Reading about the activities of Somali highwaymen, seawaymen rather, brings to mind the circumstances of our Republic's first experience in power projection.
In 1785, as soon as the colonies -- battered by the War for Independence -- were in condition to resume the lucrative trade with southern Europe, two American merchant ships were seized by Algerian pirates, and their crews held for ransom.
Domestic considerations and fair-weather foreign friends caused the young nation to waste valuable time while figuring out how to respond, during which its citizens suffered further damage to their interests and lives. In the end, Thomas Jefferson's initial reaction was the right one: "Weakness provokes insult and injury, while a condition to punish, often prevents them."
The Barbary pirates at the end of the 18th century had two operating methods. They sold "peace treaties" and they held ships, crews, and passengers for ransom. The major commercial power of the day, Great Britain, found it worth its while to buy treaties rather than wipe out the North African gangs, which it was well within its power to do. In effect kept in business by British subsidies, the pirates preyed on weaker maritime nations, improving Britain's competitive position. The calculation was a ruthless one. As Benjamin Franklin put it: "If there were no Algiers, it would be worth England's while to build one."
The young nation did not have a navy. Indeed, under the Articles of Confederation, the United States did not even have an executive branch legally empowered to devise and execute an anti-pirate policy. And one of the principal problems confronting Thomas Jefferson, the Confederacy's ambassador to France, was that the Congress was not especially keen on raising any money for a national war-fighting machine, either on land or on sea.
Thomas Jefferson saw the advantages that a strong central government could muster, diplomatically, if it had some muscle at its disposal. He wrote to James Monroe that with the Unites States taking the lead, "a convention might be formed with those powers establishing a perpetual cruise," which is to say a deterrent force, in the Mediterranean.
The Constitution gave the national government enhanced powers and responsibilities, but it was not until 1794 that the Congress authorized funds for a six-shop navy. By then, Algerian pirates had seized 11 more American vessels, putting more than 100 officers and men in conditions of wretched captivity. "Death would be a great relief," wrote one captain. But rather than using force, money and military supplies were used to ransom off the Americans.
Mr. Jefferson, temperamentally and philosophically scornful of the practice of paying tribute, accepted the war Tripoli declared on us in 1801. It did not go especially well for us. Capt. William Bainbridge was captured with his ship, the Philadelphia; the entire crew of 300 was put to hard labor and had to be ransomed off. In 1804 Lt. Stephen Decatur sailed into Tripoli harbor and destroyed the ship. Perhaps the most perceptive observation on the war was made by Sen. William Plummer of New Hampshire: "Had [Jefferson] sent a sufficient number of men and ships it would have been expensive -- it might have endangered his reputation for economy and lessened his popularity with the rabble, but most probably would have saved the lives of deserving men."
An American named William Eaton, acting in a private capacity, attacked Tripoli from the desert, planning to install opponents of the pirate gang that sat there. The campaign went well, but the Jefferson administration decided to end the war by resuming payments of tribute.
In 1815, after the continuing troubles with Great Britain were settled by the War of 1812, the problem of Barbary piracy returned, as Algiers reneged on the tribute deal and captured an American vessel. Congress declared war. Lt. Decatur and Capt. Bainbridge returned to the Mediterranean with much more power than the first time and brought memories of Carthage to Algiers. Great Britain, meanwhile, encouraged by the American example, gave up its policy of paying tribute and instead joined in the naval operations, which included heavy bombardments. Algiers accepted treaties, abolishing tribute; Tunis and Tripoli soon did likewise. Although lone-gun pirates continued to infest the North African coastline until the French established their hegemony there in the 1830s, state-sponsored piracy in that part of the world was finished -- until the 20th century.
SO YOU SEE. I should note, by the by, that my former colleagues at the Detroit News will I am sure not object to reprinting this interesting little piece, since I wrote it for that storied paper, shortly before President Reagan ordered punitive raids against Libya -- and you will note that it was not until President Bush's show of quite considerable -- but sufficient? -- force in the larger region that the Muammar Qaddafi regime (a) ended its nuclear bomb program and (b) released hostages it was holding on absurd poison-conspiracy charges. The French government took credit for that one, and as far as I know never has apologized for interfering with Mr. Reagan's actions, which almost surely contributed to the losses our aviators sustained while carrying them out.
