The American Spectator

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, himself has said he seeks a Muslim brotherhood under the slogan “the family that prays together, stays together.” He indicated that any attempt to create a divide between Shia and Sunni is a Zionist plot to promote dissension.

In negotiation between Egypt and Iran, it was noted that “we are Muslim brothers. It is the Copts who are the enemy of Islam.” In addition, sources noted that “religious dignity means solidarity.” As the Iranians have noted time and again, “the bomb creates equilibrium with Zionism,” the real enemy along with Israel’s American benefactors.

If U.S. influence in the Middle East recedes because of a withdrawal from Iraq or because of pubic impatience with troop deployment in the region, extremism will grow and the anticipated battle of religious faiths within Islam will be little more than a fantasy.

IT HAS BEEN argued in the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report and by the Democratic candidates on the presidential campaign trail that we should engage the Iranian leadership in direct negotiation, that “jaw jaw is better than war war.” So widespread is this belief that low level conversations with Iranian diplomats have been occurring for some time under the media radar.

The question, of course, is what can we say that European leaders haven’t already said. They have offered a variety of blandishments from planes to money without getting the slightest concession from the Iranians. Well, that isn’t entirely true since the Iranians have agreed to continue talking.

For many, that is a concession since they rely on the notion that process itself is the end rather than a means to an end. For the Iranians, negotiation is cover for the pursuit of its goals.

When the weapons are produced or near production, there will be nothing to talk about. At that point, we will beseech the Iranian leadership to act responsibly. But why should they? It is irresponsible behavior that has led to foreign policy rewards.

Negotiation offers another level of benefits for the Iranians. It conveys the impression at home that the regime cannot be toppled and it conveys the impression abroad that the regime is in place and regarded as legitimate by western powers.

Should the U.S. promote a full scale regime change strategy, which it is apparently unwilling to risk, the mullahs, in order to insure their tenure, might accelerate uranium enrichment or buy a bomb or two from North Korea as an insurance policy against a successful coup. This scenario also reinforces the rationale for negotiation.

In the end, if U.S. action is neutralized by its own intelligence estimates and the much ballyhooed sanctions do not work in forestalling Iranian development of the bomb, there is little to do but pray. The question at that point is whether one prays to God or Allah.