By George H. Wittman on 2.26.08 @ 12:07AM
As President Musharraf knows, civilian government in his country always gives way to military rule.
Pakistan has held its parliamentary elections and the creation
of a new government is awaited. All this has the appearance of
democracy in action, but there is little chance civilian rule will
not be replaced by the military sometime in the future.
In the last fifty years there have been 33 years of military
rule interrupted every now and then with civilian governments. Each
time there has been a military takeover there have been
justifications based on rampant civilian corruption and national
insecurity. The civilian governments eventually would return to
power, elections held, and soon the process of power grabs and
corruption charges would begin again.
There is a tendency to view elections in a country as an
indication of the presence of democracy. In the case of Pakistan
this seeming democratic process is more a cover for the
continuation of a feudal power class system based on tribal and
eco/cultural allegiances, many of which have existed since before
independence.
The recently announced coalition of the Pakistan Peoples Party
and Pakistan Moslem League really becomes a partnership of the late
Benazir Bhutto's husband, Asif Zardari, and Nawaz Sharif,
respective heads of these parties. Short of a legislative majority
in both legislative houses necessary to impeach President
Musharraf, the way is open, however, for deals aimed at undoing
Musharraf's nine years of law making and judicial appointments.
Both Zadari and Shawaz have already been convicted of corruption
in the past and most likely are looking forward to having these
convictions overturned by a resumption of power by the deposed
Supreme Court chief justice, Iftikar Mohammad Chaudhary.
Apparently, though, Zadari is not so sure Chaudhary will come
through as desired. At the moment, the behind-the-scenes
negotiations and deal making are in full sway with intermediaries
for the supposedly incorruptible judge.
This is essentially how Pakistani civilian politics works. It is
expected that deals will be made no matter what the law is; that
monies will be made from public office and distributed among
loyalists; that privilege is provided to those families of
traditional status; and that patronage and graft are the
prerogative of those in power.
The all-volunteer military of Pakistan exists as a social and
political entity in itself. The army is recruited mostly from the
northern portion of Punjab Province and Northwest Frontier
Province. Punjabis constitute the principal cadre of the officer
corps. The personal friendships and loyalties built on this tribal
cohesion last lifetimes.
The raison d'etre of Pakistan's army, navy and air
force is to provide the nation with protection against the
perceived danger of an attack by India. The animosity toward and
fear of their giant neighbor has driven the strategic existence of
Pakistan's armed forces. It is this organizational fact, and the
lack of political will to alter it, that has inhibited Pakistan's
military ability to devote the appropriate resources to counter
Taliban operations and al Qaeda training in the mountainous tribal
areas bordering Afghanistan.
Another factor, of course, is the diminished working
relationship between elements of the Pakistan army and the mountain
tribes on both sides of the border with Afghanistan. Unfortunately,
this previously well-nurtured community of interest (so effective
during the 1980s struggle between the mujaheddin and the Soviets)
has not produced the same type of cooperation that American special
operations advisers have sought.
If Pakistan's civilian world operates on the feudal basis of
familial allegiances, the military world's arcane political/social
structure dictates through its regimental and training class
loyalties an equal, if not stronger, bond among its members.
Pervez Musharraf followed the unwritten rules of this tradition
last September when he named his former military secretary, Maj.
General Nadim Taj, head of the vastly powerful Inter Services
Intelligence agency (ISI). This key promotion preceded the
appointment of the former ISI chief, Lt. General Pervez Ashfaq
Kiyani, to take over Musharraf's own role as chief of army staff.
Both generals have since then moved up one rank, thus solidifying
their command status.
The impact of these shifts will not be felt immediately. But
whatever civilian leadership evolves from the recent elections
always will be aware of the immense elephant in Pakistan's
political room. Importantly, no matter the eventual position of
Pervez Musharraf, he already would have established the structure
for the future control of his country.
topics:
Law, Supreme Court, Military, Pakistan