Observe, too, that it is easy to understand Thomas Jefferson's mixture of frustration and stop-and-start policies. What in the world are the Saudis doing with their billions if they cannot hire some tough guys -- there must be some in their neighborhood? -- to go and clean up the Somali coast. Could they know something we don't about what's really going on over there? After all, seizing one of their super tankers must do something not good, from the rest of the world's point of view, to the price of oil.
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Danny L. Newton| 11.20.08 @ 11:02AM
This whole era of American history would make a great movie. It is good against evile and peacenik against hawk. Especially, the part where Steven Decatur's brother was killed in a mock surrender by Muslim pirates. Bainbridge called down a bombardment on his own prison by smuggeling out a map of crucial targets. But wait! That would not be politically correct. I nominate Mel Gibson as Steven Decatur.
ryykk| 11.20.08 @ 12:26PM
History has shown again and again that piracy only occurs where countries are too weak or too corrupt to protect their marantime community.
The only way to deal with them, the pirates, is to target them and then destroy them. Collateral damage such as the ships they seize will occur.
With enough pressure from overwhewlming pursuit they will move their base of operations. Then they are vulnerable to being detected and being destroyed.
During the last 10 years the pirates have been escalating in the weapons they have and the size of the ships they attack. Now they are going after the largest ships on the seas! In some cases the entire crew is eventually executed, in others the entire crew is dropped off at some out of the way port once the cargo has been sold.
The goods onboard the ships can only be sold in ports where corruption rules. The officials turn a blind eye to the transfer of goods and money as long as their pockets are lined. A long term solution involves stronger governments and non - corrupt civil servants. Unfortunalty this would involve a cultural change in some of the countries in the area.
Dai Alanye| 11.20.08 @ 7:17PM
Determine the ports from which the pirates operate, then destroy every ship and boat and port facility therein. After a few of these occurrences the pirates will be so unpopular they will find few places in which to shelter. It's a form of mass punishment, of course, and much more efficient than attempting to target individual pirate crews.
It would be nice--but not necessary--to warn the Somalis first.
Josh| 11.20.08 @ 9:54PM
He should have mentioned that the Barbary Pirates were some of the first Muslim terrorists.
In 1786, Thomas Jefferson, then the ambassador to France, and John Adams, then the ambassador to Britain, met in London with Sidi Haji Abdul Rahman Adja, the ambassador to Britain from Tripoli. The Americans asked Adja why his government was hostile to American ships, even though there had been no provocation. The ambassador's response was reported to the Continental Congress:
“It was written in their Koran, that all nations which had not acknowledged the Prophet were sinners, whom it was the right and duty of the faithful to plunder and enslave; and that every Mussulman who was slain in this warfare was sure to go to paradise.”
These events indicate that it is impossible to negotiate with or pacify Islamic terrorists. They must be defeated. Additionally, this account proves that Islamic attacks on the United States existed long before the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the intervention against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, our political dealings with Saudi Arabia and Iran, or the Iraq War. The U.S. did not provoke the attacks.
Jason| 11.21.08 @ 2:42AM
How little things have changed. Why do people refuse to learn that "weakness provokes insult and injury."
