The Lisbon Treaty was supposed to be a done deal in Europe.
After the embarrassing rejection of the European Union constitution
by Dutch and French voters three years ago, EU officials repackaged
the document as a “treaty” and proclaimed that no referenda would
be necessary. “There will be no treaty at all if we had a
referendum in France,” explained French President Nicolas
Sarkozy.
The one speed bump was Ireland, since the Irish constitution
required a popular vote. But Irish politicians, heads of most of
the other 26 governments that make up the EU, and every Eurocrat
living well in Brussels launched a concentrated propaganda
campaign. Never mind the fine print. All of the right-thinking
people in Europe believed this to be for the benefit of the Irish
people, so just sign on, thank you very much. Alas, the Irish
people voted no.
That should be the end of it. The constitution, er, treaty
requires unanimity. Ireland said no, so the deal is off.
However, voters increasingly are irrelevant in Europe. They get
to choose their governments in a quaint and old-fashioned way, but
those governments of whatever ideological stripe increasingly have
ceded authority to Brussels.
The Lisbon Treaty represents the apotheosis of rule by
international bureaucracy: the European elite have decided that
consolidation is the wave of the future, and they certainly don’t
intend to allow the ungrateful Irish to stand in the way. Observed
German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble: “a few million Irish
cannot decide on behalf of 495 million Europeans.”
No, a few million Irish certainly shouldn’t decide the fate of
495 million Europeans. That’s the job for a few thousand
politicians, bureaucrats, and other members of the New Class across
the continent, intent on creating a new Europe irrespective of the
people’s desires. Polls indicate that three-quarters of
Europeans-and majorities in all 27 countries-would like to vote on
the expansion of EU powers. And if such referenda were held, a
majority of people would vote no in 16 of them, including in
Germany. No wonder the Eurocrats won’t allow anyone else to vote on
their futures.
It’s tempting as an American to bid the Europeans well as they
embark on their grand experiment at continent-wide aggrandizement.
Frustrated with America’s continuing global dominance, European
elites want their own super-state, with a president and a foreign
minister, as well as a governing structure that can crush
disagreement — or, to put it more politely, override dissenting
minorities. To some degree the Europeans want to telescope two
centuries of American constitutional development, which also led to
national consolidation, into a decade or less.
Yet the big difference between North America and Europe is that
all of the original 13 American colonies, as well as the new states
that followed, began from more or less the same political,
cultural, linguistic, and ethnic stock.
To be sure, immigration enlivened the American body politic, but
the Great Melting Pot, at least until recently, created a common
tradition and experience.
Europe is attempting to turn 27 very different nations into de
facto states. Consolidation was a painful experience in the U.S.,
and required a bitter civil war to finally subordinate state
sovereignty to the national government.
In Europe peoples ranging from Spain to Romania are being asked
to toss aside their national identities for a new creation centered
in Brussels. National identity would not disappear, of course, but
eliminating the requirement for unanimity would destroy the most
important protection for national sovereignty. And the Eurocrats
have only begun. The Lisbon Treaty is a starting, not ending,
point.
ANYONE WHO BELIEVES in individual liberty and limited government
should care about the European experiment, since neither principle
is likely to escape unscathed. Still, as a matter of official
international relations it really is the business of the Europeans.
The Bush administration has affirmed its support for the Lisbon
Treaty, but doubtless no one in a policy-making position has read
the monstrosity. (Of course, few European policy-makers likely have
read it either.) Anyway, Washington’s opposition wouldn’t change
anyone’s opinion in Europe and would just aggravate relations
already rubbed raw over Iraq and other controversies. But why are
U.S. officials encouraging the process?
European consolidation offers at best a mixed bag for the United
States. On the positive side, in a world in which increasingly
authoritarian Russia is reasserting itself and undemocratic China
is growing in influence, a more influential capitalist and
democratic Europe should provide a positive influence.
Frankly, if Moscow is a problem, it is a problem for Europe, not
America. If Georgia’s control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia
matters to anyone, it is to Europe, not to the U.S. If someone
desires to midwife the independence of Kosovo, it should be Europe,
not America. If North Africa can be drawn away from the influence
of the Middle East, it will be by Europe, not America.
The European Union has a larger collective economy and
population than does the U.S., so let the EU start carrying its
geopolitical weight.
Whether the continent is willing to do so is quite another
question, however. French President Sarkozy has proposed
strengthening French and European military power, and British
Foreign Secretary David Miliband has added his endorsement. But
earlier European defense initiatives have essentially gone
nowhere.
In Europe only Britain and France are really serious about their
militaries. The conscript German military is primarily a source of
social workers — who receive an easy deferment from military
service — rather than a combat force. Berlin has sent soldiers to
Afghanistan, but with the proviso that they not be stationed where
they might be shot at. Most European states only play soldier,
hoping to do enough to maintain Washington’s security guarantee
through NATO. Countries like Estonia and Albania conspicuously
preen after sending two or three score soldiers to Iraq.
Moreover, a united Europe could end up being a counterweight
against America as well. Although U.S. and European interests
normally mesh, if not fully coincide, geopolitical differences are
real and might increase. A consolidated Europe is likely to be more
susceptible to the machinations of unaccountable interests,
lobbies, and bureaucracies. Moreover, a continental foreign policy
will make it more difficult for Washington to work with individual
European states, “new” or “old,” with which it has warmer
relations.
As for economics, the EU has broken down internal trade barriers
but now is beginning to create a monster regulatory state. U.S.
firms, such as Microsoft, have ended up in Europe’s legal
crosshairs. Last month the EU approved new rules, long opposed by
Washington and U.S. firms, to essentially force chemical companies
to prove their products are safe. Proving a negative is
extraordinarily difficult and the cost of implementation over the
coming decade is likely to be in the billions of dollars; some
firms might have to abandon the European market. The EU’s
regulatory reach might soon extend to American businessmen and
tourists traveling to Europe, under a new set of security
regulations being considered in Brussels.
To some degree Washington has only itself to blame. For years
the U.S. government has claimed the right to regulate everyone
everywhere — expanding Cuban sanctions to the European
subsidiaries of American firms, for instance.
Reciprocal extraterritorial regulation has now arrived for
Americans. Still, whatever Washington thinks of the prospect of a
consolidated Europe, there isn’t much it can do about it. And
Ireland would seem to have saved America the trouble of worrying
about the issue.
EXCEPT THAT THE EUROCRATS aren’t finished. They believe in a
variation of the Brezhnev doctrine: a yes is forever, but a no is
only temporary. The basic tactic was suggested by the Belgian
newspaper Le Soir: “The idea is to completely isolate
Ireland.” For this reason the eight countries that have not yet
ratified the Lisbon Treaty have been urged to carry on. Obviously,
26 to 1 allows a tougher squeeze than 18 to 9.
This tactic might not work — both the German and Polish
presidents are currently withholding their signatures from the
treaty for different reasons — but even if the other 26 say yes,
then what? The simplest proposal is for a revote — a tactic used
in 2002 after Ireland first rejected the Nice Treaty, which further
centralized power in Brussels while making a number of technocratic
changes to the EU’s governing structure. But even tossing in a few
opt-outs and other goodies might not win over the Irish people this
time.
Of course, European consolidators dismiss the Lisbon Treaty’s
critics as a bunch of know-nothings, and complain that the Irish
didn’t read the document. Undoubtedly so, but few of those who
voted yes likely did so either. Even Irish Prime Minster Brian
Cowen, a treaty backer, admitted that he had not read it.
And many Irish who opposed the accord cited serious concerns
over preserving economic freedom, maintaining government
accountability and transparency, and preserving Ireland’s national
identity and international neutrality.
Understandably, Prime Minister Cowen worries that failure in a
second referendum would mean the fall of his government, and so far
has rejected the idea of forcing another vote.
Other proposals include creating a two-tier structure for
Europe. But Britain and other countries oppose that idea, which
seems unworkable: How can the EU have a united foreign and defense
policy, except for one member? How can unanimity be abandoned,
except for the Irish? Such a system would be complex even for the
byzantine governing structure of the EU.
A few Eurocrats advocate tossing the Irish out of the EU. But
what other nation wants to establish that precedent? Even more
fundamental is the question of Europe’s commitment to the rule of
law. Democratic republics work only if the losers respect the
results and do not attempt to manipulate the system for their own
purposes. A continental government in which a few thousand elites
are able to ruthlessly override the wishes of a majority of a half
billion people raises questions about the moral and philosophical
character of the EU. It wouldn’t be Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia,
obviously, but it also would not be a genuinely liberal democratic
order either.
Ultimately, it’s up to the Europeans to decide on their
governing institutions. And we all only see through a glass darkly
into the future. But Ireland’s no vote has given the rest of the
continent an opportunity to stop and reflect. The people of Europe
should ponder well the pitfalls of EU consolidation, a one-way path
away from Europe’s great liberal heritage.
