At first glance Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev is a very ordinary
man. He’s a little guy, only five foot four inches in height, of
oft times cherubic yet serious countenance. His detractors agree
that whatever his weaknesses, he is a hard worker. Most
importantly, however, he is completely trusted by Vladimir
Putin.
At age 25 in early 1991 he went to work full time for his former
law professor at Leningrad State University, Anatoly Sobchak, when
the latter was mayor of St. Petersburg. Putin, a fellow Leningrader
13 years older, had left the KGB’s First Chief Directorate and
joined the politically powerful Sobchak as his deputy.
Medvedev swiftly became the former intelligence officer’s
acolyte. The younger man found in Putin the perfect mentor and
Putin made the willing Medvedev into his loyal adjutant. It was an
arrangement that has lasted until today.
“The kid” is now 42, awaiting his next birthday in September.
Medvedev has grown into a role that only a man of his loyalty and
acumen could assume. Putin does not readily accept advice from
many, but he counts on the still youthful former business lawyer
and part-time law instructor to provide him the intellectual
sounding board that high office requires.
Dmitry Medvedev’s job has been to think, analyze and evaluate.
Putin knows how to use his aide. They come from the same school
literally and figuratively. Unlike his boss, Medvedev is not a
leader and that works perfectly for the dynamic Vladimir Putin.
This does not mean Medvedev lacks ambition. He just hides it
very well. His mild manner can be, and has been, mistaken for a
lack of cunning and toughness. This has been an error that not only
has been to his advantage when dealing with the highly competitive
group of former security and intelligence officers surrounding
Vladimir Putin, but also of advantage to Putin himself.
There is great value in having a trusted aide who is not viewed
as a competitor by the power elements pushing and shoving around
the big man. That is one of the major factors in Medvedev’s arrival
as Putin’s choice to succeed in the cleverly arranged
pseudo-presidency of Russia for the next four years.
The process actually had begun in 2005 when Medvedev became
first deputy prime minister in charge of the ambiguously named
“national projects.” This position, as well as appointment as
chairman of Gazprom, placed Medvedev as overseer of the nation’s
politically important major investment projects, in consequence
giving him international exposure. It also balanced the aspirations
of Sergei Ivanov, the hard charging defense minister, and the more
hard line factions.
It is already clear that Medvedev’s presidency, formally
beginning May 7, will lack the political power that the Russian
constitution authorizes and implies. Even as prime minister Putin
remains in practical terms the effective power center. He has said
as much. In fact, President Dmitry Medvedev will give up his role
as chairman of Gazprom in line with current legislation. It is
possible that Putin will take over that internationally influential
position as well.
THE QUESTION REASONABLY COULD be asked why, under the
circumstances, Medvedev would be willing to accept what appears to
be a figurehead job when he currently operates in a far more
powerful position. The answer of course is that Vladimir Putin
needs him to do so.
Putin sees the new president as assisting in continuing his
balancing act between both liberal and conservative wings of the
Russian leadership. Medvedev also can be of particular value in
dealing with a new Washington administration and the European Union
as a pragmatic and non-ideological Russian head of state.
The suggestion has been made that Dmitry Medvedev presents an
image of thoughtful openness, which will allow Vladimir Putin to
play his “tough guy” card whenever convenient. The good cop, bad
cop routine has been a staple Moscow tactic going back to Soviet
days.
The quiet young lawyer from St. Petersburg has risen swiftly
from his Kremlin post as deputy chief of staff to Putin late in
1999 to president of Russia in 2008. Will he simply hold down the
presidency long enough for Vladimir Putin to return for another
eight years in 2012? Or will the temptation to utilize the power
that exists intrinsically in that post lure Medvedev into
exercising the strength the title gives him? Will Dmitry
Anatolyevich ever tire of being the good soldier?