http://rightklik.blogspot.com/
frank| 11.24.08 @ 7:25PM
I find it ironic that the same time the U.S. was upset about the pirates on the African coast were stealing American MERCHANDISE, america was stealing HUMAN Beings in the slave trade elsewhere from the same African continent
Bob S| 11.26.08 @ 7:22PM
Kaplan's article (Piracy Then and Now), unfortunately leaves readers with the impression Jefferson was an advocate of the Navy. In fact, the opposite was true. He opposed the Navy from the moment Adams first proposed the creation of "wooden walls" because a) he felt it was too costly and irreversibly so (i.e., ships must be maintained), b) favored the militia as our first line of defense, c) was hostile toward the northern mercantile class (which was the reason for having a Navy), d) favored the radical French (who were just then attacking our shipping), e) opposed an officer corps necessarily populated by Federalists (too few Republicans were appropriately educated and trained to qualify), and f) saw the Navy as a major step toward a permanent military (which he viewed as a threat to liberty). Once he became president, however, he saw things in a different light, readily employing Adams' navy and marines and Washington's army for his own political ends. Otherwise, he mothballed most of the fleet both to reduce expenses and as a means to weaken the military (discharged most naval officers). In those days, the officer corps was the key to a navy (as ordinary sailors could easily shift between navy and commerce, whereas capable fighting officers were difficult to reacquire once lost). By cashiering 2/3 of the officer corps, (starting with the most experienced) Jefferson effectively crippled the Navy for half a generation through destroying its prestige and morale. If not for the Barbary pirates, we might have lost our Navy altogether. For an excellent account of our early Navy and the Jefferson’s role in discouraging it, read "Six Frigates", by Ian W. Toll ( http://www.amazon.com/Six-Frigates-Epic-History-Founding/dp/039333032X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1227740939&sr=1-1 ).
Kaplan seems to have a beatific regard of Jefferson the icon at odds with Jefferson the man. Jefferson was often hypocritical as between philosophy and actions; and the Barbary incident was one of those times. Before he was president, he'd long advocated a peaceful, agrarian society (versus a pushy, commerce driven America); even to the point of advocating America ignore attacks on our commerce and retreating within our shores. He unequivocally advocated a strict and limited interpretation of executive powers before he had them, only to double our size (Louisiana Purchase) without reference to Congress when he did, and necessitating an expanded military presence to secure into the bargain. His decision to deploy the Navy to Tripoli was similarly unilateral, by passing Congress without a formal declaration of war. Despite his anti-militant domestic sentiments, he long championed the military exploits of the French and of Napoleon (i.e., selective militarism). He was a devious, vindictive and divisive politician who kept hidden his machinations against rivals, a strong sectionalist who manipulated every opportunity to the South’s favor at the expense of the northeast, and established a virtual Virginian dynasty lasting through three presidencies (Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe). His partisanship was so strongly divisive it came very near to wrecking the union, with the northeast threatening to secede on more than one occasion. Jefferson’s rivalry with his own vice-president (Burr) ended with Burr’s political career in ashes despite an acquittal and in a permanent rupture with moderate Federalists. His rivalry with Marshall (over the roles and power of their respective branches – executive & judiciary) similarly split the country; precipitating a series of Constitutional clashes starting with Marbury v. Madison.
We are greatly indebted to Jefferson for our Declaration of Independence, his Constitutional contributions, diaries and extensive philosophical musings, but Jefferson the politician had a decidedly unattractive, disloyal and renegade side not yet fully explored.
will| 12.3.08 @ 9:25PM
But not all terrorists are Muslims, Josh
Josh said
He should have mentioned that the Barbary Pirates were some of the first Muslim terrorists.
In 1786, Thomas Jefferson, then the ambassador to France, and John Adams, then the ambassador to Britain, met in London with Sidi Haji Abdul Rahman Adja, the ambassador to Britain from Tripoli. The Americans asked Adja why his government was hostile to American ships, even though there had been no provocation. The ambassador's response was reported to the Continental Congress:
“It was written in their Koran, that all nations which had not acknowledged the Prophet were sinners, whom it was the right and duty of the faithful to plunder and enslave; and that every Mussulman who was slain in this warfare was sure to go to paradise.”
These events indicate that it is impossible to negotiate with or pacify Islamic terrorists. They must be defeated. Additionally, this account proves that Islamic attacks on the United States existed long before the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the intervention against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, our political dealings with Saudi Arabia and Iran, or the Iraq War. The U.S. did not provoke the attacks.
Bob S| 12.20.08 @ 9:07PM
Will,
While true not all Muslims are terrorists, it is also true Islam has deep roots in what we consider terrorism going right back to the Prophet. Muhammad launched a number of campaigns and reprisals against perceived enemies; whose main offense appears to be a ‘refusal to surrender to Allah’. He annihilated the Quraiza Jews rather than grant clemency as he did others. He slaughtered Meccan relatives and neighbors who had earlier chased him out as a lunatic and agitator. He turned against friends and allies who opposed his methods, and he made plunder the basis for his growing power over a fierce, nomadic people. His methods and justifications were already the norm in pre-Muslim Arabia, but long past barbaric in nearby Syria and Persia. Inter- & Intra-tribal feuds, reprisals, assassination, and land piracy were respectable and respected, as reflected in the Koran and other contemporary sources. Payments (blood-reparations) were sometimes made when feuds got out of control to avoid greater loss. In the absence of cash, livestock, or other objects of sufficient value, chattels might be substituted (submission) to allay revenge. Destruction of rival tribes might not be complete without the symbolic destruction and humiliation of the tribe’s gods. Early Muslim chroniclers made no apology for the massacre, pillage, rape, slavery, and desecration they made of ‘enemies’ of Islam; whose sole crime was opposition to the new order. In fact, they gloried in it as evidenced by effusive reports of conquests, slaughter and conversions in the name of Allah in every century since. Regardless the justification, much of Islam was/is based on this kind of behavior and of justifying it as ‘holy’.
Early Muslim legalists attempted to channel the aggression inherent in their creed, making it more palatable, but made little attempt at softening it because it was hugely successful. Rather, they gave it the right ‘spin’ as gave the Muslim warrior pride in his actions and dhimma-taxing bureaucrat comfortable in his abuse; and kept faithful and unfaithful permanently apart within the ‘house of peace’. Thus, they created codes of conduct for Muslims and non-Muslims to follow; with different codes for those who submit versus those who refuse submission. Inside dar al salam doctrinal Islam is minimally tolerant of the unbeliever, outside (dar al harb) it is merciless. Under this codified doctrine, intolerance became tolerance and aggression became defense of the faith; magically transforming victim into aggressor and aggressor into victim.
The century following Mohammad’s rule (the era of the caliphs) was, similarly, a case of assaulting one community after another, spreading faith by the sword, and plundering all in their way (and sometimes battling each other). Thus, plunder and power were joined to the sacred. The history of southern Europe, southwest-Asia, and India from the 9th through 17th centuries is one long chronicle of Muslim raids, year after year, raiding season after raiding season; following a successful strategy laid down in that first century of gradual conquest through remorseless terror (blunted briefly and incompletely by the Crusades – which some suggest imitate Muslim jihad – and Mongol invasions, but never universally sated).
Plunder and jihad became the norm in the fissures between cultures; lands made barren by long strife for whom piracy seemed natural. The Mediterranean coasts remained the semi-fixed border between Muslim and Christian lands from the conquest to modern times. This closed the Mediterranean to commerce for long stretches and, even in good times, kept relations tense. The arid but adequate African coast, without benefit of trade, became a place of nomads, tribal loyalty, and little else – an ungovernable frontier. Such places have always encouraged piracy and just across the water lay the rich cities of southern Europe: rich in trade, rich in resources, rich in people (slaves), and rich in gold. The Barbary pirates were, thus, inheritors of a long tradition of religiously justified aggression and chronic poverty to whom the ‘infidel’ across the water was lawful fodder. Therefore, they were not “some of the first Muslim terrorists” as you state. Nor were they the dying vestiges of a moribund culture. They were the smoldering remains of a millennially long passion – one that still burns brightly only needing fresh fuel and oxygen.
Other cultures have had their barbaric origins, but Islam is one of the few to justify that barbarism behind an unassailable veil of holiness. The modern liberal Muslim, then, is caught in a quandary. Proud of his culture and his religion, he does not want to admit to the truth of Islam’s warrior origins, long conquests, and doctrinal aggression. So, he pretends jihad is (and has always been) purely spiritual; simultaneously denouncing the jihadists resurrection of aggression as a modern day ‘corruption’ of his most ‘peaceful of religions’. It has only been in the last century or so Islam has begun the long process of liberalization; and it has only been in this period substantial numbers of Muslims have misapprehended or misrepresented jihad as something other than colonization by terror. It is ‘spiritual’ jihad that has shallow roots historically, making it easy prey for the jihadist who demands pure faith and threatens fatwahs against apostates. The practicing Muslim, safe within the sheltering ummah can afford such elastic distinctions, the unfortunate unbeliever close outside and unwilling to convert cannot.