Reading about the activities of Somali highwaymen, seawaymen
rather, brings to mind the circumstances of our Republic’s first
experience in power projection.
In 1785, as soon as the colonies — battered by the War for
Independence — were in condition to resume the lucrative trade
with southern Europe, two American merchant ships were seized by
Algerian pirates, and their crews held for ransom.
Domestic considerations and fair-weather foreign friends caused
the young nation to waste valuable time while figuring out how to
respond, during which its citizens suffered further damage to
their interests and lives. In the end, Thomas Jefferson’s initial
reaction was the right one: “Weakness provokes insult and injury,
while a condition to punish, often prevents them.”
The Barbary pirates at the end of the 18th century had two
operating methods. They sold “peace treaties” and they held
ships, crews, and passengers for ransom. The major commercial
power of the day, Great Britain, found it worth its while to buy
treaties rather than wipe out the North African gangs, which it
was well within its power to do. In effect kept in business by
British subsidies, the pirates preyed on weaker maritime nations,
improving Britain’s competitive position. The calculation was a
ruthless one. As Benjamin Franklin put it: “If there were no
Algiers, it would be worth England’s while to build one.”
The young nation did not have a navy. Indeed, under the Articles
of Confederation, the United States did not even have an
executive branch legally empowered to devise and execute an
anti-pirate policy. And one of the principal problems confronting
Thomas Jefferson, the Confederacy’s ambassador to France, was
that the Congress was not especially keen on raising any money
for a national war-fighting machine, either on land or on sea.
Thomas Jefferson saw the advantages that a strong central
government could muster, diplomatically, if it had some muscle at
its disposal. He wrote to James Monroe that with the Unites
States taking the lead, “a convention might be formed with those
powers establishing a perpetual cruise,” which is to say a
deterrent force, in the Mediterranean.
The Constitution gave the national government enhanced powers and
responsibilities, but it was not until 1794 that the Congress
authorized funds for a six-shop navy. By then, Algerian pirates
had seized 11 more American vessels, putting more than 100
officers and men in conditions of wretched captivity. “Death
would be a great relief,” wrote one captain. But rather than
using force, money and military supplies were used to ransom off
the Americans.
Mr. Jefferson, temperamentally and philosophically scornful of
the practice of paying tribute, accepted the war Tripoli declared
on us in 1801. It did not go especially well for us. Capt.
William Bainbridge was captured with his ship, the
Philadelphia; the entire crew of 300 was put to hard
labor and had to be ransomed off. In 1804 Lt. Stephen Decatur
sailed into Tripoli harbor and destroyed the ship. Perhaps the
most perceptive observation on the war was made by Sen. William
Plummer of New Hampshire: “Had [Jefferson] sent a sufficient
number of men and ships it would have been expensive — it might
have endangered his reputation for economy and lessened his
popularity with the rabble, but most probably would have saved
the lives of deserving men.”
An American named William Eaton, acting in a private capacity,
attacked Tripoli from the desert, planning to install opponents
of the pirate gang that sat there. The campaign went well, but
the Jefferson administration decided to end the war by resuming
payments of tribute.
In 1815, after the continuing troubles with Great Britain were
settled by the War of 1812, the problem of Barbary piracy
returned, as Algiers reneged on the tribute deal and captured an
American vessel. Congress declared war. Lt. Decatur and Capt.
Bainbridge returned to the Mediterranean with much more power
than the first time and brought memories of Carthage to Algiers.
Great Britain, meanwhile, encouraged by the American example,
gave up its policy of paying tribute and instead joined in the
naval operations, which included heavy bombardments. Algiers
accepted treaties, abolishing tribute; Tunis and Tripoli soon did
likewise. Although lone-gun pirates continued to infest the North
African coastline until the French established their hegemony
there in the 1830s, state-sponsored piracy in that part of the
world was finished — until the 20th century.
SO YOU SEE. I should note, by the by, that my former colleagues
at the Detroit News will I am sure not object to
reprinting this interesting little piece, since I wrote it for
that storied paper, shortly before President Reagan ordered
punitive raids against Libya — and you will note that it was not
until President Bush’s show of quite considerable — but
sufficient? — force in the larger region that the Muammar
Qaddafi regime (a) ended its nuclear bomb program and (b)
released hostages it was holding on absurd poison-conspiracy
charges. The French government took credit for that one, and as
far as I know never has apologized for interfering with Mr.
Reagan’s actions, which almost surely contributed to the losses
our aviators sustained while carrying them out.
Observe, too, that it is easy to understand Thomas Jefferson’s
mixture of frustration and stop-and-start policies. What in the
world are the Saudis doing with their billions if they cannot
hire some tough guys — there must be some in their neighborhood?
— to go and clean up the Somali coast. Could they know something
we don’t about what’s really going on over there? After all,
seizing one of their super tankers must do something not good,
from the rest of the world’s point of view, to the price of oil.
