Barack Obama’s election as president has triggered hysterically
high hopes at home and abroad. The frenzied reaction of Europeans
to his victory belies the tough issues that he, like any incoming
president, will have to address. Perhaps the most fanciful idea
for transforming the trans-Atlantic relationship is the European
desire for an “equal partnership,” in the words of Karsten Voigt,
in charge of U.S.-German relations at the German Foreign
Ministry.
The European Union already is America’s economic equal, though
the U.S. retains the advantage of being a nation rather than a
conglomeration of sovereign states. But Voigt hopes for equality
in “foreign and security policy” as well. This perspective
reflects the objective of political leaders like French (and
current EU) President Nicolas Sarkozy, who has made enhancing EU
military power a priority. His ambitions only expanded with his
diplomatic efforts to end the Russia-Georgia war.
Europe as a great power sounds good in theory. The 27 EU states
collectively have the largest economy on earth and a population
exceeded only by India and China. Despite obvious differences
with the U.S., the Europeans share with America a more liberal
political order, a market-oriented, high-tech economy, and a
globe-spanning culture. The world geopolitical summit is bound to
get more crowded: Russia demonstrated in Georgia that it is not
yet ready to yield and China has started its assent. The EU
should be joining them.
But in practice the EU is nowhere to be found. Economic power it
has, but little political unity. President Sarkozy and others
blame the lack of consolidated government on the EU’s relative
ineffectiveness, and claim that the Lisbon Treaty — which
attempts to create a more effective continent-wide government —
is the answer. Thus the widespread impatience with Irish voters
who said no to Lisbon in a referendum last summer. Just make them
vote correctly or override their opposition and the EU will be
ready to take its place among the world’s leading powers, runs
the conventional wisdom in Brussels and national capitals across
Europe.
However, the Eurocrats who see process as more important than
substance have the relationship all wrong. Europe does not lack
political cohesion because Lisbon remains un-ratified. Rather,
Lisbon has not been ratified because Europe lacks political
unity.
The U.S. Constitution was controversial when proposed. While the
states did not hold referenda to approve the new form of
government, they did call popularly elected conventions to
consider the document. The public got to vote and, after great
argument, decided yes.
The EU proceeded in the opposite direction. When the European
constitution was originally proposed, Danish and French voters
rejected it. So the continent’s Eurocratic elite dropped a
handful of provisions and called the revised document a treaty,
allowing it to be ratified by parliamentary rather than popular
vote. The agreement’s backers recognized that only by preventing
the European people from having any say could continental
consolidation continue. Although polls indicate that a majority
in every EU member would like to vote, and in half of the
countries a popular majority would vote no, of the 27 EU members
only Ireland scheduled a vote (mandated by the Irish
constitution).
Even if the Irish obstacle eventually is overcome — some
Eurocrats advocate tossing Dublin out of the EU if it won’t
recant — Lisbon won’t turn Europe into a country. If average
Europeans won’t vote for a more powerful government in Brussels,
how could EU leaders claim to represent people opposed to the new
government institution? How many Europeans would view the new
system as their own? How many would fight for Brussels?
America achieved its greatest single episode of government
consolidation in the midst of violent conflict, the Civil War, in
which more than 600,000 people died. Consolidation occurred as a
natural adjunct to nationalism triumphant. Nationalism did not
arise from tinkering with the government structure.
However, the fact that the EU remains more an artificial
construct than political unity is a secondary issue. Even if
there were a United States of Europe akin to the USA, it wouldn’t
matter. No one in Europe is willing to do what is necessary for
the continent to be taken seriously in security affairs.
Europeans are entitled to spend whatever they desire on the
military. And there’s no obvious reason to spend a lot. Most of
Europe faces no a plausible, let alone significant, foreign
threat: the likelihood of hostile armored divisions passing under
the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, around the Arc de Triomphe in
Paris or by Big Ben in London is about the same as the War of the
Worlds being played out in real life. For the western Europeans,
anyway, the welfare state is more real than any geopolitical
danger.
The former members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet
Union which adjoin Russia understandably feel in greater danger,
though conquest by Moscow seems far-fetched. For instance,
Georgia’s irresponsible and impulsive Mikheil Saakashvili invited
Russian intervention by attacking South Ossetia. Moscow appears
to be more interested in influencing its neighbors than in ruling
hostile territories.
However real the threat, Berlin and Paris, especially, have
evinced no interest in risking their relations with Russia by
standing up for Georgia, and by implication the other eastern
Europeans. Great Britain has been tougher on Moscow rhetorically,
but seems no more willing to risk much practically. That’s its
prerogative, but without meaningful military forces capable of
constraining Moscow — and a willingness to use whatever armed
services it possesses — the Russian government will never take
it or the EU seriously.
European military forces have engaged in “peacekeeping”
activities. Some EU members, such as the Brits and Danes, really
are fighting in Afghanistan. The Germans, in contrast, are more
noted for their beer consumption than combat activities against
the Taliban. A few EU countries contributed to America’s effort
in Iraq. The Europeans also have garrisoned Bosnia and Kosovo,
though their efforts have yielded at best a cold peace without
the ethnic reconciliation that was supposed to occur. Indeed,
many of the European militaries, which tend towards conscript
rather than professional forces, are best suited to essentially
non-military tasks.
Until this circumstance changes, European leaders shouldn’t
flatter themselves that anyone in America, including
President-elect Obama, will take them seriously on security
issues. The EU wants power without responsibility. It’s great if
you can arrange it, but why would Washington share
decision-making authority with Europe if Europe won’t provide an
equivalent share of military resources? The EU and individual
European countries contribute much on economics. But their
opinions on security won’t be of much interest so long as they
rely on America for their defense and provide few forces to
advance Washington’s priorities elsewhere.
Barack Obama’s presidency will create opportunities as well as
challenges for Europe. But the Europeans should have no illusion
that even this incoming president is likely to turn security
decisions over to countries unwilling to spend the money for or
accept the risks of global leadership. There will be no “equal
partnership” so long as the burdens are not equally shared.
