The American Spectator

At the recent Herzliya conference former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton said, “there is almost no chance that President Bush will approve a military strike against Iran before he leaves office.” If there was once a credible military option, it has been undermined by the National Intelligence Estimate, or I should say the interpretation given to it.

The foreign policy establishment, from State Department unnamed sources to many of those at the Council for Foreign Relations, has responded to the NIE report by arguing a military strike is unnecessary since Iran can be deterred. Yet an Iran with nuclear weapons the international community could not prevent would be emboldened to pursue a variety of goals in an already volatile part of the world.

We do know that a nuclear Iran would assert regional dominance. It is apparent, since the release of the NIE report, that Iran has vigorously pursued diplomatic overtures with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It could be assumed that what they discussed are nuclear guarantees Iran will provide if Egypt and Saudi Arabia do not attempt to develop their own nuclear weapons. In this scenario, the United States is a mere bystander.

A second order threat posed by Iran with nuclear weapons is that it offers terror surrogates, Hamas and Hezbollah, a license to destabilize existing regimes with a reduced fear of retaliation Iran can derive these benefits without producing a weapon. All it has to do is get close: enrich enough uranium to produce a bomb, maintain a warhead development program, and secure delivery capability.

IS THE U.S. INOCULATED against a grand bargain in which Iran’s regional dominance is acknowledged in return for non-deployment of nuclear weapons? It’s doubtful, and even without the actual bomb, Iran might secure this concession.

Cheering on the sidelines would be Russia and China eager to diminish United States’ influence in the Middle East and eager as well to either obtain oil for a growing economy as is the case with China or maintain high oil prices which benefit the relatively oil rich Russian economy.

Any way one looks at it, the U.S. would be bargaining from a position of weakness even if the mullahs were willing to bargain at all. After all, nuclear weapons represent an insurance policy for the survival of the regime and regional hegemony.

These weapons would also undermine the non-proliferation treaty and the role of the U.N. as an arbiter for stability, a role it has tended to exercise in the breach in any case. By thumbing its nose at the world, Iran can become a regional and arguably a world power capable of advancing its own agenda.

Rather than deter an enemy, which is the presumption behind evolving State Department logic, the administration will be deterred from actions. It is apparent in the five party talks with North Korea that the U.S. has very little leverage other than acting as a supplicant offering a carrot and yet another carrot to a rogue state with nuclear weapons.

IF IRAN CEASED its nuclear weapons program in 2003 as the NIE report asserts, it probably did not do so because of negotiation, another NIE assertion, but rather because of the American invasion of Iraq in that year. Guns often speak louder than words.

But counter force strategy used to deter Iran’s nuclear weapon only works when you know what the mullahs want or are unwilling to give up. At the moment, intelligence about Iranian motives and strategy is deficient and in the face of theological politics, possibly irrational.

There is the belief advocated by Martin Indyk and Fareed Zakaria, among others that a Sunni-Shia rift can be exploited for America’s advantage. This belief has the added merit, its adherents maintain, that it will bring largely Sunni nations such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt in alliance with Israel in order to thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions or deter the use of an Iranian bomb.

However, evidence on the ground suggests the triumph of experience over hope. The Saudis may be scared to death of Iran, but their diplomats would prefer appeasement to confrontation. The spread of Shiism may be limited, but Iran is relentless in spreading its faith and has achieved some success in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, despite the fact there is distrust of Persian leadership in the Arab world.

Hezbollah has been vigorous in spreading Shia notions through the free distribution of books and pamphlets in Lebanon and Syria with titles like the “Sayings of Khomeini.” It is also the case that converts to Shiism are often Alawites whose religious predilections are close to Shia beliefs. But the pamphlets do not only make the case for Shiism, they also reinforce anti-western sentiment.

Hezbollah controls the fate of stability in Lebanon and Iran’s support for Hezbollah is dependent on spreading the Shia faith. It is not at all surprising that ninety thousand Maronite Christians have left or been forced out of Lebanon in the last few years. If there is a residual Shia-Sunni rift in Lebanon it is likely to be political, not religious. In fact, the Iranian mullahs often say “it is not a Shia Crescent we seek, but a full moon.”