washington minds
was shelved just in time.
The product moves down the line by donkey, motorbike, truck, and
numerous colorful horse-drawn carts. Organized armed smuggling
teams operate through Pakistan and southern Iran's shared Baluchi
tribal territory. Others head northward, crossing through Iran
and the central Asia nations to the Caspian and onward to Turkey,
thence Europe and the Americas. Some smugglers travel eastward to
supply markets in south Asia and even those Asian markets
formerly served by the once powerful "golden triangle."
The overall business is calculated to be worth in excess of $4
billion at point of entry of neighboring transit countries. Of
this the gross income to farmers is estimated at $732 million for
2008. This means tens of millions of dollars go to the Taliban
and other payoffs before the smugglers even become involved.
Drugs have been a traditional Afghan commerce for centuries, and
that is not going to change very much because Washington, London,
and the United Nations want it. The Taliban, though, could do the
job -- if they really wanted to do it. But that would cut off a
major source of their funding, as it would for many tribal
leaders, government officials and police.
The commitment to fight the war in Afghanistan is going to take
far more than a troop increase!
topics:
Afghanistan, Opium-Heroin Production
