“American success or failure in Iraq may well depend on
whether the Iraqis (as the people are called) like American
soldiers or not. It may not be quite that simple. But then again it
could.” — from a “pocket guide” prepared by the Special Service
Division of the Army Service Forces, U.S. Army, 1943
Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, Commanding General, III Corps,
has come home after another tour of Iraq. By some estimates his
time in theatre exceeds that of any World War II general which, in
and of itself, is indicative of the challenges over there.
This homecoming brings with it much praise for his leadership in
implementing the counterinsurgency doctrines developed by General
David H. Petraeus and set out in the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual. The
implementation of these ideas, along with the surge of additional
boots on the ground, proved to be more successful in reducing
violence and casualties than many of us had imagined given the
carnage and chaos then extant.
“It is not unfair to say that in 2003 most Army officers knew
more about the U.S.Civil War than they did about
counterinsurgency,” claims Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, a
veteran of both Iraq wars and author of the highly praised Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife:
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (2005).
Nagl was a member of the writing team of the new Manual
for which he wrote the Forward for the University of Chicago Press
edition.
Generals David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno, along with the
inimitable Col. H.R. McMaster, author of the Vietnam
classic Dereliction of Duty, have worked hard to overcome
the loss of institutional memory of irregular or counterinsurgency
warfare which may have been misplaced during the great Cold War
stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union.
General Odierno’s accomplishments have even caused at least two
analysts to christen him “The Patton of Counterinsurgency,”
an explicit reference to the late, “hard-charging” General’s
relationship to the “diplomatic” Eisenhower.
What is interesting, even compelling, about General Odierno’s
triumphant return is that it may signify a very real turnaround
from his prior reputation as a commander who acted contrary to the
tenets of counterinsurgency doctrine. The Washington
Post’s headline for a recent story on Odierno reads, “Evolution Of a U.S.
General In Iraq. No. 2 Commander Transformed Tactics.”
That tall man in the flowing robe you are going to
see soon, with the whiskers and the long hair, is a first-class
fighting man, highly skilled in guerilla warfare. Few fighters in
any country, in fact, excel him in that kind of war. If he is your
friend, he can be a staunch and valuable ally. If he should happen
to be your enemy — look out!
In Thomas E. Ricks’s in-depth, disturbing book,
Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in
Iraq (2006), he chronicles the runup to the Iraq war in
2003 and the rise of the horrendous insurgency with which we are
still contending.
Ricks, who has covered military affairs for the Wall Street
Journal and, most recently, the Washington Post,
recounts the military’s failure to anticipate and, then, its
failure to recognize the very fact of an insurgency itself.
Throughout these early days of blood and chaos, Ricks portrays
Marine Corps commanders, Petraeus, and McMaster as the very few
military leaders who understood the challenge and the necessity of
utilizing sound counterinsurgency tactics to secure the population
and win them over to the new dispensation.
Ricks casts Odierno and the 4th Infantry Division, which he
commanded at that time, as the villains of the piece
notwithstanding their successful capture of Saddam Hussein. He
cites many authorities, both named and anonymous, who argue that
the 4th ID’s strong-arm tactics, including mass arrests,
intimidation of civilians, and the like, alienated the local
population and thereby intensified the insurgency.
“The American offensive was undone by a combination of
overwhelmed soldiers and indiscriminate generals — especially the
4th ID’s Odierno, who sent too many detainees south, and his
immediate superior, [Lt. Gen. Ricardo] Sanchez, who should have
seen this and stopped it,” argues Ricks.
Discuss something else — NEVER religion, politics
or women — with Moslems. Avoid offering opinions on internal
politics.
Whether or not Ricks’s account is accurate, General Odierno, now in
sync with General Petraeus, appears to have achieved tactical
success in overcoming a multi-faceted counterinsurgency in Iraq at
least for now. I say “multi-faceted” because this week, in an
address to the Heritage Foundation in Washington, he characterized
the American effort in Mesopotamia as being “counterinsurgency
plus” given the unusual political, social and sectarian complexity
that confronts Coalition forces.
In his speech Odierno described the “change in mindset” that
began, even before the implementation of the surge, and allowed the
military to “break the cycle of violence” and focus on “protecting
the population,” which he views as the “key principle.” He noted
how the additional troops have allowed for multiple operations and
continual disruption of the insurgents. He described the Awakening
or “Sons of Iraq” movement as “an unqualified success” that results
in a ten-fold increase in market activity in any given locale where
it as been implemented.
Clearly, he views the establishment of Joint Security Stations
and outposts in Baghdad and elsewhere as critical in giving the
local population a sense of security and generating trust of the
American forces.
Above all, use common sense on all occasions. And
remember that every American soldier is an unofficial ambassador of
good will/
Nevertheless, the General believes that the “window of opportunity”
for political progress will not remain open forever. He is hopeful
that recent efforts on de-Baathification and amnesty will aid
reconciliation. He believes that, over time, Americans will be
doing less fighting and more economic development and job creation
(worrying more about the “environment” than the “enemy”).
He recognizes that substantial numbers of Americans will be over
there for 9-10 years absent a change in political direction. Yet,
he acknowledged that the long-run sustainability of the Army is a
big concern of his.
General Odierno, a huge, bald bear of a man, was asked about a
possible Democratic president who might want to draw down American
forces in Iraq. The General responded that he would hope that a
complete military and policy assessment would be completed before
any final decisions were made. He was not asked and did not raise
the issue of the trade-offs with the war in Afghanistan.
General Odierno is living proof that the U.S. Army is an
institution that is capable of effective adaptation to reality, no
matter how painful that process may be. At a tactical level at
least, that institution has proven itself to be the exemplar of
resilience. It remains to be seen if its tactical success will
yield strategic success amidst the trying circumstances of
Iraq.
