A consistent theme of most of the world press has been what it
considers the unusual nature of the terrorist attack in Mumbai,
India. The fact is that the terrorist organization used what it
had most readily available and organizationally useful: trained
men and light arms.
The men who attacked multiple targets simultaneously were merely
executing in a low-tech fashion the ordinary targeting associated
with their political ambitions. Their operational and political
logic is quite easy to divine. Their intent was to seek out
foreigners, preferably British and Americans, symbols of Hindi
economic success and decadence, a Jewish center in Mumbai, and
lastly but most specifically, the local Anti-Terrorist Squad
(ATS).
On September 13, 2008, on the occasion of a series of bombings of
markets and businesses in New Delhi, an e-mail threat reportedly
was delivered by the organization “Indian Mujahideen” that in the
future they would attack the ATS in Mumbai for harassing Moslems.
Three other bombings in Jaipur, Bangalore and Ahmedabad already
had been attributed to the IM since the previous May. In all 130
people had been killed.
There have been clear indications that the leadership of the IM
wanted to embarrass the security forces of India’s great
financial and entertainment center of Mumbai by establishing and
maintaining for as long as it could a military-type presence in
this immense city. Bombings could not accomplish its
sophisticated, if brutal, ambition and at the same time challenge
the ATS directly. An actual special operations-type strike was
required.
India, and Mumbai in particular, provides an environment of
historical religious division that offers a ready support
structure for terrorist operations. Diplomatically stated,
Mumbai’s police do not have a reputation for incorruption. Covert
information gathering on security matters from cooperating local
police, plus the widespread potential of materiel support from
the city’s long-time organized crime element and impoverished
Moslem community, created access both to essential intelligence
and physical assistance.
Much has been made of the possibility of terrorist personnel and
equipment being off-loaded from an unidentified cargo ship.
Transportation from the coast of such a force with all its
weapons, ammunition, explosives and other equipment and supplies
does require considerable local assistance. It would have been
easier, and carry less security risk, if stockpiles had been
created beforehand easily accessible to an infiltrating fighting
force.
Similarly, both the Taj hotel and the Oberoi had professional
security protection whose circumvention or countering
necessitated a detailed casing operation beforehand. All this
adds up to careful planning made possible by well-developed local
assets providing accurate information. What carried all the
earmarks of a well-trained operation was actually a carefully
thought out covert operations procedure — information for which
was available through many public sources.
It is the execution phase of this activity that indicated the
personnel involved had professional-level training and
well-disciplined motivation. The Indian Mujahideen, of which the
Daccan Mujahideen (the group taking responsibility) is said to be
just another useful nomenclature, had already been cited by
Indian government authorities as an operating instrument of
Lashkar-e-Toiba. The LET has been said to be a Pakistani
intelligence-aided instrument originally created to operate
against Indian rule in Kashmir.
The connection to Lashkar-e-Toiba is also indicated by the
lightning strike force tactics that had been used in the past by
LET-associated Moslem terrorists in their attacks on Kashmiri
targets. There are many terrorist elements that have been aligned
with al Qaeda, gaining both financial and material aid. LET is
considered one of these — though quite independent of al Qaeda’s
directives.
Ultimately the bloody attacks in Mumbai were aimed at a
propaganda objective. The lavish international lifestyle of the
Indian city that has become the subcontinent’s finance center and
film capital has taken a direct hit. The attacks have also
embarrassed Pakistan’s President Zardari, who had only recently
sought to reinvigorate peace talks with India.
Disruption of normal life in this most cosmopolitan of Indian
cities also sends a message around the globe that nations cannot
ignore the Islamic ambitions in South Asia. The mayhem in Mumbai
is a forceful reminder that jihad is not limited to any
particular region, but has worldwide objectives.
