By George H. Wittman on 6.10.08 @ 12:08AM
It's always part of the game, no matter what the politicians say.
The discussion/argument over whether talking to a hated foreign
opponent is appeasement or smart diplomacy is one of those false
issues that politicians utilize for their own interests and foreign
affairs professionals rarely entertain.
Some level of contact is always a part of the foreign policy
context no matter the existing antagonism. Sometimes it is done
through intermediaries. Representatives of third countries are
regularly the formal conduit between the principals handling
ongoing business and governmental administrative matters.
The Swiss Embassy has acted in this role up to now in American
diplomatic contacts in Tehran, though there has been some recent
grumbling from Washington on how well the job was being done. At
the same time the U.S. has had various Gulf States and even
Pakistan, among others, as informal routes of contact.
Perhaps Washington's most useful behind the scenes third country
contact with Iran surprisingly has been through members of the
Shia-dominant government of Iraq. Whatever the method of
intermediary communication, this confidential third party
methodology provides a continuing exchange -- sometimes merely
procedural, but sometimes substantive.
Rounding out these multiple devices of continuing contact
between antagonists are the various covert operations that put
individuals in a position to gain information from and pass
information on to the parties who supposedly refuse to talk to each
other. These non-official clandestine messengers often provide a
useful service in introducing new ideas -- positive and negative --
into the non-relationship.
With this proliferation of extra-curricular devices to create an
exchange of views, it rarely can be said that two countries really
have no means to communicate. The Delegates' Lounge at the United
Nations is always abuzz with the latest in rumor, innuendo, and
sometimes, but not often, even a worthwhile new line of diplomatic
opening.
It is generally agreed that the summit meeting in most instances
should be restricted to the theatrical aspects of intergovernmental
accords. "Back channels" are used so that which would be deemed
publicly objectionable might be considered without external
pressures.
ALL THIS IS PERFECTLY well known by anyone with a modicum of
foreign affairs background. So why has such an issue been made of
the need to sit down and talk things out between adversarial heads
of government? The answer possibly lies both in political ignorance
and also personal predilections for high-level diplomacy. Some
world leaders (and those who aspire to that rank) appear to enjoy
the mano y mano contest with their opposite number. Ego
plays a large part in all of it.
From the standpoint of the career foreign service officer, the
last thing with which he or she wishes to deal is the insecurity of
what their national leader will agree to, or even imply agreement
to, in a one-on-one meeting with their opposite number.
The world of international politics is arcane, and domestic
politicians -- which most heads of government are -- just don't
have the background and knowledge required. There are some
exceptions, but they are rare. Ronald Reagan surprised many people
by being one of those exceptions that proved the rule.
Foreign leaders aren't any smarter than their American
counterparts. On the contrary, they often are far more parochial in
their experience and interests. National culture often dictates
much of the character of the various chief executives. Men like
Hugo Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are hardly sophisticates.
WHAT THESE MEN do have is a full comprehension of the utility of
political propaganda plus the use of deadly force in all its
ramifications. Both characteristics have been very important in
their careers. One cannot expect to be able to negotiate with
autocrats, dictators, and fanatics through the use of Aristotelian
logic.
The concept of sitting down with an adversarial foreign leader
and working out differences as one would a domestic business
negotiation is not merely inappropriate; it carries with it a
dangerous misconception that both sides seek a reasonable
solution.
Anything that can be conceived of as appeasement gives the
initiative to the other side. Being acquiescent, or even appearing
to be, neither works with the schoolyard bully nor with any of the
international versions. "Treading softly" does maintain the
appearance of peaceful intentions, but carrying the potential of
the "big stick" makes effective a reminder of the alternative. In
that respect today's world is no different than Teddy's.
topics:
Foreign Policy, Business, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan
